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FOREWORD 
An increased awareness of global economic interdependence and competition for 
diminishing stocks of resources, coupled with widening disparities in material welfare, 
has made future population growth a central issue in international affairs. Indeed Robert 
McNamara, former President of the World Bank, has ranked today's rapid population 
growth in Third World countries second only to nuclear proliferation in significance. 
Urban population growth rates in the Third World have been even more explosive. 
Roughly 1.8 billion people, 42 percent of the world's population, live in urban areas to-
day, and this total is growing by almost 3 percent per year. Even more dramatic are the 
growth rates of large cities in developing countries. Rates of 5-8 percent are not uncom-
mon, and the urban growth multipliers that they imply are truly awesome - a doubling 
time of8-15 years. 
Scholars and policy makers are divided on the issue of rapid urbanization and urban 
growth in the Third World. Some see these trends as effectively speeding up national pro-
cesses of socioeconomic development; others believe their impacts to be largely undesirable 
and argue that they should be slowed down. Yet many of the determinants and conse-
quences of urban and rural demoeconomic patterns of change are poorly understood, and 
there is an urgent need for improved methods for analyzing the fundamental issues and 
options that they bring about. 
During the past several years, the Human Settlements and Services Area of the 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis has focused much of its research on 
population growth, structural change, and settlement dynamics. The five papers in this 
collection, written by current or past scholars in the Area, are a representative sample of 
this research. Together with three papers by other authors (not included here), they form 
the proceedings of a symposium on urbanization in the Third World published by the 
journal Economic Development and Cultural Change. 
A list of related papers from the Human Settlements and Services Area appears at 
the end of this publication. 
ANDREI ROGERS 
Chairman 
Human Settlements and Services Area 
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Migration, Urbanization, and Third World 
Development: An Overview* 
Andrei Rogers 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
Jeffrey G. Williamson 
University of Wisconsin-Madison 
I. The Urban Explosion 
Recent urban population growth has been explosive. Roughly 1.8 billion 
people live in urban areas today, and this total is growing by just under 
3% per year. At the beginning of th.e last century the urban population 
of the world totaled only 25 million. The United Nations estimates that 
about 3.2 billion people, nearly twice the size of today's urban popu-
lation, will be living in urban areas by the year 2000-a multiple of 128 
in just 2 centuries .1 
Rapid rates of urban growth initially occurred among the nine-
teenth-century leaders in the industrial revolution. In less developed 
parts of the world these rates did not reach significant levels until 
recently, generally after World War II. Consequently, a relatively small 
fraction of Third World population, only about one-fourth, is urban. 
The corresponding fraction for the developed world is close to seven-
tenths. Because of their considerably larger share of the world's pop-
ulation, however, less developed countries today have as large an urban 
population as the developed countries: just under four-fifths of a billion 
people each. Yet , the LDC share is expected to increase substantially, 
reaching two-thirds by the end of the century and including some 264 
of the world's 414 million-plus cities. 
This urban transformation is occurring so fast that LDC institutions 
are having difficulty coping. Are the explosive urban growth rates in 
* In writing this paper, we have received helpful comments from Nathan Keyfitz , 
Piotr Korcelli , Warren Sanderson , and Leon Tabah . We are grateful to them all but 
absolve them of any errors remaining. 
1 UN, Patterns of Urban and Rural Population Growth (New York: United Nations 
Department of International Economic and Social Affairs , 1980). 
© 1982 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 
0013-0079/82/3003-0001$01.00 
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today's developing countries likely to continue for long? Are there 
"limits to urban growth"? If rapid urban growth is a transitory phase 
of Third World development, what then are probable future levels of 
urban resource , job, housing, and service demands? 
Demographers interpret today's accelerated rates of urban growth 
in the less developed countries as the direct consequence of a rise in 
rates of natural increase and of net urban in-migration. Their expla-
nations of temporal and spatial variations in these two rates have fol-
lowed conventional descriptive generalizations that appeal to historical 
regularities described as "transitions" or "revolutions." Population 
growth is attributable to the vital revolution, the process whereby so-
cieties with high birth and death rates move to a situation of low birth 
and death rates. Urbanization is attributed to the mobility revolution, 
the transformation experienced by societies with low migration rates 
as they advance to a condition of high migration rates. These two 
revolutions occur simultaneously and jointly constitute the demo-
graphic transition: the demographer's classic tale of population and 
development. 
In the demographer's story, urbanization evolves from a spatial 
interaction of the vital and mobility revolutions . It is characterized by 
distinct urban-rural differentials in fertility-mortality levels and patterns 
of decline , and by a massive net transfer of population from rural to 
urban areas through internal migration. Simple multiregional cohort-
survival models that reflect these characteristics indicate that urban 
growth is partly self-limiting. Urban growth rates tend to decline as 
urban proportions increase and as rural populations first stabilize and 
then decline. However, the time horizon for such limits is a long one. 
To illustrate such patterns of evolution, one may extend Coale's now-
classic analysis of fertility reduction to include rural-urban migration. 2 
Following the Coale style of analysis , one may examine the evo-
lution of a hypothetical population with the age composition and fer-
tility-mortality rates typical of Latin America. Coale's two alternative 
projections-(A) fertility unchanged and (B) fertility reduced-may be 
increased to four by introducing two assumptions regarding internal 
migration-(a) migration unchanged and (b) migration increased. A 
multiregional projection model then may be adopted to translate as-
sumptions about future trends in urban and rural mortality, fertility, 
and migration patterns into estimates of the future size, age compo-
sition, and spatial distribution of a population. This gives rise to four 
projections which in table 1 are labeled Aa, Ab, Ba , and Bb. 
2 A. J. Coale, "Population and Economic Development," in The Population Di-
lemma, ed. P. M. Hauser, 2d ed. (Englewood Cliffs , N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc. , 1969), pp . 
59-84. 
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Table I describes these four urbanization scenarios: 20% of the 
initial population is taken to be urban, and the initial birth and death 
rates are assumed to be lower in urban areas than in rural areas (40 
against 45 per 1,000 for the birth rate , and 11 against 15 per 1,000 for 
the death rate). Mortality and fertility are reduced as in the Coale 
projections, but the declines are assumed to take place 10 years sooner 
in urban areas (25 instead of 35 years for the decline in mortality, and 
20 instead of 30 years for the decline in fertility). Finally, the starting 
rates of out-migration are set equal to those prevailing in India in 1960: 
that is, a crude out-migration rate from urban areas of lO per 1,000 and 
TABLE I 
ALTERNATIVE PROJECTIONS OF URBAN AND RURAL POPULATION AND 
" LABOR FORCE" OVER A 50-YEAR PERIOD 
(Millions) 
INITIAL YEAR 20 YEARS LATER 50 YEARS LATER 
Popula- Labor Popula- Labor Popula- Labor 
TH E FOUR SCENARIOS ti on Force ti on Force ti on Force 
Aa Fertility and migration 
unchanged: 
Urban ..... . ..... . .. . .2 . I .5 .3 2.0 1.0 
Rural ..... .. .... . .... .8 .4 1.5 .7 4.7 2.3 
Total .. . ........... 1.0 .5 2.0 1.0 6.7 3.3 
Bb Fertility reduced , 
migration unchanged : 
Urban .... . . . . ... . . .. .2 . I .4 .3 1.0 .6 
Rural .. . . . . .. .. . . .... .8 .4 1.3 .7 2.3 1.4 
Total . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.0 .5 1.7 1.0 3.3 2.0 
Ab Fertility unchanged , 
migration increased : 
Urban . . .... . ........ .2 .I .7 .4 4.2 2.1 
Rural .. . .. ... . . . .. . . . .8 .4 1.3 .6 2.2 1.0 
Total . . . ...... . .... 1.0 .5 2.0 1.0 6.4 3.1 
Bb Fertility reduced, 
migration increased: 
Urban . ... ........ . .. .2 .I .6 .4 2.0 1.3 
Rural .. . .. . .. .... . ... .8 .4 I.I .6 I. I .7 
Total ... . . . ... . .... 1.0 .5 1.7 1.0 3.1 2.0 
SouRCE.-A. Rogers, " Migration, Urbanization , Resources and Development," in 
Alternatives for Growth : The Engineering and Economics of Natural Resources Devel-
opment, ed . H.J. McMains and L. Wilcox (Cambridge , Mass .: Ballinger Publishing Co., 
1978) , pp. 176--77. 
NoTE .-The " labor force" is simply the population of working age-15 through 64. 
The initial rates are discussed in the text. 
Future paths of these rates are: Mortality-decline over 25 years (urban) and 35 
years (rural) to a level with an expectation of life at birth of 70 years ; unchanged there-
after ; Fertility-in Ba and Bb a reduction of 50% over 20 years (urban) and 30 years 
(rural); unchanged thereafter; Migration-in Ab and Bb an increase of 500% over 50 
years . 
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a corresponding rate from rural areas of 7 per 1,000. 3 The age-specific 
rates of out-migration from urban areas are held fixed in all four pro-
jections, as are the corresponding rates from rural areas in the two a 
projections. Out-migration rates from rural areas, however, are as-
sumed to increase sixfold over a period of 50 years in the two b pro-
jections. 
The four scenarios point out the apparently inescapable conclusion 
that most of today's less developed countries will enter the twenty-first 
century as predominantly rural societies. Even with rising rural out-
migration rates, it seems very probable that rural populations will triple 
before beginning to decline. In consequence the growth rates of their 
future demands for sustenance, employment, and services are likely 
to be unprecedented. 
The two scenarios with "unchanged fertility" exhibit natural in-
crease rates that begin at 3% per annum and then increase gradually 
as mortality declines. The initial national population of 1.0 million is 
projected to be 6. 7 and 6.4 million, respectively, by the end of 50 years. 
The somewhat lower total in the Ab scenario (fertility unchanged, mi-
gration increased) is the combined consequence of higher assumed 
rural-to-urban migration rates and of the assumption that rates of nat-
ural increase are lower in urban than in rural areas. Yet the differences 
are not great, implying that the reduction in national population size 
attributable to urbanization is minimal. The reduction in growth rates 
in the two scenarios is also trivial: from 3.99% to 3.74% per annum 
after 50 years. The reduction is even smaller in the two scenarios with 
reduced fertility. In short, urbanization is unlikely to offer a significant 
reduction in Third World population growth rates. 
The scenarios with "increased migration" raise sharply the end-
period level of urbanization. The impact of rising migration on the 
spatial distribution of population in labor force ages is dramatic: the 
end-period fraction accounted for by the urban population in the un-
changed fertility regimes rises from one-third in case Aa to two-thirds 
in case Ab. The "fertility reduced" scenarios show a similar increase 
in urbanization between case Ba and Bb. Clearly, migration matters to 
future urbanization experience. In the words of Johnston and Clark, 
the "investment and other requirements that would be required even 
to permit the 13-fold increase of urban employment of .. . . Scenario 
[Bb] are staggering."4 
3 A. Bose , Studies in India 's Urbanization 1901-1971 (Bombay: McGraw-Hill Book 
Co., 1973). 
4 B. F. Johnston and W. C. Clark, "Food, Health, and Population: Policy Analysis 
and Development Priorities in Low Income Countries," Working Paper WP-79-92 (Lax-
enburg, Austria: International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 1979). 
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The scenarios summarized in table 1 also suggest that rates of 
urban growth above 4% per annum are transitory. Even in the increased 
migration projections, urban growth rates in excess of 4% occur only 
in the short run during early phases of urbanization. This sudden spurt 
of urban growth declines over the medium term, and ultimately levels 
off at a growth rate below that generated by the fixed migration regime. 
Increased migration into cities reduces the size of rural populations 
and hence their density with respect to rural resources such as agri-
cultural land. The projections show that the relative size of the rural 
population aged 15-64 is over 2.5 times larger under the "unchanged 
migration" projections than under the increased migration projections. 
Thus scenarios Ab and Bb create rapid urban growth and exacerbate 
human-settlement problems but at the same time reduce the density 
of rural populations with respect to land and other rural resources. 
Scenarios Aa and Ba, on the other hand, give urban areas more time 
to cope with growth but do so at the cost of increasing rural population 
densities. "Hyperurbanization" and "rural overpopulation," there-
fore, are two sides of the same fundamental policy question regarding 
development. 
These demographic projections indicate that the forces of demo-
graphic transition will reduce urban growth rates-through the braking 
influence of lower fertility among city populations-only in the very 
long run. Kelley and Williamson argue, however, that economic forces 
are likely to act much earlier. 5 Rising urban costs of various kinds 
should reduce rural-urban migration rates. Growing requirements for 
"unproductive" urban investment to augment public infrastructure, 
levels of service provision , and housing, will increasingly take priority 
over those investments that create capacity for future urban employ-
ment. This should also curtail urban growth. Assessments concerning 
timing and impacts, however, require a demographic-economic (de-
moeconomic) modeling perspective of the kind illustrated in this col-
lection of essays . And this, in turn, requires a marriage of the largely 
independent macroperspectives of demographers and economists . 
It is not surprising that the demographer, with roots in sociology 
and the actuarial sciences, relies principally on decomposition as a 
research method. Macrodemographic events are typically accounted 
for by shifting weights between groups which exhibit different demo-
graphic behavior. Demographic accounting tends, therefore, to stress 
between group variance and then focuses on the macro impact of shift-
ing group weights. The economist's perspective focuses instead on 
explanations of individual choice behavior. That is, the economist tends 
5 Allen C. Kelley and Jeffrey G. Williamson. "The Limits to Urban Growth: Some 
Suggestions for Macromodeling Third World Economies ," in this issue . 
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to explain macro events by accounting for changing behavior within 
groups, regions, and firms. 
Related to these two different perspectives are different styles of 
modeling: large versus small, and disequilibrium versus equilibrium. 
Those striving to offer prescriptions regarding complex systems will 
often adopt a relatively large and complex model. Others will frequently 
use a model only to illustrate a parable and, therefore, will often be 
content with a small, transparent model if it makes a point. Economists 
are likely to criticize the designer of large demoeconomic models as 
wanting to build in complexity where simplicity best exposes behavior. 
Demographers are likely to find this view extraordinarily naive, exhib-
iting a failure to appreciate between group variance and problems of 
aggregation. 
Finally, some analysts-demographers among them-tend to focus 
on quantities and see their limited availability as setting ceilings to 
society's growth. In this view, economies often seem to be in dis-
equilibrium and headed for disaster if left uncontrolled. Economists 
tend to focus on prices and believe that substitution will push any 
economy back toward equilibrium since scarcity implies high cost, 
reduced use, and diminished shortage. 
The urban explosion in today's Third World is nothing less than 
the evolution of a society during its structural transformation from an 
agrarian to an industrial-service economy. In order to be effective, 
projects and programs designed to modify any single aspect of this 
evolution must take into account the broad system-wide interdepen-
dencies that characterize such processes. Recognizing this, the World 
Bank, the United Nations, and other international agencies have grad-
ually moved away from a particularistic focus on specific problems and 
projects toward a much broader concern with understanding the de-
velopmental process itself. The essays in this symposium seek to ad-
vance that understanding by combining the insights of demographers 
and economists studying the interdependent processes of migration, 
urbanization, and development. 
II. The Demographer's View of Urbanization: Migration Exogenous 
Is urbanization experience explained by migration, or by natural in-
crease? This question is at the heart of the papers by Andrei Rogers 
and Jacques Ledent, 6 but the answers clearly depend on one's definition 
of "urbanization experience." Urban growth refers to the expansion of 
the numbers living in urban settlements. Obviously, the rate of natural 
increase matters a great deal to this growth, although even here there 
6 Andrei Rogers, "Sources of Urban Population Growth and Urbanization, 195{}-2000: 
A Demographic Accounting"; and Jacques Ledent, "Rural-Urban Migration, Urban-
ization, and Economic Development," both in this issue. 
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is debate, as we shall see below. Urbanization refers to the proportion 
living in urban settlements, and here the role of natural increase is not 
so clear. 
Rogers presents data indicating that the fertility of urban women 
is lower than that of rural women virtually everywhere in the Third 
World . Furthermore , rural mortality exceeds urban mortality. While 
the differences between rates of natural increase are never very great, 
they do tend to be higher among rural populations in most of the Third 
World. Clearly, urbanization cannot be explained by natural increase 
differentials at all ; on the contrary, all of the measured urbanization in 
the Third World must be accounted for by in-migration to the cities . 
This inevitable conclusion justifies the attention that both demogra-
phers and economists have devoted to migration in the Third World. 
The demographer's view, tracing the link between urbanization 
and migration, is seen very clearly in Ledent's paper. Taking economic 
variables as exogenous, he explores the relation between rural-urban 
migration and development. Exploiting the evidence that rural-urban 
differences in natural increase are negligible, Ledent derives an expres-
sion that links the rate of net rural out-migration to the level of urban-
ization. 7 He then uses this expression to derive, for a number of coun-
tries, the evolution of the rural net out-migration rate that is consistent 
with the past and anticipated future evolution of the degree of urban-
ization. This allows him to contrast, for example, the expected future 
rural net out-migration rates of Mexico and India and to conclude that 
they are likely to decrease in the former country and increase in the 
latter. 
By estimating the relationship between urbanization and GNP per 
capita, Ledent is then able to project migration experience over time , 
given GNP per capita experience and given stability in the parameters 
linking GNP per capita and urbanization. A test of his estimated re-
lationship suggests a bell-shaped evolution of the rural net out-migra-
tion rate over the course of a nation's economic development. Stressing 
the experience of India, Egypt, Honduras, and Mexico to the year 2000 
and beyond , Ledent concludes that for most of the developing coun-
tries-those with a per capita GNP below 500 1964 U.S . dollars-the 
peak rates of rural out-migration are yet to come. 
What about urban growth? What portion of the spectacular rates 
of city growth in the Third World is to be explained by migration and 
what portion by natural increase? One school of demographic thought 
is led by Kingsley Davis and the United Nations, who argue, that, 
contrary to popular opinion, the rapid expansion of city populations 
7 See also N. Keyfitz , " Do Cities Grow by Natural Increase or by Migration?" 
Geographical Analysis 12, no. 2 (1978): 142-56. 
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in the Third World is primarily due to natural increase, rather than to 
rural-urban migration. 8 A second school of thought, led by Michael 
Todaro and others, argues that this view "fails to recognize that the 
age selectivity of migrants ... is such that the recorded high natural 
increase is, in fact, largely the direct result of the locational choice and 
high fertility of migrants . . . the unprecedented volume and rate of 
internal rural-urban migration is the principal factor." 9 Which view is 
correct? 
Rogers begins with a simple aggregative projection model focusing 
on India and the USSR for empirical motivation. The exercise is useful 
in illustrating the relative importance of migration and urban natural 
increase, especially since these two countries illustrate the contrasts 
raised by a recent United Nations study:'° in Europe, roughly two-
thirds of recent urban growth can be attributed to migration, while in 
the Third World the figure is only 40%. The difference appears to be 
due to the generally higher rates of urban natural increase in the Third 
World. Rogers replicates these results, as well as the so-called cross-
over point where a country switches from "migration-driven" to "ur-
ban-natural-increase-driven" urban growth and illustrates a demo-
graphic theorem for Third World urban growth: "the principal effect 
of migration is to determine the level of urbanization, whereas that of 
natural increase is to establish the urban growth rate." 11 Yet the ag-
gregate projection model fails to confront Todaro's view. Rather it 
simply estimates the proportion of current urban growth that would be 
eliminated if rates of either migration or natural increase were set at 
zero. As Todaro points out, urban in-migrants as a group are predom-
inantly of childbearing ages and the urban natural rate should reflect 
that fact. Rogers considers this thesis by applying a disaggregated pro-
jection model with age-specific rates. The results support Todaro since 
the introduction of age composition alters the projections in favor of 
migration as a contributor to urban growth. While searching for the 
explanation for this reversal of results, Rogers offers another demo-
graphic theorem: "although a sharp increase in the rate of rural-to-
urban migration temporarily raises the urban population growth rate, 
its ultimate effect is to urbanize the population more rapidly and thereby 
to depress the urban growth rate to a lower level than it would have 
reached in the absence of the increase." 
8 UN; and K. Davis, "The Urbanization of the Human Population," Scientific 
American 213, no. 3 (1965): 18. 
9 M. Todaro, "Urbanization in Developing Nations: Trends, Prospects, and Poli-
cies," Working Paper no. 50 (New York: Population Council, Center for Policy Studies, 
1979), p. 11. 
10 See n. I above. 
11 Rogers, all quotations are from the article in this issue. 
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Why do we care about the demographic sources of contemporary 
urban growth? Why does the debate over migration versus urban nat-
ural increase matter to policy? Rogers' s citation of the 1978 UN survey 
of national population policies offers at least one clear defense. The 
survey showed that Third World authorities felt that in-migration was 
indeed the principal contributor to urban population growth, and the 
vast majority of those responding to the UN inquiry expressed that 
belief that urban growth was too high and indicated that they had 
adopted policies to slow down and even to reverse this migration. 
Although the papers by Rogers and Ledent cast some doubt on this 
view, the controversy certainly justifies the efforts by economists to 
understand more about the determinants and consequences of migra-
tion. 
III. The Economist's View of Urbanization: Endogenous Migration in 
Partial Equilibrium 
An enormous body of empirical literature on migration behavior in the 
Third World accumulated during the 1960s. These studies attempted 
to explain migration in general, and rural-urban migration in particular, 
by the application of partial equilibrium, single-equation models . That 
is, wage, income, or earnings variables were taken as exogenous, and 
migration itself was rarely allowed to influence these or any other 
economic variable. Furthermore, the central issue in that stream of 
early migration research-led by the human-capital approach embodied 
in Sjaastad's classic contribution-was a test of economic rationality. 12 
Do Third World households respond to economic incentives in selecting 
employment locations? The answer has been a resounding yes, and 
this result is confirmed by the more sophisticated models presented in 
the contributions to this symposium by Gary Fields and T. Paul Schultz. 
Both papers deal with place-to-place lifetime migration in Latin 
America, Fields appealing to the 1973 Colombian Census and Schultz 
to the 1961 Venezuelan Census. Both studies confirm the economic 
model of migration. In Fields's words: " ... the results sustain the 
empirical validity of the economic model of migration .... These 
patterns are consistent with the view that past migration may have been 
caused by large rural-urban income differentials, just as the economic 
model of migration would predict." 13 Similar findings are offered by 
Schultz. Indeed, migration was surprisingly responsive to economic 
incentives in Venezuela in the early 1960s: "Average wage rates at 
destination are associated with migration within all four education 
12 L.A . Sjaastad , "The Costs and Returns to Human Migration," Journal of Political 
Economy 70, suppl. (October 1962): 80--93. 
13 Gary Fields, " Place-to-Place Migration in Colombia," in this issue. 
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groups; the elasticity of the migration rate with respect to destination 
wages ranges between 1.4 and 2.9." 14 
These two studies also reveal interesting differentials among de-
mographic groups. The average propensity to migrate rises with edu-
cation, but the marginal propensity to migrate also rises with education 
and, in the case of Venezuelan out-migration, is greatest where school 
enrollment is highest. 
In 1969, Michael Todaro raised an issue that influenced much of 
the research of the 1970s. If migrants were rational, how was it that 
(i) "wage gaps" between urban and rural areas persisted (and perhaps 
even widened) , and that (ii) migration to the city continued in the face 
of urban unemployment, where the latter was defined to include low-
productivity underemployment? To explain these apparent anomalies, 
Todaro offered a simple thesis: Migrants did not respond solely to 
actual earnings differentials between farm and city but rather to ex-
pected earnings differentials. Expected earnings were conditioned by 
migrants ' expectations of securing favored urban formal sector jobs. 
Debate ensued over the form of the expectations function as well as 
its empirical relevance , but the Todaro model quickly became a key 
premise in Third World models of urban labor markets. 15 
Although Todaro and subsequent analysts were dealing with mi-
gration in general equilibrium-a topic to be described below in Section 
IV-the underlying motive driving migration behavior in their models 
has become conventional wisdom in partial equilibrium analysis as 
well. 16 The Todaro adherents view urban unemployment as a market-
clearing price between sectors where urban wages are institutionally 
fixed. In this case rural-urban migration proceeds until urban unem-
ployment equates discounted expected earnings. The response of mi-
gration to unemployment is a crucial dimension in the Todaro model. 
Yet Fields finds little support for the importance of the employment 
rate on Colombian migration. Schultz's results, while consistent with 
Fields's, are even more revealing: "The essential feature of the Harris-
Todaro model . . . is that inflexibilities in wage rates across labor mar-
kets induce compensating variation in employment rates ... compen-
sating variation between wages and employment levels is not evident 
in Venezuela among male migrants with less than a secondary educa-
tion . For these less educated groups in the labor force the traditional 
14 T. Paul Schultz , " Lifetime Migration within Educational Strata in Venezuela: 
Estimates of a Logistic Model," in this issue. 
15 M. Todaro, "A Model of Labor Migration and Urban Unemployment in Less 
Developed Countries ," American Economic Review 60 (March 1969): 138-48. 
16 See, e .g., J . R. Harris and M. Todaro, " Migration, Unemployment and Devel-
opment: A Two-Sector Analysis ," American Economic Review 60 (March 1970): 126-42; 
and W. Corden and R. Findlay, "Urban Unemployment , Intersectoral Capital Mobility 
and Development Policy," Economica 42 (1975) : 59-78. 
- - -----~-
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wage gap appears to be the predominant determinant of urban labor 
force growth and interregional migration ." This is not true of the more 
educated in Venezuela: " ... for men with some secondary or higher 
education the elasticity of migration with respect to employment is 
greater than that with respect to wages. For these better-educated men 
the Harris-Todaro (1970) framework may be applicable." 17 Obviously, 
unemployment among better-educated Venezuelan migrants may rep-
resent idle resources or simply job-search costs incurred by young 
inexperienced workers . To inform policy properly, we must discrimi-
nate between these two interpretations in future research . But both 
Schultz and Fields suggest that there is no Latin American trade-off 
on migration between unemployment and wage rates among the less 
educated. 
Another premise of the new conventional wisdom has been that 
the in-migrant accepts informal service sector employment (or, indeed, 
unemployment) at a wage below that prevailing in the rural area so that 
he may remain in the labor queue, hopeful for employment in the formal 
high-wage sector. Accumulating "revisionist" research has cast much 
doubt on this premise. For example, Fishlow's work on Brazil and 
Bellante's work on the American South suggests that observed nominal 
wage gaps are in large part a reflection of skill, age, sex, and occu-
pational differentials, rather than regional wage gaps per se. 18 Fur-
thermore, Yap has shown that recent in-migrants to Brazilian cities did 
not have lower income than they would have received in the rural areas 
they vacated; they did not appear in informal sector employment with 
much greater frequency; and furthermore, they improved their relative 
income position very quickly after arriving in the city. 19 Even more 
recently, Mohan has shown for Bogota that underemployment is not 
extensive and in any case not specific to recent in-migrants, that mi-
grants are not poorer, and that the so-called informal sector is extremely 
hard to distinguish from alternative employment in the city. 20 The To-
daro-generated conventional wisdom simply does not hold up to em-
pirical scrutiny. 
The papers by Fields and Schultz advance our understanding of 
the determinants of urban in-migration in the Third World, but they 
17 Schultz, in this issue. 
18 A. Fishlow, "Brazilian Size Distribution of Income ," American Economic Review 
62 (May 1972): 391-402; and D. Bellante , " The North-South Differential and the Mi-
gration of Heterogenous Labor," American Economic Review 69 (March 1979): 166-75. 
19 L. Yap , " Internal Migration and Economic Development in Brazil ," Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 90 (February 1976): 119-37 ; " Rural-Urban Migration and Urban 
Underemployment in Brazil," Journal of Development Economics 3, no. 3 (1976): 227-43 ; 
and "The Attraction of the Cities : A Review of the Migration Literature," Journal of 
Development Economics 4, no. 4 (1977): 239-M. 
20 R. Mohan, ' 'The People of Bogota: Who They Are , What They Earn , Where They 
Live ," World Bank Staff Working Paper no. 390 (Washington, D.C. : World Bank, May 
1980). 
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leave unanswered some questions that might well be central to future 
urban policy. Rarely do empirical studies of migration take adequate 
account of cost-of-living differentials. When they do, the cost-of-living 
indices almost always exclude rents, which are difficult to measure, 
especially in squatter housing. The exclusion is troublesome since rents 
rise with density and crowding, and thus cities, especially large ones, 
tend to have high rents. Furthermore, as the cities grow, rents usually 
climb at a steep rate. Nominal wage differentials obviously overstate 
the advantage of city life. When cost-of-living differentials are included, 
much of the nominal gap disappears. 21 In addition, nowhere in these 
studies is serious attention given to urban disamenities, an issue that 
has been examined lately both for developed economies as well as for 
important historical cases like the British industrial revolution. 22 But 
little work has been done on Third World societies along these lines, 
which is certainly surprising given the general concern with the quality 
of life among the Third World urban poor. As Section IV indicates, such 
evidence is very important to modeling the potential limits to urban 
growth and thus to informing policy. 
A number of labor market studies of Third World economies have 
indicated that urban unemployment is more a consequence of seg-
mented urban labor markets than of deficient aggregate urban demand 
or technological rigidities. If correct, these studies would suggest that 
urban jobs may not be as scarce as the conventional wisdom implies. 
These studies would also suggest that the problem is limited intraurban 
occupational migration, especially between urban employments re-
quiring different levels of skills. This view argues for a shift in focus 
from the determinants of "aggregate pull" in urban areas to (i) the 
composition of that urban pull across employment of various types and 
to (ii) the rural determinants of migration. 
The Third World rural exodus is thought to be "pushed" by grow-
ing population pressures in relatively stagnant agrarian regions. Cer-
tainly Schultz's findings on Venezuelan data confirm the importance 
of this Malthusian push, although population growth appears to have 
21 See Fishlow, cited above . and the recent work on Peru by V. Thomas, "The 
Measurement of Spatial Differences in Poverty: The Case of Peru ," World Bank Staff 
Working Paper no. 273 (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, January 1978). 
22 For the more contemporary applications , see the following : W. N ordhaus and J. 
Tobin, "Is Growth Obsolete?" in Economic Growth , General Series , no. 96, vol. 5 (New 
York: Columbia University Press , for the National Bureau of Economic Research , 1972) ; 
I. Hoch, "Climate, Wages, and the Quality of Life," in Public Economics and the Quality 
of Life , ed. L. Wingo and A. Evans (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press , 1977); 
and S. Rosen , "Wage-based Indexes of Urban Quality of Life," in Current Issues in 
Urban Economics, ed . P. Mieszkowski and M. Straszheim (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1979). For an application in economic history, see J. G. Williamson , 
"Urban Disamenities, Dark Satanic Mills and the British Standard of Living Debate," 
Journal of Economic History 41 (March 1981): 75-84. 
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a more potent impact on destination choice. A key issue in the urban-
ization literature is whether rural modernization can stem the agrarian 
Malthusian tide. Obviously, the answer depends critically on whether 
the rural modernization effort is labor saving; whether it is small-farm 
oriented; and whether on balance it raises the potential income of 
landless labor and subsistence peasant households. 
IV. The Economist's View of Urbanization: Endogenous Migration in 
General Equilibrium 
If economic factors play a critical role in determining rural-urban mi-
gration, then urbanization and city growth are clearly determined by 
those same factors. It follows that urbanization and city growth cannot 
be analyzed without giving explicit attention to the interaction between 
rural and urban labor markets. Furthermore, those labor markets can-
not be fully understood without explicit modeling of labor supply and 
demand forces in both the sending and receiving regions. In short, 
urbanization and city growth can be understood only by embedding the 
process in a complete general equilibrium model. This conclusion has 
slowly emerged over the past decade or so as economists and demog-
raphers have become increasingly sophisticated in their study of the 
sources of urbanization. 
The economist usually views the urbanization problem from the 
perspective of comparative statics. Three simple comparative static 
views of the equilibrium level of urbanization are commonly put for-
ward. One invokes wage equalization and full employment; another 
assumes full employment but introduces "market segmentation"; a 
third combines market segmentation with underemployment. While 
each of these models is capable of telling a different tale, they have 
one point in common. They all ignore potential dynamics linking ur-
banization levels to growth performance, and growth performance to 
future urbanization experience. On the supply side of these labor mar-
kets, for example, there is no theory of demographic transition that 
links urbanization patterns to fertility and mortality trends. On the 
demand side, there is no theory of accumulation and technical change 
that links urbanization to shifts in the derived demand for labor. In 
short, none of these comparative static models offers an explanation 
of the sources of urbanization over time. We need dynamic models for 
that purpose. 
Dynamic demoeconomic models have already passed through two 
generations and now are entering a third . The first generation surely 
can be dated by the appearance of Coale and Hoover's classic work. 23 
23 A. J. Coale and E. M. Hoover, Population Growth and Economic Development 
in Low-Income Countries: A Case Study of India 's Prospects (Princeton , N .J .: Princeton 
University Press, 1958). 
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The second generation made an effort to formalize some of the issues 
raised there. Five second-generation demoeconomic models which 
have taken the effort seriously enough to simulate, among other things, 
urbanization experience, are: Tempo-II, Bachue, Simon, FAO, and 
KWC. 24 As Warren Sanderson has recently pointed out, these five 
hardly exhaust the list that has accumulated since 1970, but they are 
representative and perhaps the dominant contributions. 25 
What do these second-generation models have to say about mi-
gration, urbanization, and-city growth in the Third World? Since ur-
banization and city growth are endogenous in such models, each is 
capable of describing the time path of the urbanization experience. The 
KWC model, for example, was able to replicate urbanization levels 
over a cross section of countries as well as the urbanization histories 
of nine countries which could be documented from the 1860s onward. 
Having established the validity of the model, KWC then went on to 
explore the sources of that urbanization experience by posing coun-
terfactuals. That is, they isolated the impact of population growth, 
technical change, demand, saving, and other influences on urbaniza-
tion. 
The contribution by Allen Kelley and Jeffrey Williamson to the 
symposium appears to be part of a ''third generation'' of demoeconomic 
urbanization models. 26 The authors are motivated by a search for the 
limits of urban growth, not just those induced by policy but also those 
that may be the inevitable result of rapid development. What forces 
tend to inhibit the rate of urbanization in a developing economy 
undergoing structural change? No doubt there are many, but Kelley 
and Williamson stress two. 
Most models of Third World growth and urbanization have little 
to say about limits to urban growth since they fail to introduce ade-
quately potential sources of such limits into their frameworks. In par-
ticular, the authors argue that nowhere are competing, urban unpro-
ductive investment demands on the national saving pool considered. 
The label "unproductive" is taken directly from Coale and Hoover 
who stress population-sensitive investment needs and their negative 
influence on the rate of accumulation of directly "productive" capital 
stocks. Kelley and Williamson apply this notion to urban investment 
requirements in general, but they focus on housing requirements in 
particular, In their account, two urban housing sectors are considered-
24 A. C. Kelley, J. G. Williamson, and R. J. Cheetham, Dualistic Economic Devel-
opment: Theory and History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972). 
25 W. C. Sanderson, "Economic-Demographic Simulation Models: A Review of 
Their Usefulness for Policy Analysis ," Working Paper RR-80-14 (Laxenburg, Austria: 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis , 1980). 
26 See also I. Adelman and S. Robinson , Income Distribution Policy in Developing 
Countries: A Case Study of Korea (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1978). 
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informal squatter settlements (the major source of residential housing 
expansion in Third World cities), and conventional higher-cost housing. 
Rapid in-migration to the cities can have two effects, either of which 
may place natural limits to urban growth: first, urban rents may rise 
due to lags in housing construction; second, a rise in unproductive 
housing investment will tend to diminish the residual savings pool avail-
able for productive urban capital stock accumulation. The retardation 
in the rate of productive urban capacity creation clearly means fewer 
new jobs in the future, less attraction to the cities, and therefore slower 
future urban growth. 
In addition, Kelley and Williamson point out the importance of 
augmenting our models to include inelastic urban land supplies. In 
traditional approaches to Third World urbanization and economic 
growth, high and rising city rents-a critical component of a potential 
rural migrant's city budget-never play a role through cost-of-living 
differentials. Nor do increasing urban disamenities (and the declining 
quality of life associated with overurbanization) ever play a role in such 
models. As Kelley and Williamson argue: "Urban land constraints 
serve to raise (market or shadow price) rents, augment urban relative 
to rural living costs, and inhibit in-migration to the city. The importance 
of these urban land constraints on city rents can only be evaluated in 
a general equilibrium model which admits housing service activities 
and confronts issues of equilibrium land use." While any urban land-
use characterization should allow for a variety of city land-use require-
ments, Kelley and Williamson develop a simpler model that stresses 
land use for public social overhead, for residential squatter settlements, 
and for "luxury" housing sites. 
There is, of course, no way of knowing exactly how important 
these and other potential limits to urban growth in the Third World 
may be. But Kelley and Williamson propose a multisectoral general 
equilibrium model which can be validated on Third World evidence. 
If they are successful in replicating the economic development, urban-
ization, and city growth experience that have been typical of the Third 
World since the early 1960s, then they will be in a position to project 
the year 2000. Having done so, they will then be in the enviable position 
of decomposing the underlying sources of that urbanization experience, 
past, present, and future. They should also be able to trace through 
the influence of demographic transition, energy scarcity, technological 
slowdown, austerity in advanced economies, and sharp policy change. 
V. The Political Economy of "Overurbanization" 
Kelley and Williamson focus on the limits to urban growth by stressing 
high urban capital intensities, as well as public social overhead and 
population-sensitive private investment requirements in cities. Could 
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these investment requirements be diminished by more appropriate use 
of less capital-intensive technologies? One way to achieve such tech-
nologies, of course, is to pursue policies that retard the rate of urban-
ization . Another is to invoke the notion of "optimal city size" which, 
so it is alleged by some critics, implies eroding the bias that favors 
large cities and fostering instead the development of smaller cities and 
towns. Central to these issues are the costs of urbanization, and central 
to these costs is efficiency (and equity) in the supply of public goods. 
Many governments in developed and less developed countries be-
lieve that their largest cities are too big and seek policies that deflect 
growth to medium-sized centers. The sizes held to be optimal . vary 
from country to country, but the recommended totals often lie in the 
250,000-500,000 range. How are such numbers calculated? 
Most studies of optimal city size assume diseconomies of urban 
scale and seek to identify that population at which per capita public 
costs are minimized. But since such studies have been unable to mea-
sure public-sector outputs, it is difficult to match expenditures with the 
public services actually purchased. Moreover, the costs are money 
costs, not economic costs. Lacking a theoretical basis for measuring 
the latter gives rise to tough questions: Are expenditures on land costs 
or wealth transfers? Are public employees' salaries true costs, or are 
they partly transfer payments? Furthermore, since per capita output 
appears to increase with city size, it would seem more appropriate to 
maximize the difference between outputs (incomes) and inputs (costs) 
than merely to minimize costs. 27 And how are we to measure quality-
adjusted public sector outputs anyway? 
Although there is little hard evidence that large cities are too big, 
there may well be circumstances under which large additions to cur-
rently underserviced populations may be impossible to accommodate 
in the shortrun. A higher city growth rate means greater pressure on 
the quality of the local environment, less time for overcoming social, 
institutional, and political barriers, and the postponement of the res-
olution of existing problems created by past growth. A slower growth 
rate buys time to explore alternatives and to catch up with past needs. 
Urban populations that double in size every decade would strain the 
absorptive capacity of cities in most developed countries; in the less 
developed nations such doublings are frequent and occur in a setting 
of inadequate human , physical, and financial resources. 
27 W. Alonso , "Problems, Purposes , and Implicit Policies for a National Strategy 
of Urbanization," in Population. Distribution, and Policy. ed . S. M. Mazie (Washington, 
D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978) , pp. 635-47 ; and H. W. Richardson, " The Costs 
and Benefits of Alternative Dimensions and Perspectives ," in The Population Debate: 
Dimensions and Perspectives. Papers of the World Population Conference, Bucharest , 
1974 (New York : United Nations, 1978), 2:131-78. 
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Johannes Linn's contribution to this symposium responds to these 
issues-issues that became especially visible among academic econo-
mists after W. Arthur Lewis's Janeway Lectures in 1977. 28 As Lewis 
reminded us, "Urbanization is decisive because it is so expensive ." 29 
Why the concern over the costs of urbanization? Linn offers four rea-
sons: (1) urbanization places a high financial burden on urban govern-
ments-a financial problem made especially acute in the Third World 
due to imperfect capital markets there; (2) because of the high capital 
requirements of city building, and given the rapid growth of cities, 
some believe that today's Third World urbanization is responsible for 
growing international indebtedness; (3) the costs associated with 
congestion and pollution are thought to be higher in larger cities than 
in small, and higher in urban than in rural areas; and (4) there is the 
equity concern: rural areas should not subsidize urban areas. 
Based on Colombian data, it is true that public expenditures per 
capita are higher in larger cities and urban areas, a conclusion supported 
by Asian data as well.Jo What is not clear, however, is how many of 
these expenditure patterns can be explained by per capita income. 
Obviously, public expenditures are determined both by unit costs on 
the supply side and income plus price effects on the demand side. 
Linn's conclusion on these income effects is well worth repeating: 
"To the extent that urbanization costs are dependent on incomes, they 
are not avoidable by accelerated rural development or by favoring the 
development of smaller towns and cities." Unit costs aside, the user 
price charged may also be critical to urban demand for public services . 
Subsidized public services are common in the Third World, and they 
do tend to be higher in urban areas since there are more services 
provided there.Ji 
What about the unit costs of supplying public goods? The issue 
of scale economies in the provision of public goods is an old topic, and 
it underlies the optimal-city-size problem. Are unit costs higher in cities 
and especially higher in large cities? If so, then an argument could be 
made that the Third World is overurbanized. Linn summarizes the 
evidence on water supply, sewerage, electricity, solid-waste disposal, 
transportation, education, health, and other social-overhead services. 
He can find no evidence to support the view that cities are inefficient 
28 J. Linn, "The Costs of Urbanization in Developing Countries ," in this issue. All 
quotations are from this article. 
29 W. A. Lewis, "The Evolution of the International Economic Order," Discussion 
Paper no. 74 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University, Woodrow Wilson School, Re-
search Program in Development Studies , 1977) , p. 39. 
30 See J. Meerman, Public Expenditure in Malaysia: Who Benefits and Why (London: 
Oxford University Press , 1979); and M. Selowsky, Who Benefits from Government Ex-
penditures: A Case Srudy of Colombia (London: Oxford University Press, 1979). 
31 See Selowsky. 
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relative to rural areas or smaller towns. What about congestion, pol-
lution, and other urban disamenities? While we need much more re-
search on the question, Linn emphasizes that ''the main lesson to draw 
for purposes of policy is that controlling city size is rarely, if ever, the 
appropriate policy instrument to deal with ... congestion, pollution, 
public service subsidies .... The appropriate policy intervention should 
instead focus directly on the sources of the inefficiency, which would 
include the pricing of externalities through pollution and congestion 
charges and the pricing of urban services at cost rather than at sub-
sidized rates." 
What about the distributive impact of public expenditures in de-
veloping countries? Michael Lipton has been in the forefront of the 
critics alleging overurbanization. 32 For Lipton, an urban bias in public 
policy leads to excessive rates of urbanization and worsens the distri-
bution of income. Furthermore, Lipton feels that these effects have 
been large . While these allegations have provoked useful debate, they 
have not yet generated much hard fact. But even if we accept the 
allegations, what do they imply for urbanization policies? Linn sug-
gests: "To the extent that urban areas are subsidized by the public 
sector, one may indeed want to correct the balance . .. on equity 
grounds. But this corrective action should not involve policies geared 
primarily to slow down the urbanization process; rather, the subsidies 
provided to urban dwellers should be reduced or eliminated by appro-
priate changes in taxation, user charges, and public expenditures pol-
icies. Indirectly, these policies may also affect relative rural-urban pop-
ulation growth rates, but judging from the empirical evidence on the 
determinants of rural-urban migration in developing countries this im-
pact is not likely to be strong." 
Nathan Keyfitz would find this view naive. In the final contribution 
to this symposium, Keyfitz raises four big questions: Why does in-
equality in poor countries still persist? Why so great an expansion of 
government? Why such rapid urbanization? And why the neglect of 
agriculture in countries where many people are hungry? The answer, 
according to Keyfitz, lies in large part with the rise in urban-based, 
middle-class elites who reinforce and accelerate the urban bias. That 
is, once in power, urban elites are unlikely to pursue the corrective 
policies that erode their power. '' ... even in democracies the levers 
of power are in the hands of the middle class, which determines the 
policies that make the cities grow and the countryside wilt." 33 
32 M. Lipton, Why Poor People Stay Poor: Urban Bias in World Development (Cam-
bridge , Mass.: Harvard University Press , 1977). 
33 Nathan Keyfitz , "Development and the Elimination of Poverty," in this issue . All 
quotations are from this article. 
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While economists have stressed the urban-industrial bias for some 
time, and have dwelt at length on the menu of policies that tend to 
implement that bias, in Keyfitz's hands these policies come alive as a 
comprehensive political economy of overurbanization. 
Such are the policies that improve the lot of city people and so inciden-
tally increase city sizes. They help explain the perversity ofurbanization . 
. . . Those who have already attained such jobs and are in power may 
not be directly trying to expand their numbers, but it is hard for them 
to avoid doing so. For one thing the urban amenities that they introduce-
roads, local transport, and schools-are available in some degree to the 
poor. The elite cannot make the city better for themselves without ... 
making it better for the newcomers, and so encouraging further new-
comers .... The masses in the capital city are physically close enough 
to the government to communicate their wishes . . .. 
If true, it is obviously important to learn much more about the social 
mechanism that causes overurbanization through the urban bias. Yet, 
the quantitative importance of the urban bias has never been estimated 
nor have the sources of Third World urbanization been established. 
Perhaps the general equilibrium models of the type described by Kelley 
and Williamson will offer that accounting. Until then, overurbanization 
remains a force of unknown magnitude. 
VI. Demoeconomic Models as Tools for Urban Management 
As with rapid population growth in general, rapid urban growth in-
creases the difficulties of providing a population with the necessary 
sustenance, employment, services, and infrastructure . Income per cap-
ita growth adds to these demands and complicates urban problems. 
Growth in urban population and incomes strains health and educational 
budgets, complicates the reduction of unemployment levels, and ex-
acerbates problems connected with provision of adequate housing, 
food, energy supplies, transport, water, and sanitary facilities. The 
" demographic investment" needed just to maintain present standards 
in many rapidly urbanizing areas means a doubling or tripling of insti-
tutional plant within the next 25 years . The overwhelming challenge 
to urban planners and managers in LDC cities, therefore, is how to 
absorb large numbers of newcomers in an effective and equitable man-
ner. Demoeconomic simulation models have an important role to play 
in these planning efforts, since they can be used to trace out the likely 
consequences of alternative policies. 
It is not enough to examine the impact of aggregate population and 
income growth on urban resource demands, since changing age com-
position introduces an additional influence . Peak demands for education 
services , for example, occur largely between the ages of 5 and 20. 
Housing requirements, on the other hand, increase during the later 
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years of childbearing and hold steady until the ages of retirement. Jobs 
are in demand during the labor force participation ages of 15 to 65. 
Food requirements increase until the late teens, peaking at about age 
18; after a slight decline they then level off and remain constant. Health 
service demands are relatively high for infants and older adults. These 
age groups have the highest incidence of illness and require the most 
hospitalization. 
Finally, urban infrastructure and services are demanded not only 
by urban residents but also by industrial and commercial users. This 
is especially true of public utilities such as water supply, electricity, 
and sewerage. Thus industrialization generates its own increased de-
mands for urban infrastructure . 
Policymakers concerned with increasing the stock of urban infra-
structure may well be interested in the indirect effects that this in-
vestment might have on rural out-migration and on rural population 
growth. On the other hand, policymakers designing strategies for ag-
ricultural development may be equally concerned with their impact on 
the growth of the informal urban service sector. It is precisely in this 
connection that demoeconomic models make an important contribu-
tion. Their usefulness derives from their systems-wide character, an 
attribute that allows the policymaker to explore the indirect effects, on 
different economic sectors and regional populations, of one set of pol-
icies against another. Such models, therefore, further the process of 
informed policymaking. 
Sources of Urban Population Growth and 
Urbanization, 1950-2000: A Demographic 
Accounting* 
Andrei Rogers 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 
Cities in the less developed world are growing at historically unprec-
edented rates. Since 1975, for the first time in history, the majority of 
the global urban population is located in the less developed countries. 
The United Nations estimates that cities in the LDCs will have to cope 
with over a billion more people in the year 2000 than they have today. 
In 1950, 11 of the world's 15 largest cities were in the more developed 
countries. By 1975, this share declined to eight, and only three (Tokyo, 
Los Angeles, and New York) are expected to be members of this set 
at the turn of the century. About 264 of the world's 414 "million-plus 
cities" are expected to be in the LDCs by the year 2000. 1 
What has caused this phenomenal growth? The immediate de-
mographic sources are unprecedented rates of natural increase, large 
migratory flows from rural to urban areas, and the increasing reclas-
sification of previously rural localities to urban status. Urban growth 
rates are roughly double the growth rates of national populations in the 
developing world, and most estimates attribute at least half of this 
growth to natural increase. 
But the demographics of urban population growth and urbanization 
are only manifestations of more fundamental structural changes in na-
tional economies undergoing their transformation from agrarian to in-
dustrial societies. Thus the demographics cannot be logically separated 
from the associated economics. Nevertheless, considerable insights 
*I am grateful to Julie Davanzo, Nathan Keyfitz, Young Kim, Jacques Ledent, and 
Jeffrey Williamson for their helpful comments on an earlier draft, and to Walter Kogler 
and Dimiter Philipov for programming and carrying out the numerical calculations used 
in this paper. 
1 UN Population Division, Patterns of Urban and Rural Growth (New York: De-
partment of International Economic and Social Affairs , 1980). 
© 1982 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 
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regarding the evolution of urbanization trends can be gained by rather 
simple mechanical decompositions of current patterns of urban growth 
and distribution. Such decompositions will serve as the frame of ref-
erence for the examination of the sources of urban population growth 
and urbanization set out in this paper. 
This paper begins with a brief presentation of new UN estimates 
of urban population growth and urbanization since 1950, with projec-
tions to the year 2000. This review is followed by an examination of 
the contributions of natural increase and rural-to-urban migration to 
urban population growth and urbanization for a number of nations with 
adequate data for making such estimates. Variants of a simple demo-
graphic projection model are then used to analyze the demographic 
sources of urban population growth rates and urbanization levels. 
I. Global Patterns of Urban Population Growth and Urbanization 
Global comparisons of urban and rural population growth are beset by 
problems of data and definition. Unlike studies of mortality and fertility, 
for which vital registration systems provide a continuous supply of 
data, studies of urbanization generally must rely on information sup-
plied by widely spaced population censuses. Moreover, the definition 
of urban localities varies from nation to nation and over time. 
All settlements that are not rural are urban, and traditionally, rural 
residence has been associated with a predominantly agricultural local 
economy. More commonly, however, urban settlements are distin-
guished from rural ones on the basis of their number of inhabitants. In 
many countries the threshold defining urban localities lies between 
2,000 and 5,000 inhabitants; in others, density and administrative des-
ignations play a central role. 
In this paper we present urbanization data published by the United 
Nations, which continues its practice of developing estimates based on 
national designations of urban areas instead of imposing a uniform set 
of criteria. 2 Table 1 sets out the estimated and projected urban and rural 
populations for the world by more developed and less developed re-
gions, and by major geographic regions. 3 It shows that although world 
population growth is still a dramatic phenomenon-with nearly 200,000 
individuals added each day to its total-the growth rate apparently has 
peaked and is decelerating. The UN projections show a decline in the 
annual growth rate from 2.3% to 2.0% per year between the years 1970 
and 2000 in the LDCs and from 1.0% to .6% in the MDCs, giving an 
aggregated decline from 1.9% to 1.7%. 
About 90% of expected world population growth by the end of this 
2 Ibid . 
3 Any regions other than North America , Europe , Japan, Australia, New Zealand , 
and the USSR are defined to be less developed regions. 
TABLE I-POPULATION ESTIMATES AND PROJECTIONS AND AVERAGE ANNUAL RATE OF GROWTH: WORLD TOTAL, REGIONS, COUNTRIES, OR ;p. 
::3 
AREAS, URBAN AND RURAL, 1950-2000 0. 
..., 
TOTAL POPULATION (Thousands) ANO (b 
REGIONS, COUNTRIES, 
ANNUAL RATE OF GROWTH (%) ~ 
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(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (IO) (II) (12) (b 
..., 
World total: [/) 
u ............ ................ ... 724, 147 3.4 1,012,084 2.9 1,354,357 2.9 1.806,809 2.9 2,422,293 2.8 3,208,028 
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More developed regions: 
u ······················ · ········ 448,929 2.4 572,730 2.1 702.876 1.7 834,401 1.5 %9,226 1.2 1.092,470 
R .... . ...... ······ ·· ······ · •· 405,502 -. I 402,396 -.5 383,894 -.8 355,013 -.9 325,258 - 1.0 294,700 
Less developed regions: 
u .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 275 ,218 4.7 439.354 3.9 651,481 4.0 972,408 4.0 1.453 ,067 3.8 2, 11 5,558 
R .......... . . . ................ 1,371,422 1.4 1,57 1,337 1.8 1.871,922 1.7 2,2 12.029 1.4 2,532, 15 I .8 2,751,256 
Africa: 
u ..... . . 31 ,818 4.4 49,506 4.9 80.373 5.0 132,95 1 5.0 219,202 4.6 345,757 
R ········ · ···· ·· ·····•····· · · 186,986 1.8 223,290 2.0 271,355 1.9 327 ,963 1.9 394,881 1.7 467,923 
Latin America: 
u .. ...... . ... . ........ 67,511 4.6 106,599 4.2 162 ,355 3.9 240,592 3.6 343,304 3.1 466,234 
R ........................... %,411 1.2 108 ,982 1.0 120,670 .8 131 ,042 .8 142 ,283 .8 153,695 
Northern America: 
u ............. . .... .. ..... .. .. 106,019 2.3 133.281 1.8 159,493 1.4 183.28 1 1.5 212,393 1.2 239,199 
R .... 
············ ·· · ··· · ···· 
60,054 .9 65,381 .2 66.896 -.2 65,552 - .4 62,743 - 1.0 57,000 
East Asia: 
u ............... . . .. .. ....... 112,8 12 5.5 194,734 3.1 265.153 3.0 359,457 2.8 476,462 2.7 622,44 1 
R ..... ... . . . . 
······· ····· 
562,008 .5 593,246 I.I 661 ,7 13 .9 728,292 .4 757 .036 -. I 747,621 
South Asia: 
u ............... .. .... .. ..... 104,883 3.4 146,902 3.9 217,290 4.2 329,760 4.5 515,685 4.3 790,685 
R ···················· · ······ •··· 565,336 1.8 678 ,453 2.2 844,886 2.1 1,046,859 1.8 1,256,031 I.I 1,397.199 
Europe: 
u .... .... .. ...... ... ..... . 222,603 1.8 266,032 1.8 318,374 1.5 369,286 1.4 423,291 1.2 476,953 
R . . .. 
············ · ········· 
191,926 -.I 189.3 18 -.5 179,534 - .7 167,229 -.8 154,551 -.9 141,548 
Oceania: 
u ........ ...... .. ....... .... . .. 7,736 3.0 I0,443 2.7 13,675 2.6 17 ,829 2.4 22,590 1.8 27,145 
R ............. .... .... . ...... . .. 4,893 .8 5,321 .6 5,638 .0 5,643 -.2 5,508 .I 5,557 
USSR: 
u ......... ... ...... ..... .. .. 70,765 3.9 104.587 2.8 137,644 2.3 173 ,653 1.9 209,366 1.4 239,614 
R ·············· · · · ············· 109,310 .0 109,742 - .4 !05,124 - I.I 94.462 - I.I 84,376 - I.I 75,413 
SouRCE.-UN Population Division , Patterns of Urban and Rural Growth (New York: Department of International Economic and Social Affairs , 1980). 
""' 00 NoTE.-U = urban, R =rural. VI 
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century will thus take place in the less developed countries, with the 
result that two countries (China and India) will have populations in 
excess of I billion each; nine countries are projected to show totals 
between 100 and 300 million, and 13 between 50 and 100 million. The 
global total is expected to reach 6.2 billion. 4 
Urban populations are growing much more rapidly than the total 
populations of which they are a part. Between I 950 and I 970 the total 
population of the more developed countries increased by 27% and that 
of the less developed countries by 53%; during the same period the 
urban population of the more developed countries grew by 57%, while 
that of the less developed countries increased by over 137%. By the 
year 2000, urban areas in LDCs will have gained about I .5 billion 
people since 1970-double the MDC urban population in 1970. Even 
so, the current 86% LDC share of the world's rural population is ex-
pected to increase to 90% by that date. 
Historically, urban population growth and urbanization have oc-
curred together, but they do not measure the same attribute of national 
population. Urban growth refers to an increase in the number of people 
living in urban settlements . Urbanization, on the other hand, refers to 
a rise in the proportion of a total population that is concentrated in 
urban settlements. The latter measure , therefore, is a function not only 
of urban growth but also of rural growth. 
Urbanization-the transition from a dispersed pattern of human 
settlement to one concentrated around cities and towns-is a process 
that has a beginning and an end. Urban growth, on the other hand, has 
no such inherent limit inasmuch as cities can continue to grow as a 
pure consequence of an excess of births over deaths. Thus urban 
growth can occur without any urbanization if the rural population in-
creases at a rate equal to or greater than that of the urban population. 
Table 2 traces the urbanization process in the world's developed 
and less developed regions and in eight of its major geographical areas. 
More than half of the world's population is projected to be urban by 
the year 2000. About three-fourths and just over two-fifths of the na-
tional populations of the more and the less developed countries, re-
spectively, are expected to be living in urban areas at that tjme. 
Rates of urban growth are even more dramatic at the level of the 
individual urban settlement. Table 3 sets out recent UN projections of 
the growth of some of the less developed world's largest urban centers, 
indicating that the size of the population growth multiplier for some 
cities is truly awesome. For example, during the 25 years between 1975 
and 2000, Lagos and Jakarta are expected to triple their populations; 
Lima, Mexico City, Sao Paulo, and Teheran are projected to grow by 
4 UN Population Division. 
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a factor of2.5; and Addis Ababa, Nairobi, and Kinshasa are to increase 
fourfold or more . The largest city in the world by the year 2000 is 
expected to be Mexico City with 31 million inhabitants . Not far behind 
will be Sao Paulo with about 26 million. 
Rapid urban population growth and increased consumption arising 
out of a growing per capita income, both continuing to grow at annual 
TABLE 2 
ESTIMATED AND PROJECTED PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION IN URBAN AREAS: WORLD 
TOTAL, MACRO REGIONS, AND REGIONS, 1950-2000 
PERCENTAGE OF ESTIMATED AND PROJECTED POPULATION 
MACRO REGIONS AND IN URBAN AREAS 
REGIONS 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
(!) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
World total: . . . . . . . . . . . . 28.95 33.89 37.51 41.31 45.88 51.29 
More developed regions 52 .54 58.73 64.68 70.15 74.87 78 .75 
Less developed regions 16.71 21.85 25.82 30.53 36.46 43.46 
Africa .. ............... 14.54 18.15 22.85 28.85 35.70 42.49 
Latin America .. .. . . . . . . 41.18 49.45 57.37 64.74 70 .70 75.21 
Northern America . .. .. . 63 .84 67 .09 70.45 73 .66 77.20 80.76 
East Asia ...... .. .... .. 16.72 24 .71 28.61 33.05 38 .63 45.43 
South Asia . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15.65 17.80 20.45 23 .95 29 .10 36.13 
Europe . . . ... . .. . . ... .. 53 .70 58.42 63 .94 68 .83 73.25 77.11 
Oceania .. ... .. ...... . .. 61.24 66 .22 70.77 75.93 80.37 82 .97 
USSR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39.30 48.80 56.70 64.77 71.28 76.06 
SouRcE.-UN Population Division , Patterns of Urban and Rural Growth (New 
York: Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, 1980). 
TABLE 3 
POPULATION ESTIMATES ANO PROJECTIONS FOR 15 LARGE CITI ES 
MULTIPLE 
INCREASE OVER 
POPULATION (Millions) BASE YEAR 
1950- 1975-
CITY 1950 1975 2000 75 2000 
Cairo, Egypt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 6.4 13.1 2.6 2.0 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia .. . ... . . .2 1.2 5.6 5.8 4.8 
Nairobi, Kenya . . .. . . ..... . . .. .I .9 4.9 6.2 5.6 
Lagos , Nigeria .. . . . .. .. . ... . .. .4 2.0 6.9 5.2 3.6 
Kinshasa , Zaire .... .. . . . . .. . .. .2 2.2 8.4 10.9 3.9 
Mexico City, Mexico . ..... .. .. 3.0 11.9 31.0 4.0 2.6 
Sao Paulo, Brazil . . .. . ... . . .. . 2.5 10.7 25.8 4.3 2.4 
Bogota, Colombia .6 4.0 11.7 6.3 2.9 
Guayaquil , Ecuado~ . : : : : : : : : : : : .3 .9 2.4 3.5 2.7 
Lima, Peru ... . . . . . .... .. . .... I. I 3.8 8.9 3.5 2.4 
Jakarta, Indonesia . .. . .... . ... 1.7 5.7 16.6 3.3 2. 9 
Teheran , Iran .... ....... .... .. I. I 4.3 11.3 3.8 2.7 
Seoul , Korea I. I 6.8 14.2 6.1 2.1 
Karachi , Pakist~~ · : ::::::::: :: : I.I 4.0 11.8 3.5 3.0 
Bangkok, Thailand ........... . 1.4 4.0 11.9 2.8 3.0 
y SOURCE.-UN Population Division. Patterns of Urban and Rural Growth (New 
ork: Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, 1980). 
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rates of 4o/o-5%, means an annual growth rate of total urban income 
and demand for goods and services of about 9%, a doubling every 7-8 
years. 
An examination of future prospects for world population growth 
and urbanization reveals very forcefully that the twin historical de-
velopments that have combined to create the problems of human set-
tlements today will continue for the rest of this century and beyond in 
most parts of the world. The rate of world population growth, though 
apparently declining, will still be considerable for some time to come, 
and rural-urban migration shows no signs of abating in much of the less 
developed world. Therefore the number of people in the world will 
continue to increase in the near future, as will the proportion living in 
urban settlements. Populations in urban centers will continue to grow 
at an alarming rate, particularly in the larger urban agglomerations of 
the less developed world. The problems created by this transformation 
are manifold and will continue to involve large private and social costs. 
These costs have led a number of governments in Jess developed coun-
tries to express a growing concern over issues of population distribu-
tion . For example, a 1978 UN survey of national population policies 
revealed that only six out of 116 less developed countries responding 
to the inquiry viewed the spatial distribution of their population as 
"acceptable," whereas 68 declared it "highly unacceptable," and 42 
considered theirs "unacceptable to some extent." 5 Most believed that 
rural-to-urban migration was the principal contributor to urban popu-
lation growth, and 90 out of the 116 indicated that they had adopted 
policies to slow down or reverse this migration . 
In light of the apparently widespread dissatisfaction with rapid 
urban population growth and urbanization in less developed countries, 
an important issue is the degree to which internal migration contributes 
to such growth. Is rural-to-urban migration or natural increase primarily 
responsible for the growth of cities in LDCs today? 
Some scholars, such as Kingsley Davis, have placed natural in-
crease above migration: "It is the population boom that is overwhelm-
ingly responsible for the rapid inflation of city populations in such 
countries. Contrary to popular opinion both inside and outside those 
countries, the main factor is not rural-urban migration."6 Others, such 
as Michael Todaro, argue that " ... this interpretation fails to recognize 
that the age selectivity of migrants ... is such that the recorded high 
5 UN Economic and Social Council , Concise Report on Monitoring of Population 
Policies (E/CN .9/338) Population Commission , Twentieth Session (New York , 1978), pp. 
27-28. 
6 Kingsley Davis, " The Urbanization of the Human Population ," Scientific Amer-
ican 213, no . 3 (March 1965): 41-53, esp. 48. 
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natural increase is, in fact, largely a direct result of the locational choice 
and high fertility of migrants .... The unprecedented volume and rate 
of internal rural-urban migration is the principal factor .... " 7 
Which point of view is correct? Confronting the data with a model 
is the only way to unconfound the contribution of each component of 
change. 
II. The Demographics of Urban Population Growth and Urbanization 
The evolution of a human population in a territorial unit with fixed 
boundaries is governed by the interaction of births to residents, deaths 
of residents, and migration across those boundaries. When boundaries 
change over time, as they do with populations classified as urban and 
rural, territorial reclassification also becomes a contributor to change. 
In this paper we shall follow the UN practice of including the effects 
ofreclassification together with those of internal migration, distinguish-
ing them from those of natural increase. The latter component of change 
will be assumed, as in the UN study, to also include the effects of 
international migration. 8 
Table 4 presents 1960 component rates of urban and rural popu-
lation growth for the world and for its major regions. These data indicate 
that the fertility of urban women is lower than that of rural women 
virtually everywhere, and that rural mortality exceeds urban mortality, 
particularly in the less developed countries. The difference between 
the birthrate and the death rate is natural increase, and the natural 
increase of rural populations exceeds that of urban populations in most 
parts of the world. Yet populations in urban areas have been growing 
much more rapidly than in rural areas. Clearly the component of change 
fostering this differential growth is rural-to-urban migration. Assessing 
its relative importance over time as a source of urban growth requires 
a projection model. 
Aggregated Projection Models 
The growth of urban and rural populations may be represented by 
simple projection models that follow groups of individuals just born 
into a population, as they age with the passage of time, reproduce, and 
ultimately leave the population because of death or outmigration. These 
events and flows enter into an accounting relationship in which the 
growth of a regional population is determined by the combined effects 
of natural increase and net migration. The fundamental mechanics of 
7 Michael Todaro, "Urbanization in Developing Nations: Trends, Prospects, and 
Policies," Working Paper no. 50 (New York: Population Council, Center for Policy 
Studies, 1979), p. I l. 
8 UN Population Division. 
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such models may be illustrated with a simple numerical example based 
on data for India. For ease of exposition , fixed rates of fertil ity, mor-
tality, and migration will be assumed throughout. 
The urban population oflndia was increasing by about 3.7% a year 
during the late 1960s and early 1970s. The urban growth rate, ru, was 
the outcome of a birthrate of 30 per 1,000, a death rate of 10 per 1,000, 
TABLE 4 
COMPONENT ANNUAL RATES OF URBAN AND RURAL POPULATION GROWTH: WORLD 
TOTAL AND REGIONS, 1960 
URBAN RURAL 
Growth Birth- Death Growth Birth- Death 
MACRO REGIONS Rate rate Rate Rate rate Rate 
AND REGIONS (r.) (b.) (d.) (r,) (b,) (d,) 
World : ... . .. .. .. ... . 33.0 27.7 11.6 12.5 39.8 19.1 
More developed 
regions ......... 23 .5 20.I 8.9 -2.6 23.3 9.3 
Less developed 
regions . . .. .. .. . 45.5 37.9 15.4 16.5 44.I 21.7 
Africa: .. . .. .. . .... . . 44.8 41.6 18.0 18.0 47.8 25 . I 
Western . . .. ... . . .. 49.9 41. 1 20.0 17.9 50.2 27.I 
Eastern .. . . ... .. . . 49.9 44.6 18.9 20.I 46.9 24.8 
Northern ....... . .. 42 .3 43 .8 17.I 18.5 47.4 22. I 
Middle .. . .. . . ... .. 58.6 47.2 20.6 13.0 44.8 27 .7 
Southern . . ... . . ... 32.9 32.1 15.I 16.3 47.6 20. I 
Latin America: ...... 44.6 35. I 10.8 12.7 44.2 12.6 
Tropical South 
America ..... ... 49.6 31.1 11.2 11.7 45.0 12.8 
Middle America 
(Mainland) ... ... 47 .0 42.7 11.5 21.1 47.0 13.0 
Temperate South 
America 30.2 24.3 9.1 -9.I 34.3 9.5 
Caribbean .. . . ... .. 34.2 30.8 11.3 15.I 41.9 12.9 
Northern America .. . 24.3 24 .2 8.9 -1.2 24.8 9.3 
East Asia: . .. . ... .. .. 48 .6 29.8 12.9 8.6 36.7 19.3 
China .. . .. . .... . .. 50.3 33.9 15.4 9.7 38.2 20.7 
Japan .... . . . . .. . .. 29.2 15 .8 6.6 -5.9 18.5 8.6 
Other East Asia . .. 56.2 35.8 9.0 14.9 43.3 13.6 
South Asia: .. .. .. ... 36.7 40.0 17.2 21.2 47 .I 22.9 
Middle South .... . . 32.6 39.6 17.9 21.1 47 .2 23.9 
Southeast . . .. .. ... 43.3 42.2 16.2 21.9 46.7 21.1 
Southwest .. ... . ... 46.4 38.0 15.I 18.6 48 .9 19.5 
Europe: . . . .. . . . . .... 17.9 17.8 10.2 -4.2 21.8 10.0 
Western . .. .. .. . .. . 19.5 17.4 10.6 -6.5 20.9 11.2 
Southern . . . . .... .. 21.0 19.3 9.1 -2.2 23.0 9.4 
Eastern . .. .. .. . ... 19.2 17.3 9.6 -3.8 22.6 9.3 
Northern .......... 11.2 17.4 11.0 -6.4 17.6 I I. I 
Oceania: . . .. .. .. .. .. 26.2 22.5 8.9 13.2 36.3 13.1 
Australia and New 
Zealand .. . ... . .. 25 .8 22.2 8.9 1.8 29 .0 7.5 
Melanesia ..... . ... 47 .9 45 .8 13.8 22.4 42.7 19.8 
Micronesia and 
Polynesia ..... . . 47 .6 35.5 9.1 25 .8 42.6 12.9 
USSR . ... . . .. .. .. .. 34.5 20.8 6.5 -1.4 26.5 8.4 
SOURCE.-United Nations, Global Review of Human Settlements: A Support Paper 
f or Habitat, I and 2 (Oxford : Pergamon Press, 1976), pp. 51-52. 
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an inmigration rate of 27 per 1,000, and an outmigration rate of JO per 
1,000.9 Expressing these rates on a per capita basis leads to the fun-
damental identity 
.030 - .010 + .027 - .010 
.037. 
The corresponding identity for the rural population was 
r, b, - d, + i, - o, 
.039 - .017 + .002 - .007 
.017 . 
The total national population of India in 1970 was about 548 million, 
of which roughly 109 million (20%) was classified as urban. Multiplying 
this latter total by the urban growth rate gives 109 (.037) = 4.03 million 
as the projected increase for 1971. An analogous calculation for the 
rural population gives 7.46 million for the corresponding projected in-
crease in the rural population. These changes imply, for 1971, an urban 
population of 113 million, a rural population of 446 million, and a rate 
of national population increase of 
r = .20ru + .80r, = .021 (l) 
Alternatively, urban population growth may be described by the 
equation 
Equation (2) states that next year's urban population total may be 
calculated by adding to this year's urban population (i) the increment 
due to urban natural increase, (ii) the decrement due to urban outmi-
gration to rural areas, and (iii) the increment due to rural to urban 
migration. Substituting in the rates for India gives the accounting iden-
tity 
9 Andrei Rogers, "Migration, Urbanization, Resources, and Development," in Al-
ternatives for Growth: The Engineering and Economics of Natural Resources Devel-
opment, ed. H.J . McMains and L. Wilcox (Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co., 
for the National Bureau of Economic Research , 1978), pp. 149-217. 
492 
Pu(l971) 
Economic Development and Cultural Change 
(1 + .030 - .010 - .010)Pu0970) + .007P,(1970) 
= 1.010(109) + .007(439) 
= 113.2 million . 
An analogous equation for the rural population yields 
P,(1971) .010Pu(l970) + (1 + .039 - .017 - .007)P,(1970) 
.010(109) + 1.015(439) 
446.7 million . 
Projecting India 's population forward with fixed rates gives the 
evolution of the urban and rural populations presented in table 5. Also 
included, for purposes of comparison, is the analogous projection of 
the urban and rural populations of the Soviet Union. 
Starting with a growth rate of 3. 7% a year and a share of the total 
of 19.9%, India's urban population gradually increases its urban pro-
portion to 27% by the year 2000, as it slowly approaches an ultimate 
asymptotic share of 37. 7% , at which point its ultimate, or intrinsic, 
annual urban growth rate is 2.1%. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, 
starting with an urban growth rate of 2.5% per year and an urban 
proportion of 56.3%, stabilizes its urban population ' s share of the total 
TABLE 5 
AGGREGATED PROJECTIONS OF OBSERVED POPULATIONS: INDIA AND THE SOVIET 
UNION 
Net Urban 
Urban Growth lnmigration Growth Due to 
Year Urban(%) Rate Rate Migration (%) 
m (IOOU) (ru) (mu= ru -nu) (m ufru X 100) 
A. India 
1970 ............. 19.9 .037 .017 47.1 
1975 ............. 21.4 .034 .015 43.5 
1980 .... .. ..... . . 22.7 .033 .013 40.2 
2000 . . ...... . ... . 27.1 .028 .008 29.8 
2020 .. ... ........ 30.2 .025 .006 22.7 
Stability . . . . . . . . . 37.7 .021 .001 6.0 
B. Soviet Union 
1970 ... .... .. . . . . 56.3 .025 .016 63.8 
1975 .. .. ...... ... 60.2 .021 .012 56.7 
1980 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63.3 .018 .009 49 .8 
2000 ............. 70.6 .012 .003 26.7 
2020 . . .. . . . . . .... 73.4 .010 .001 13.0 
Stability ......... 75 .3 .009 .000 1.7 
NoTE.-(A) Natural increase: nu = 20 x 10 - 3, n, = 22 x 10 - 3; migration: ou = 
10 x 10 - 3, o, = 7 x 10 - 3• (8) Natural increase : nu = 9 x 10- 3, n, = 10 x 10 - 3; 
migration : Ou = 11 x 10- 3, o, = 35 x 10 - 3. 
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at 75.3% and at that point exhibits an intrinsic annual urban growth 
rate of 0.9%. The contributions of urban natural increase and urban 
net migration vary significantly in each of the two projections. India's 
urban population in 1970 was growing more from natural increase, 
whereas that of the Soviet Union was growing more from migration. 
Decompositions such as these for identifying the demographic sources 
of urban population growth and urbanization are dealt with in greater 
detail in Section III of this paper. 
Disaggregated Projection Models 
Population projections have both a retrospective and a prospective 
aspect. For example, given our earlier projections to the year 2000 of 
the urban and rural populations of India, we may wish to identify 
retrospectively how many of the projected urban residents were living 
in rural areas at the start of the projection period. Or we may be 
interested in determining what fraction of the projected urban dwellers 
were born in rural areas (i.e., are· 'alien'' residents) and what proportion 
are urban "natives." 10 
Prospectively, we may ask, What proportion of the 1970 Indian 
rural population will be living in urban areas in the year 2000? Or we 
may wish to calculate, on 1970 rates, the fraction of an average lifetime 
that a baby just born in a rural village in India can expect to live in the 
urban settlements of that nation. 
To answer these and related questions, we may begin by dividing 
the resident urban population of a nation into natives and aliens: Pu(t) 
= uPu(t) + ,Pu(t), where the additional subscript on the left of the 
population variable, P, denotes the region of birth and the right sub-
script denotes the region of residence, as before. 11 
The accounting relationship for calculating urban residents given 
earlier as equation (2) may be used to obtain urban natives simply by 
introducing the place of birth subscript and allocating the new births 
during the year to the "native" population: 12 
uPu(t) = (l + bu - du - Ou)uPu(f - 1) 
+ O, uPrCt - 1) + bu ,Pu(l -1) . (3) 
10 Andrei Rogers and Dimiter Philipov, "Multiregional Methods for Subnational 
Population Projections," Working Paper WP-79-40 (Laxenburg, Austria: International 
Institute for Applied Systems Analysis , 1979). 
11 Although we speak of " region of birth," it should be clear that we could instead 
consider "region of residence in 1970" (or at some other past moment in time) . 
12 In the age-disaggregated model described later, a fraction of the births to alien 
migrants is added to the native population in the destination region (Dimiter Philipov 
and Andrei Rogers, " Multistate Population Projections," Working Paper WP-80-57 [Lax-
enburg, Austria: International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 1980]). 
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Analogous relationships may be defined for rPu(t), uPr(t), and rPr(t). It 
is assumed that natives and aliens experience the same fertility, mor-
tality, and migration rates, that is, those prevailing at their region of 
residence, and all births to alien migrants are added to the alien pop-
ulation stock. 
For illustrative purposes, assume that all of India's 1970 urban 
population was born in urban areas and that all of its rural population 
was born in rural areas. Projecting these stocks forward with fixed 
rates until stability, one obtains the evolution of the urban and rural 
populations presented in table 6. Again, the analogous projection for 
the Soviet Union is included for purposes of comparison. 
This fixed-rate projection shows that the fraction of rural-born 
aliens in India's urban population ultimately stabilizes at about the 
level of one-fourth, whereas the corresponding fraction in the Soviet 
Union is roughly one-fifth. Thus the ultimate contribution of migrants 
to the urban population stock in India is higher than it is in the Soviet 
Union. Recall that the corresponding contributions to annual net ad-
ditions (i.e., the.flows), set out earlier in table 5, showed the reverse 
ordering. We shall return to this apparent paradox in Section III. 
Crude rates are weighted combinations of age-specific rates; 
changes in age composition alter the weights and produce changes in 
crude rates. The aggregation of age groups, therefore, creates a pro-
jection bias. A standard biregional cohort-survival projection of the 
1970 Indian population to the year 20~n the assumption of un-
TABLE 6 
AGGREGATED PLACE-OF-RESIDENCE-BY-BIRTH PROJECTIONS OF 
OBSERVED POPULATIONS: INDIA AND THE SOVIET UNION(%) 
Year Urban Urban Natives Urban Aliens 
en oooU) ooouN> ooou A> 
A. India 
1970 ...... ... . 19.9 19.9 0 
1975 .. .... .. .. 21.4 19.0 2.4 
1980 .. ... ..... 22.7 18.4 4.3 
2000 .......... 27.l 18.5 8.6 
2020 .... ...... 30.2 20.2 10.0 
Stability 37.7 28.4 9.3 
B. Soviet Union 
1970 .......... 56.3 56.3 0 
1975 .......... 60.2 53.6 6.6 
1980 .... .. .... 63.3 51.9 11.4 
2000 . . . . . . . . . . 70.6 50.6 20 .0 
2020 .......... 73.4 52.4 21.1 
Stability ...... 75.3 60.6 14.7 
NOTE .-(A) Natural increase: nu = 20 x 10- 3, nr = 22 x 10- 3; 
migration : Ou = 10 x 10 - 3, Or = 7 x 10- 3• (B) Natural increase: 
nu= 9 x 10- 3, nr= 10 x 10- 3; migration: Ou= II x 10 - 3, o, = 35 
x 10- 3• 
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changing age-specific rates of fertility, mortality, and internal migra-
tion-gives a total population of 1.051 billion, with 27. 7% of that total 
residing in urban areas, and exhibiting an annual growth rate of 2.5%. 
The national population at that moment in time is projected to be 
increasing at the rate of 2.0% per year. 
How does the fixed-rate projection compare with one produced 
by the aggregate biregional model of the preceding section? For the 
projection summarized in table 5 the corresponding figures are a total 
population of 1.023 billion, growing at a rate of 2.1 % per year, with 
27 .1 % located in urban areas and growing at a rate of 2.8% per annum. 
The slight differences between the two sets of projections are a 
consequence of aggregation bias, which in this illustration results from 
an aggregation across age groups. 
III. The Sources of Urban Population Growth and Urbanization 
Do cities grow mostly by their own natural increase or do they grow 
mostly as a consequence of net inmigration from rural areas? A recent 
study by the United Nations concluded that urban growth in the less 
developed world results primarily from the natural increase of its urban 
population. 13 Table 7 presents a selection of the more detailed results. 
These results were generated by an intercensal comparison of age-
specific populations in which exceptional changes in age structure were 
ascribed to internal migration and reclassification. The residual be-
tween the observed population growth and the estimated migration 
totals were attributed to natural increase. 
The UN calculations show that the highest relative contribution 
of migration (and reclassification) to urban growth occurred in Europe, 
in particular, and in the more developed countries, in general. An 
average of two-thirds of recent urban growth in Europe and in the 
USSR is attributable to migration . In the less developed countries, on 
the other hand, the bulk of urban growth (about 60%) comes from 
natural increase. Much of this difference between the two groups of 
countries is due to the much higher rates of urban natural increase in 
the LDCs. 
The UN decomposition strives to disentangle the instantaneous 
contributions of migration and natural increase to urban population 
growth. It estimates the fraction of today's growth that would be elim-
inated if rates either of migration or of natural increase suddenly were 
set equal to zero. But as Todaro points out, migrants will bear children, 
and that contribution to urban growth perhaps should not be fully 
attributed to natural increase .14 The long-run impacts of current pat-
13 UN Population Division . 
14 Todaro. 
TABLE 7 
SOURCES OF INTERCENSAL URBAN GROWTH 
Intercensal 
Annual Annual Annual 
Urban Rate of Rate of 
Population Urban Net Urban Growth Due to 
Growth Rate Natural Increase Inmigration* Migration 
Country or Region Dates (ru) (nu= bu-du) (mu= ru -nu) (mjru x 100) 
Africa: 
Ghana ........... . . ........ 1960-70 .04685 .02697 .01988 42.4 
Morocco ........ .. .... .. ... 1960-71 .04100 .02581 .01519 37 .0 
Mean ...... .... ... ... . . .... ... . .. . . . 36.9 
North America: 
Canada .. .. .... ... . . ... .... 1961-71 .02563 .01644 .00919 35.9 
Mexico . ... ..... .. . ........ 1960-70 .04904 .03349 .01555 31.7 
Mean . . .. . ........ .. ... ... . . . . . .. . .. . .. 35.9 
South America: 
Argentina .................. 1947-60 .02906 .01431 .01475 50.8 
Peru . . . .... .. . .. . . . ..... . . . 1961-72 .04923 .02875 .02048 41.6 
Mean ........... . ........ .. ... .. . . .. . .. 36.3 
Asia: 
India ..... . . .. ....... ... ... 1961-71 .03211 .o2173 .01038 32.3 
Turkey ........... . ......... 1960-70 .05552 .02117 .03435 61.9 
Mean ......... ... . . .. . . .. .. ... . .. . .. . .. 46.6 
Europe: 
Austria ........... . ........ 1961-71 .00884 .00053 .00830 94 .0 
Sweden .. . .......... . ...... 1960-70 .01870 .00944 .00925 49.5 
Mean ........... . .. . .. . .... ... . .. . .. . .. 66.6 
Oceania: 
Australia ........... . ....... 1961-71 .02370 .01889 .00481 20.3 
New Zealand . ......... . .... 1951-61 .03620 .01833 .01788 49.4 
Mean .......... . ........... . .. . .. . .. . .. 34.8 
USSR ....................... 1959-70 .02788 .01083 .01705 61.1 
Mean: 
Sample (N = 65) ....... .. .... . . . . .. . .. . .. 45 .9 
Developing countries (N = 40) . . . ... . . . . . . 39.6 
Developed countries (N = 25) . . . . . .. ... . . . 57.4 
SouRcE.-UN Population Division, Patterns of Urban and Rural Growth (New York: Department of International Economic and 
Social Affairs, 1980). 
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terns of migration and natural increase on urban population growth and 
urbanization levels can be assessed only by population projection. 
Decompositions with Crude Fixed Rates 
With no city population there can be no urban natural increase; and 
some time after the establishment of a city it is likely that the contri-
bution of urban net inmigration will begin to exceed that of the surplus 
of urban births over urban deaths, that is, urban natural increase. At 
the other extreme, when a nation is mostly urbanized, rural population 
can contribute little to urban increase. Between these two extremes, 
there is a time at which the contribution of natural increase to urban 
growth should begin to exceed that of net inmigration. Keyfitz and 
Ledent call this moment the "crossover point" and develop analytical 
expressions that express it as a function of the components of urban 
population growth. 15 Their argument may be illustrated with the Indian 
and Soviet Union examples previously set out in table 5. 
Imagine a hypothetical population, initially entirely rural, that is 
subjected to the regime of growth exhibited, for example, by India in 
1970. Table 8Al shows that after 30 years the urban population is 15.5% 
of the national total and growing at 4.7% per annum. The rate of urban 
net inmigration at that moment is 2.7%, and its contribution as a source 
of urban growth is (2.7/4.7)100 = 58.1%. Twenty years later the urban 
fraction increases to 22.0% and migration's contribution falls to 41.9%. 
The crossover point is passed after 39 years, when the urban fraction 
is 18.7%. Note that this hypothetical population, starting its evolution 
as an entirely rural population, ultimately stabilizes at exactly the same 
equilibrium state as did its empirical counterpart in table 5A. This is 
simply a consequence of what is known in demography as "strong 
ergodicity," the tendency of an observed population to eventually 
"forget its past" as it is projected for a long period into the future 
under fixed rates of natural increase and migration. 16 Such "horizon-
year" projections allow one to contrast two regimes of growth without 
confounding their impacts with different starting conditions, such as 
India's initial 19.9% urban to the Soviet Union's 56.3%. 
Table 8 suggests that India's urban population in 1970 was growing 
more from natural increase than from net migration because it passed 
15 Nathan Keyfitz, "Do Cities Grow by Natural Increase or by Migration?" Geo-
graphica!Analysis 12, no. 2 (April 1980): 142-56; Jacques Ledent, " The Dynamics of 
Two Demographic Models of Urbanization," Research Memorandum RM-78-56 (Lax-
enburg, Austria: International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, 1978) , and "The 
Factors and Magnitude of Urbanization under Unchanged Natural Increase and Migration 
Pattems," Research Memorandum RM-78-57 (Laxenburg, Austria: International Insti-
tute for Applied Systems Analysis , 1978). 
16 Andrei Rogers , Introduction to Multiregional Mathematical Demography (New 
York: John Wiley & Sons, 1975). 
TABLE 8 
AGGREGATED PROJECTIONS OF HYPOTHETICAL POPULATIONS INITIALLY ENTIRELY RURAL AND EXPOSED TO DIFFERENT REGIMES OF GROWTH 
A . HYPOTHETICAL POPULATION: INDIA 
2. India 's Natural Increase Rates with Soviet Union 's 
I. India' s Growth Regime Migration Rates 
nu=20 x 10 - 3 n,=22 x I0 - 3 Ou= !O x 10- 3 o,=7,xI0 - 3 nu= 20 X 30- 3 n,=22 x 20 - 3 Ou=Il x I0 - 3 o,=35 + 10 - 3 
lOOU ru mu mufru X 100 T IOOU ru mu mufru x 100 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
3.2 .215 . 195 90.9 5 15.5 .198 . 178 90. I 
6.1 . 114 .094 82 .8 IO 27.7 .099 .079 80 .3 
15.5 .047 .027 58.1 30 55 .9 .036 .016 45 .3 
22.0 .034 .014 41.9 50 67 . 1 .025 .006 22.8 
37.7 .021 .001 6.0 Stability 74 .7 .020 .001 2.5 
B . HYPOTHETICAL POPULATION: SOVIET UNION 
2. Soviet Union's Natural Increase Rates with India 's 
I. Soviet Union's Growth Regime Migration Rates 
nu=9 X J0 - 3 n,= !O x 10 - 3 Ou= II X I0- 3 o,=35xI0- 3 nu=9 X J0 - 3 n,=IO x I0 - 3 Ou=IO x J0 - 3 o,=7 X J0 - 3 
lOOU ru mu mufru x 100 T lOOU ru mu mufru X 100 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
15 .7 .184 .175 95.1 5 3.3 .201 .192 95.6 
28.1 .087 .o78 89.7 IO 6.2 .IOI .092 91.2 
56.7 .024 .015 63.I 30 15.9 .035 .026 74.4 
67 .9 .014 .005 36.6 50 22 .7 .022 .013 59.5 
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its crossover point when it was 18.7% urban some time ago. The urban 
population in the Soviet Union, on the other hand, in 1970 was growing 
more from net migration than from natural increase because it still was 
about 9-10 years short (on 1970 rates) of reaching the 63.2% urban 
level associated with its crossover point. 
The crossover point with the Soviet Union's growth regime occurs 
at about the same time as with India's, that is, after 39V2 years, but it 
is experienced by a national population that is much more urban. Tables 
8A2 and 8B2 show why. Lowering rates of natural increase delays the 
crossover point, but raising net rates of urban inmigration hastens its 
occurrence. Combining India's natural increase with the Soviet Union's 
higher rates of rural to urban migration reduces the time to the cross-
over from 39 to 27 years. Replacing these migration rates with India's 
in the Soviet Union's growth regime delays the crossover by over 20 
years. 17 
Table 8 indicates that the principal effect of migration is to deter-
mine the level of urbanization, whereas that of natural increase is to 
establish the urban growth rate. Despite differences in migration rates 
(tables 8Al and 8A2), India's natural increase ultimately produces an 
urban population growing at 2% per year; the Soviet Union's gives rise 
to urban growth at roughly half that rate (tables SB I and 8B2). Despite 
differences in rates of natural increase, the Soviet Union's migration 
rates generate a national population that ultimately is three-fourths 
urban (tables 8A2 and SBI), whereas those of India produce an urban 
fraction that is just under 40% (tables 8Al and 8B2). 
That increasing rural-to-urban migration should speed up the time 
to crossover is perhaps intuitively understandable; that it should also 
reduce the urban population growth rate, however, is not. Yet table 8 
suggests this conclusion. For example, introducing the Soviet Union's 
migration rates into India's growth regime results in a lower rate of 
urban population growth. A similar reduction occurs when the urban 
growth effects of the growth regime in table 8B2 are contrasted with 
those of table 8Bl. What is the cause of this counterintuitive pattern 
of evolution? 
The fixed-rate projection model used to generate the results set 
out in tables 5, 6, and 8 defines the urban population growth rate ru(t) 
to be the sum of a fixed rate of natural increase, nu, and a changing 
rate of net urban inmigration, mu(t). Since net urban inmigration is the 
17 Ledent , working with the continuous-time formulation of the projection model, 
derives an expression for the urban fraction that also illuminates these interdependencies: 
V(T,) = o/(n 0 + 0 0 + o,), where T, is the crossover time in years from r = 0 and U(T,) 
is the fraction urban population at that moment. Observe, e.g., that this fraction increases 
as the rate of urban natural increase decreases or as the rate of rural-to-urban migration 
increases (Ledent, "The Factors and Magnitude of Urbanization under Unchanged Nat-
ural Increase and Migration Patterns"). 
- .......................... . 
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difference between rural and urban outmigration flows, for a national 
population that is IOOU(t)% urban, we have that U(t)mu(l) = [I -
U(t)]o, - U(t)ou, whence 
1 - V(t) 
V(l) O, - Ou , (4) 
with mu(t) > 0 if [l - V(t)]IU(t) > ojo,. 
Since o, and Ou are fixed by assumption, if U(t) increases with t, 
then mu(l) must decrease over time. Hence ru(l) must also and so must 
the fraction of urban growth due to migration. And because, in our 
illustrations, increasing o, increases the urban fraction more than pro-
portionately, mu(!) and ru(l) must take on lower values than before. 
A projection model that guarantees an ultimately declining fraction 
of urban growth due to migration is of limited value for answering the 
question whether it is natural increase or net migration that is the 
principal source of urban population growth. It appears that a more 
realistic model is needed, one that allows the natural increase rate to 
change over time along with the rate of net urban inmigration. The 
simplest way to introduce such realism is to disaggregate the population 
by age. 
Decompositions with Age-specific Fixed Rates 
Table 9 sets out age-specific population projections for India and for 
the Soviet Union . Tables 9A 1 and 9B I are the age-specific counterparts 
of tables 5A and 5B, respectively. Tables 9A2 and 9B2 are projections 
carried out with hypothetical growth regimes, in which the migration 
rates of one country are substituted for those of the other in the pro-
jection model, as in table 8. The projections show that exposing India 
to the migration rates of the Soviet Union would urbanize India in 50 
years to the level ultimately attained by the USSR, whereas introducing 
India's migration rates into the Soviet Union's growth regime would 
rapidly "de-urbanize" that national population. 
The introduction of age composition alters the results in favor of 
migration as a contributor to urban growth . In the Indian case it in-
creases migration's ultimate contribution threefold (from 6.0% to 
19.8%); in the Soviet Union example it reverses the ranking itself, 
making migration the principal source of urban growth. What accounts 
for this reversal? 
The disaggregation by age does not change the pattern of evolution 
of the aggregate net urban inmigration rate mu(!). In both the Indian 
and the Soviet illustrations it declines sharply from its initial level. But 
now the aggregate rate of natural increase no longer remains constant, 
dropping from 2% to 1.5% in the case of India and from .9% to .05% 
TABLE 9 
AGE-DISAGGREGATED PROJECTIONS OF OBSERVED POPULATIONS EXPOSED TO DIFFERENT REGIMES OF GROWTH: INDIA AND THE SOVIET UNION 
A. INDIA'S POPULATION 
2. India ' s Natural Increase Rates with Soviet Union ' s 
I. India' s Growth Regime Migration Rates 
JOOU ru mu m.fru X JOO T JOOU ru mu m.fru X JOO 
J9.9 .037 .017 47.J J970 J9.9 . J75 . J55 88.8 
21.6 .035 .OJ5 42 .8 J975 33.4 .087 .058 67.J 
23.3 .033 .OJ4 41.2 J980 44.4 .065 .038 57.9 
27.7 .025 .009 33.8 2000 69.8 .026 .007 26.2 
30.J .023 .006 28.2 2020 77. J .017 .002 J0.9 
33.8 .OJ9 .004 J9.8 Stability 79.0 .OJ4 .OOJ 3.8 
B. SOVIET UNION'S POPULATION 
2. Soviet Union 's Natural Increase Rates with India's 
I. Soviet Union's Growth Regime Migration Rates 
JOOU ru mu mulru X JOO T JOOU ru mu m.fru X JOO 
56 .3 .025 .OJ6 63.8 J970 56.3 .004 - .005 -132.8 
60.5 .020 .OJ2 59.5 J975 54.5 .003 -.004 -156.9 
64.4 .OJ8 .Oil 57.4 1980 52.8 .002 -.003 -167.4 
73.4 .005 .003 60.9 2000 45.6 -.002 - .002 87.0 
76 .9 .004 .002 44.9 2020 39.6 .002 .000 27.3 
77.5 .002 .OOJ 72.7 Stability 29.3 .010 .007 71.8 
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in the case of the Soviet Union. The cause of this decline in the ag-
gregate rate is, of course, the gradual aging of the population and the 
associated shift in its age composition. This shift alters the relative 
weights with which the fixed age-specific rates are consolidated to form 
the aggregate crude rates. The net result is an increased relative con-
tribution of net migration as a source of urban population growth, a 
consequence apparently of the fact that as with mortality, and not with 
fertility, the risks of migration are experienced by individuals of all 
ages. 
Table 9A2 illustrates the short-run impacts of high rates of rural 
to urban migration on urban natural increase. The crude rate of urban 
national increase, held fixed at 20 per 1,000 in table 5, now grows to 
29 per 1,000 in 1975 and 27 per 1,000 in 1980 before declining to roughly 
half those levels in the subsequent decades. Nevertheless, the even 
higher short-run rates of net urban inmigration ensure the primacy of 
migration as a source of urban growth for over a decade. Observe that 
increasing rural to urban migration still produces an ultimately lower 
urban growth rate, but now only after migration ceases to be the prin-
cipal source of urban population growth-a crossover that, in this il-
lustration, occurs when the national population is about 50% urban. 
In conclusion, it appears that the principal effect of introducing 
age composition into the fixed-rate projection model is to decrease the 
aggregate rate of natural increase over time, nu(t), while slowing down 
the decline of the net urban inmigration rate, mu(t). Since these two 
contributors to urban growth now can exhibit different rates of decline 
over time, their relative importance as sources or urban growth also 
can change, and in patterns that are difficult to anticipate. 
The decompositions presented in this paper have attempted to 
identify the instantaneous contributions of migration and natural in-
crease to urban population growth over time. The focus has been on 
estimating the fraction of growth at each moment, t, that could be 
attributed to migration or natural increase rates prevailing at that same 
moment. But as Todaro points out, migrants bear children, and it may 
be desirable to identify that particular contribution to urban growth 
more explicitly in efforts to answer the question of whether it is mi-
gration or natural increase that is the major source of urban population 
growth. 18 A convenient way of approximating this contribution is to 
disaggregate the projection model further to permit it to keep track of 
the respective places of birth of the projected populations. 
Decompositions Focusing on Migrant Stocks 
A number of studies dealing with the urban problems of the less de-
18 Todaro. 
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veloped world today view with concern the high fractions of urban 
residents born in rural areas, implying that these high fractions of 
"lifetime migrants" reflect high rates of rural-to-urban migration. Table 
6 has already indicated that this may not be true. Table 10, the age-
disaggregated counterpart to table 6, provides further evidence to the 
contrary. 
Table IO presents the results of a further disaggregation of the age-
specific projections summarized earlier in table 9. The additional dis-
aggregation is by place of birth, as in table 6. Because no data are 
available to disaggregate the initial (l 970) population along this dimen-
sion, we focus only on the allocation that evolves at stability, inasmuch 
as this result is independent of the starting condition and is a function 
only of the particular growth regime. 19 
The place-of-residence-by-place-of-birth (PRPB) projections dem-
onstrate that the existence of a large fraction of rural-born urban res-
idents is not necessarily an indication of high rural-to-urban migration 
rates. Indeed, the association is apparently the other way around. High 
rates of rural-urban migration, such as those experienced in the Soviet 
Union, for example, generate urban populations with a higher share 
TABLE 10 
AGE-DISAGGREGATED PLACE-OF-RESIDENCE-BY-PLACE-OF-BIRTH PROJECTIONS OF 
OBSERVED POPULATIONS EXPOSED TO DIFFERENT REGIMES OF GROWTH : 
INDIA AND THE SOVIET UNION 
A. INDIA ' S POPULATION 
I. India's Growth Regime 
IOOU IOOUN IOOUA 
19.9 19.9 0 
21.6 19.1 2.6 
23.3 18.6 4.6 
27.7 18.6 9.1 
30.1 19.4 10. 7 








2. India's Natural Increase Rates 
with Soviet Union ' s Migration Rates 
IOOU IOOUN IOOUA 
19.9 19.9 0 
33.4 20.7 12 .8 
44.4 23.8 20.6 
69.8 39.5 30.3 
77.1 51.3 25.7 
79.0 66.9 12. I 
B. SOVIET UNION ' S POPULATION 
I. Soviet Union's Growth Regime 
IOOU IOOUN IOOUA 
56.3 56 .3 0 
60.5 53.9 6.6 
64.4 53 .2 11 .3 
73.4 53 .5 20.0 
76.9 55 .2 21.8 








2. Soviet Union's Natural Increase 
Rates with India's Migration Rates 
IOOU IOOUN IOOUA 
56.3 56.3 0 
54.5 52.9 1.6 
52 .8 50.0 2.8 
45.6 39.5 6.2 
39.6 31.0 8.6 
29 .3 16.5 12.8 
19 This independence is , once again, a consequence of the attribute of "strong er-
godicity" mentioned earlier in the paper-an attribute that is shared by all of the fixed-
rate projection models used in this paper. 
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of urban-born "natives" than do lower migration rates, such as those 
found in India. The reason for this apparent paradox is, once again, 
the influence of the urbanization level, U(t). 
High rates of net urban inmigration produce high levels of urban-
ization, with the result that urban areas account for increasingly larger 
fractions of national births over time. For example, on 1970 rates, 
roughly three-fourths of all national births occur in urban areas at 
stability in the Soviet Union, compared with only one-fourth in India. 
This situation gives rise to a high fraction of natives in urban areas and 
explains why only 21% of the Soviet Union's stable urban population 
is rural born, compared with India's 30%. 
The place-of-birth disaggregation can be carried one step further 
by keeping track of the place of birth of the parent as well as that of 
the child. Such a projection disaggregates the native urban population 
into two parts, separating the first-generation natives (urban-born chil-
dren of rural-born parents) from the rest. 
On 1970 rates, a projection that separately identifies first-genera-
tion natives shows that of the 23 .6% urban natives in India at stability, 
over a third (36.0%) are children of rural-born parents; whereas of the 
61.2% urban natives in the Soviet Union at stability, only about a fifth 
(21.9%) fall into this category. Thus, if one includes the children of 
rural lifetime migrants into the accounting, more than half (55.3%) of 
India's ultimate urban population will consist of lifetime migrants and 
their direct (first generation) contribution to urban natural increase. 
The corresponding result for the Soviet Union illustration is only 38.5%. 
IV. Conclusion 
This paper seeks to contribute to the debate on the demographic 
sources of the historically unparalleled rates ofurban population growth 
in today's less developed countries. Following a broad review of the 
estimated and projected global patterns of such growth during the pe-
riod 1950-2000, the paper turned to an examination of the simple de-
mographics of urban population growth and urbanization, focusing in 
particular on the relative contributions made by natural increase and 
internal migration. Responding to the apparently widespread dissatis-
faction in less developed nations with the evolving spatial distribution 
of their populations, the paper has considered the question whether 
urban populations are growing mostly from their own natural increase 
or from net inmigration from rural areas. 
The major conclusion of the paper is that this fundamental question 
does not have a simple unequivocal answer. At different periods during 
a nation's urbanization transition, its urban population may grow pri· 
marily as a consequence of net urban inmigration; at other times the 
main contributor may be urban natural increase. The "guaranteed" 
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ultimate decline of the relative contribution of migration projected by 
Keyfitz and Ledent was shown to be merely a direct consequence of 
their model specification, which ignored the effects of age distribution. 20 
In the process of analyzing the demographics of urbanization and 
the changing contributions of natural increase and migration over time, 
this paper has also put forward a few important observations: 
I. The principal effect of migration is to establish the level of ur-
banization, whereas that of natural increase is to determine the rate of 
urban population growth. 
2. Although a sharp increase in the rate of rural-to-urban migration 
temporarily raises the urban population growth rate, its ultimate effect 
is to urbanize the · population more rapidly and thereby to depress the 
urban growth rate to a lower level than it would have reached in the 
absence of the increase. 
3. The relative importance of the two sources of urban population 
growth and urbanization may differ depending on whether the focus is 
on periodical net additions to the urban population stock or on the chang-
ing projected composition of that stock, for example, the disaggregation 
between natives and lifetime migrants. 
4. A relatively large fraction of rural-born people among urban res-
idents is not necessarily a sign of high rural to urban migration rates. 
Scholars and policymakers often disagree when it comes to eval-
uating the desirability of current rates of rapid urban population growth 
and rural-urban migration in the less developed world. Some see these 
trends as effectively speeding up national processes of socioeconomic 
development, whereas others believe their consequences to be largely 
undesirable and argue that both trends should be slowed down. 
Among those taking the negative view are many national planners, 
who view with growing concern the rapid shift of their national pop-
ulation from rural to urban areas and the concurrent rapid growth of 
their largest urban centers, fearing that the econonomic, social, aild 
political costs will be excessively large. Since most locational decisions 
are private decisions made in response to perceived socioeconomic 
conditions, it is difficult to see how national policy can appreciably 
slow the rate and pattern of urbanization. The universality of the phe-
nomenon in countries with different policies, cultures, and economies 
suggests that the impact of such policies may be minimal. Investing in 
education and transport facilities in rural areas, for example, may in-
crease rural incomes, but this is likely to also increase rural outmigra-
tion. Increasing labor-intensive productive activities in cities would 
ease unemployment levels but would also encourage more rapid urban 
growth. 
2° Keyfitz; Ledent, "The Dynamics of Two Demographic Models of Urbanization" 
and "The Factors and Magnitude of Urbanization under Unchanged Natural Increase 
and Migration Patterns." 
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Nevertheless, regardless of how desirable or feasible it may be to 
restrict the movement of people in the interests of national welfare, it 
seems reasonable to ask whether such efforts could make a significant 
impact on the growth rates of urban centers. Our simple decompositions 
do not provide a clear-cut answer, but they nevertheless do cast some 
doubt on the matter, inasmuch as they indicate that slowing down rural-
to-urban migration is not likely to produce more than a short-run re-
duction of urban population growth rates unless fertility levels are also 
reduced. 
Rural-Urban Migration, Urbanization, and 
Economic Development* 
Jacques Ledent 
JNRS-Urbanisation, University of Quebec, Montreal 
I. Introduction 
Since the beginning of the last century, the world has experienced rapid 
urbanization as the proportion of the population living in urban areas 
has increased from 2.5% in 1800 to 40% in 1975. 
Urbanization is a finite process experienced by all nations in their 
transition from an agrarian to an industrial society; thus, different ur-
banization levels reflect differing degrees of economic development. 
On the one hand, the countries that experienced the Industrial Revo-
lution in the last century-that is, those countries that constitute to-
day's more developed parts of the world-had about 65% of their 
populations living in urban areas in 1975. On the other hand, the eco-
nomically poorer, less developed parts of the world, in which a large 
part of the population is still engaged in agriculture, have reached 
significant levels of urbanization only recently; in 1975, the proportion 
of their population that was urban amounted to 28%. According to the 
latest UN population projections of the world and its major areas, 1 
urbanization will continue for some time in the less developed regions 
as well as in the more developed regions: by the year 2000, 44% and 
76% of their populations, respectively, will be living in urban areas. 
From a demographic point of view, urbanization depends on the 
interaction of two factors, that is, the rural-urban differential in natural 
increase and the migration exchange between the rural and urban sec-
• The author is grateful to Ansley Coale and especially Jeffrey Williamson for critical 
comments and constructive suggestions on an earlier draft. The work on this paper was 
done when the author was with the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis , 
Laxenburg, Austria. 
1 UN Population Division, Patterns of Urban and Rural Growth (New York: UN 
Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, 1980). 
© 1982 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 
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tors. 2 In most situations, however, the impact of the first factor is much 
smaller than the impact of the second, so that a large part of the world's 
continued urbanization is to be attributed to the continuation of rural-
urban migration, which apparently shows little sign of abating in much 
of the less developed world. 3 
This indeed raises the question of how rural-urban migration 
evolves with economic development. In this paper, we attempt to char-
acterize this phenomenon in quantitative terms, in contrast to past 
research which has described such an evolution in qualitative terms. 
In brief, a mathematical treatment of the relationship between rural-
urban migration and degree of urbanization is presented. Initially gen-
eral, such a treatment is later made more specific by assuming a logistic 
evolution of the degree of urbanization, reflecting the general obser-
vation that the evolution of urbanization levels can be adequately de-
picted by S-shaped curves. 
The paper consists of eight sections. Section II, intended as a 
background section, discusses in qualitative terms the relationship be-
tween rural-urban migration and economic development. Section III 
presents the general mathematical framework concerning the relation-
ship between rural-urban migration and the degree of urbanization. On 
the basis of this treatment, Section IV proposes an assessment of the 
evolution of the rural net out-migration rate in selected developing 
countries (India, Egypt, Mexico, and Honduras) as implied by recent 
UN I 950-2000 estimates and forecasts of urban and rural populations. 4 
Section V derives a formula describing the evolution of the rural net 
out-migration rate that is consistent with a logistic evolution of the 
degree of urbanization. Such a formula indicates that, if the rural-urban 
natural increase differential is negligible, the ensuing rural net out-
migration rate first increases, then passes through a maximum, and 
finally decreases. Such a result is shown to be only slightly affected 
by values of the rural-urban natural increase differential typically ob-
served. Sections VI and VII illustrate the applicability of the rural net 
out-migration rate formula with the help of examples based on time-
series as well as cross-section data on urbanization levels. Section VI 
determines the dates at which, in the four aforementioned developing 
2 There is, in fact, a third factor which may influence urbanization , namely, the 
continuous qualification of additional areas as urban: people can "move" from a rural 
to an urban area without ever changing their residence, provided that the area in which 
they live has reached the urban population threshold or has been annexed into an already 
urban area. Our concept of migration obviously includes the effect of reclassification. 
3 A. Rogers, "Migration, Urbanization, Resources, and Development ," in Alter-
native for Growth: The Engineering and Economics of Natural Resources De1•elopment, 
ed. H . McMains and L. Wilcox (Cambridge , Mass.: Ballinger Publishing Co., for the 
National Bureau of Economic Research , 1978), pp . 149-217. 
4 UN Population Division. 
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countries, the rural net out-migration rate is expected to decline; Sec-
tion VII investigates the evolution of the rural net out-migration rate 
with economic development measured by an objective index, per capita 
GNP. 
II. Qualitative Considerations 
Urbanization is a process of human settlement that arises from the 
polarization of economic development in urban areas. It is character-
ized by a rise in the proportion of the total population of an urban-rural 
system that is urban. Clearly, it is a population attribute differing from 
urban growth, for it also depends on rural growth. 5 
Thus, a better understanding of the dynamics of urbanization re-
quires a focus on the process of rural and urban population change. 
But, owing to the nature of the urbanization concept, the emphasis 
should not lie so much on the absolute growth of the urban and rural 
areas as on their relative growths. When such a perspective is adopted, 
urbanization becomes a dynamic process generated by only two fac-
tors: (1) rural-urban differential in natural increase, and (2) population 
exchange from rural to urban areas through internal migration. We shall 
look at both factors in turn. 
Natural increase is the difference between fertility and mortality, 
both of which are generally lower in urban areas than in rural areas. 
Table 1, which shows UN estimates of urban and rural crude birth- and 
death rates around 1960, reveals that: 
a) Virtually everywhere the fertility of urban women is lower than 
that of rural women; except for North America, where the difference 
is slight, the rural-urban discrepancy is substantial, ranging from four 
points in Europe to nine points in Latin America. 
b) The rural death rate exceeds the urban death rate by six points 
in the less developed regions of the world but only by about half a 
point in the more developed regions. 
The aggregation of crude birth- and death rates indicates that rural 
natural increase exceeds urban natural increase in most parts of the 
world, but the difference between the two amounts to only a few points 
except for Latin America and Oceania. Yet, as shown in table 1, urban 
areas are growing much more rapidly than rural areas: the urban growth 
rate of the major regions of the world exceeds its rural counterpart by 
1330 in Oceania to 40%0 in East Asia. The conclusion here is that the 
component of change fostering urbanization is the net transfer of pop-
ulation from rural to urban areas. With the exception of Oceania, rural-
5 Urban growth and urbanization do not necessarily occur together, although his-
torically they have; urbanization accompanies urban growth only if the urban population 
grows faster than the rural population. 
TABLE 1 
COMPONENT RATES (%0) OF RURAL AND URBAN POPULATION CHANGE IN THE WORLD AND MAJOR REGIONS: DEATH, BIRTH, AND NATURAL 
INCREASE, 1960 
CRUDE DEATH RATE CRUDE BIRTH RA TE NATURAL INCREASE RATE 
Rural-Urban Rural-Urban Rural-Urban 
REGION Rural Urban Differential Rural Urban Differential Rural Urban Differential 
World ............. . .......... 19.1 11.6 7.5 39.8 27 .7 12.1 20.7 16. I 4.6 
More developed regions .. . .... 9.3 8.9 .4 23.3 20.I 3.2 14.0 11.2 2.8 
Less developed regions . . .. . ... 21.7 15.4 6.3 44.1 37.9 6.2 22.4 22.5 - .I 
Africa ....... . .... . . . ........ 25.I 18.0 7.1 47.8 41.6 6.2 22.7 23.6 -.9 
Northern America . ... .. .. . ... 9.3 8.9 .4 24.8 24.2 .6 15 .5 15.3 .2 
Latin America . . . . . . ... ... . ... 12.6 10.8 1.8 44.2 35.1 9.1 31.6 24.3 7.3 
East Asia ... . ... .. ...... . .. . . 19.3 12.9 6.4 36.7 29.8 6.9 17.4 16.9 .5 
South Asia ... . ... . .. .. . . .... . 22.9 17.2 5.7 47.I 40.0 7.1 24.2 22 .8 1.4 
Europe .... . .... . . .. . . .... . .. 10.0 10.2 -.2 21.8 17.8 4.0 11.8 7.6 4.2 
Oceania . .. . . . ... .. . ..... . . ... 13.1 8.9 4.2 36.3 22 .5 13.8 23.2 13.6 9.6 
USSR . . .... . .. . . . ., ... . . . . .. . 8.4 6.5 1.9 26.5 20.8 5.7 18.1 14.3 3.8 
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urban natural increase differentials have a small impact on the differ-
ential growth of urban and rural areas (negligible, in many instances). 
The above contention, that urbanization is attributable to rural-
urban migration rather than to the rural-urban differential in natural 
increase, is illustrated in table 2 with numerical values relating to a 
particular point in time (1960). But, since these values refer to world 
regions characterized by differing levels of development, it is likely 
that the role of rural-urban migration as a main contributor to urban-
ization also holds over time. In fact, although its importance may have 
varied at times, such a role has been observed historically and has been 
described by the generalization known as the mobility revolution first 
developed by Zelinsky. 6 
This mobility revolution is the spatial counterpart of the vital rev-
olution or demographic transition, which is the process whereby so-
cieties with high birth- and death rates move to low birth- and death 
rates. In brief, Zelinsky argues that all forms of personal mobility 
experience an evolutionary sequence parallel to that of the vital rev-
olution as countries go through the process of modernization. Accord-
ing to him, this sequence consists of five phases, of which the inter-
mediate ones are of greatest interest for the study of rural-urban 
migration. 
Initially (premodern traditional society), there is little genuine 
migration from the countryside to cities. In the second phase (early 
transitional society--characterized by a decline in mortality), massive 
movements take place from rural to urban areas. They tend to slacken 
in the third phase (late transitional society-characterized by a decline 
in fertility). They are further reduced in absolute and relative terms in 
the fourth phase (advanced society-with slight to moderate natural 
increase), possibly to totally disappear in the fifth and last phase (su-
peradvanced society). The evolution of the rural exodus through the 
five phases described above is illustrated in figure 1, which shows a 
curve reaching a plateau during phases Ill and IV and then dwindling 
sharply. 
III. The Relationship between Rural-Urban Migration and Degree of 
Urbanization: A Mathematical Framework 
In contrast to the work of Zelinsky, which is rather qualitative, this 
paper adopts an analytic viewpoint and attempts to characterize in 
quantitative terms the evolution of rural-urban net migration with eco-
nomic development, proxied by time or an objective index. More pre-
cisely, the objective here is to investigate: (a) the evolution, in any 
• W. Zelinsky, "The Hypothesis of the Mobility Transition," Geographical Review 
61 (1971): 219-49. 
TABLE 2 
TOTAL GROWTH RATE, NATURAL INCREASE, AND NET MIGRATION RATES (%0) IN THE WORLD AND MAJOR REGIONS, 1960 
REGION 
World . . ...... . .............. . 
More developed regions ... .. . . 
Less developed regions .... . .. . 
Africa . ..... . ..... . ... .. .. . . . 
Northern America .... . ...... . 
Latin America .. . ............ . 
East Asia . .. . . .... .. .. ... .. . . 
South Asia ... . . . ......... . . . . 
Europe . ..... .. . .. .. .. ... ... . 
Oceania ........ . . ...... ..... . 
USSR ...................... . 
SOURCE.-Same as table I. 


























NATURAL INCREASE RATE 
Rural-Urban 
Rural Urban Differential 
20.7 16.I 4.6 
14.0 11.2 2.8 
22.4 22 .5 -.I 
22.7 23.6 -.9 
15.5 15.3 .2 
31.6 24.3 7.3 
17.4 16.9 .5 
24.2 22.8 1.4 
11.8 7.6 4.2 
23.2 13.6 9.6 
18.I 14.3 3.8 
NET MIGRATION RATE 
Urban-Rural 
Rural Urban Differential 
-8.2 16.9 25 . I 
-16.6 12.3 28.9 
-5.9 23.0 28.9 
-4.7 21.2 25 .9 
-16.7 9.0 25.7 
-18.9 20.3 39.2 
-8.8 31.7 40.5 
-3.0 13.9 16.9 
-16.0 10.3 26.3 
-10.0 12.6 22.6 








































FIG. I .-Changing level of the rural-urban migration through time (W. 
Zelinsky, "The Hypothesis of the Mobility Transition," Geographical Review 
61 (1971): 233). 
given country, of the rural net out-migration rate over time; and (b) the 
evolution of the rural net out-migration rate with per capita GNP in 
the "representative" country described by a cross-sectional sample of 
noncentrally planned countries. 
In a first step toward this objective, this section seeks to derive 
a general expression of the relationship linking rural-urban migration 
to the degree of urbanization on the basis of a simple framework of 
urbanization dynamics recently suggested. 7 
Let P,(t) and Pu(t) denote the rural and urban populations, re-




[r(t) - m(t)]P,(t) 
dPu(t) 
-;ft = u(t)Pu(t) + m(t)P, (t) , 
(1) 
(2) 
in which r(t) and u(t) are the natural increase rates in the rural and 
urban sectors, and m(t) is the net migration rate out of the rural sector. 
Letting S(t) denote the ratio [Pu(t)/P,(t)] of the urban to rural pop-






P,(t)dt ' (3) 
A 7 N. Keyfitz , " Do Cities Grow by Natural Increase or by Migration?" Geographical 
na/ysis 12 (April 1980): 142-56. 
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an equation indicating that the "tempo"8 of urbanization, as measured 
by the growth rate of the urban-rural population ratio, is equal to the 
difference between the urban and rural population growth rates. 9 
Then, substituting equations (I) and (2) into equation (3) yields a 
differential equation linking the urbanization index S(t) with its two 
factors: namely, the rural-urban natural increase differential a(t) = r(t) 
u(t) and the rural net out-migration rate m(t). We obtain 
dS(t) [ 1 ] 
S(t)dt = m(t) l + S(t) - a(t) . '° (4) 
Since the proportion a (t) of the total population that is urban (or 
degree of urbanization) is linked with S(t) by 
S(t) 
a(t) = 1 + S(t) ' (5) 
equation (4) can be rewritten as 
[ 
dS(t) ] 
m(t) = a (t) S(t)dt + a(t) , (6) 
an expression which shows that the rural net out-migration rate is 
proportional to the degree of urbanization a(t) as well as to a term 
which is the sum of the tempo of urbanization and the rural-urban 
natural increase differential. 
Finally, we can write equation (6) as 
da(t) 
m(t) = [l ]d + a(t)a(t) , 
-a(t) t (7) 
which is precisely the relationship we sought to establish at the outset 
of this section. Note that, ifthe rural-urban natural increase differential 
is negligible, m(t) is equal, in the first approximation, to the first term 
appearing in the right-hand side of equation (7) and denoted hereafter 
by m(t): 
8 Note that our definition of the tempo of urbanization is slightly different from 
Arriaga's definition , which considers the difference between the urban and total popu· 
lation growth rates (E . Arriaga. "Selected Measures of Urbanization ," in The Mea· 
surement of Urbanization and Projection of Urban Population , ed. S. Goldstein and D. 
Sly [Liege: International Union for the Scientific Study of Population , 1975], pp. 19-87). 
9 This interpretation has been proposed in UN Population Division . 
10 This equation was initially derived in J . Ledent, ''Comparative Dynamics of Three 
Demographic Models of Urbanization ," Research Report no. 80-1 (Laxenburg, Austria: 
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis , 1980). 
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m(t) do.(t) (8) (1 - o.(t)]dt . 
Alternatively, if [3(t) = 1 - o.(t) denotes the percentage of the total 
population that is rural, m(t) can be written as 
- df3(t) 
m(t) = - [3(t)dt ' (9) 
thus indicating that the conditional rural net out-migration rate-that 
is, the rural net out-migration rate prevailing in case of zero rural-urban 
natural increase differential-is equal to the average rate of decrease 
of the rural percentage (a result which could have been derived intu-
itively as well). 
Note here that the absolute error made by approximating m(t) by 
m(l) is equal to IA(1)lo.(1), which in all cases is less than IA(t)I. Ignoring 
the existence of the natural increase differential leads to an absolute 
error in the value of the rural net out-migration rate that is necessarily 
less than the absolute value of actual rural-urban natural increase dif-
ferential. Since, in any instance, this differential is of the magnitude 
of 1%0-2%0, the approximation of m(l) by m(l) is generally a satisfactory 
one. 
IV. Evolution of Rural Net Outmigration Rates in Selected Developing 
Countries: 195~2000 
The mathematical framework presented above suggests the possibility 
of estimating rural net out-migration rates in countries for which data 
on the degree of urbanization are available at different times. 
If the degree of urbanization of a given country takes on the values 
cx(t1) and o.(12) at times 11 and 12 , the average annual rate of rural net 
out-migration over the period (1 1, 12) can be estimated, for the case of 
a negligible rural-urban natural increase differential, from 
- l [l - o.(ti)] 
m(li.12) =-_-In 1 _ () , 12 11 0. 12 (10) 
a relationship which follows immediately from equation (9). 11 
On the basis of this formula, estimates of the conditional rural net 
out-migration rate have been calculated for four developing countries-
lndia, Egypt, Mexico, and Honduras-during the period 195(}-2000, 
11 Eq. (10) summarizes , in a simpler and more elegant format, an earlier estimation 
Procedure set out in J. Ledent and A. Rogers, "Migration and Urbanization in the Asian 
Pac1fic," Working Paper no. 79-51 (Laxenburg, Austria: International Institute for Ap-
plied Systems Analysis , 1979). 
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from the estimated and projected degrees of urbanization recently pul 
lished by the UN 12 and shown in table 3. 
Table 4, which presents the estimates thus obtained, suggests 
general upward tendency. Exceptions to this tendency concern Egypt-
where the rural net out-migration rate fell substantially between 195 
and 1975 (a phenomenon which can be associated with the variou 
wars in which that country was involved during that period)-an 
Mexico, where the rural net out-migration rate is expected to decreas 
slightly in the last 2 decades of this century. This observation for Mexic 
is in sharp contrast with the threefold to fourfold increase that the run 
net out-migration rate is expected to experience between the earl 
1970s and the end of this century in India and Egypt. Nevertheless, b 
the year 2000, the rural net out-migration rate in these countries wil 
still be smaller than that in Mexico . 
Note that the four countries selected above for the purpose of ou 
illustration were not chosen at random. These countries (plus a fev 
other small countries of Central America) are, in fact, the only devel 
oping countries for which the UN, 13 in the recent past, has publishe( 
TABLE 3 
ESTIMATED AND PROJECTED VALUES OF THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION(%) IN 
SELECTED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES , 1950-2000 
YEAR 
COUNTRY 1950 1960 1970 1975 1980 1990 2000 
India .. ... .. . , . 16.79 17.90 19.70 20.74 22.26 26.92 34.05 
Egypt .... . . .. . 31.92 37.86 42.45 43.54 45 .37 50.54 57.36 
Mexico 42.65 50.75 59.04 63 .03 66.69 72.83 77.35 
Honduras . .. .. 17.77 22.74 28.71 31.97 35 .55 43 .27 51.04 
SouRCE.-UN Population Division, Patterns of Urban and Rural Population 
Growth , Annex C (New York: UN Department of International Economic and Social 
Affairs , 1980). 
TABLE 4 
ANNUAL AVERAGE VALUES OF THE CONDITIONAL RURAL NET OUT-MIGRATION 
RATE (%0) IN SELECTED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES , 1950-2000 
PERIOD 
COUNTRY 1950-60 1960-70 1970-75 1975-80 1980-90 1990-2000 
India .. . ...... 1.34 2.22 2.61 3.86 6.19 10.26 
Egypt . .... .. . . 9. 13 7.31 4.53 6.63 9.95 15.40 
Mexico . . . . .. . 15.23 18.43 20 .50 20.84 20.36 18.21 
Honduras ... .. 6.24 8.04 9.46 10.80 12.75 14.74 
12 UN Population Division . 
13 UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs , Demographic Yearbook 1976 
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annual data on fertility and mortality rates according to urban and rural 
residence , thus allowing one to obtain estimates of the rural-urban 
natural increase differential. 
It turns out that, in a given country, such a differential may vary 
rapidly due to changes in fertility/mortality patterns as well as shifts 
in age composition. For example, table 5 presents for our four countries 
the minimal and maximal annual values of this differential in the early 
1970s (or the late 1960s, in the case of Honduras) ; however, the vari-
ation of this differential generally occurs around a rather stable average 
value, which is shown in the last column of table 5. 
In accordance with the observation made in Section 11, such av-
erage values appear to be generally small (3 .6%o in the case of Egypt) , 
if not trifling (in the cases of India and Mexico). However, this is not 
so for Honduras, where the urban rate of natural increase is much 
higher than its rural counterpart. 14 
On the basis of the average natural increase differentials just de-
scribed, we can readily derive estimates of the discrepancy existing 
between the conditional and unconditional net migration rates relating 
to our four countries observed in the first half of the 1970s. Not sur-
prisingly, the conditional rate underestimates the unconditional one by 
a rather negligible quantity in India and Mexico (0.04%0 and 0.18%0, 
respectively). In Egypt, the discrepancy reaches 1.55%0, thus causing 
the 1970-75 average rural net out-migration rate to be 6.08%0 instead 
of the 4.53%0 conditional estimate derived earlier. 
Finally, in Honduras, the consideration of the rural-urban natural 
increase reduces the conditional estimate of 9.36% by as much as 
6.62%, thus bringing the value of the rural net out-migration rate to 
2.74%. 
In the absence of any further information on the rural-urban natural 
TABLE 5 
EXTREME AND AVERAGE VALUES OF THE RURAL-URBAN NATURAL INCREASE 
DIFFERENTIAL (%0) IN SELECTED COUNTRIES IN THE LATE 1960s OR EARLY 1970s 
Minimal Maximal Average 
Country Period Value Value Value 
India 
· · · ··· · ·· . ... ..... .. . . . . 1972-75 - .8 I. I .2 
Egypt . . . ... . .... . . .. .. . . . . .. . 1970-74 1.5 6.9 3.6 
Mexico . ....... . . . . . .. .. .. ... 1965-73 -2.2 4.0 .3 
Honduras . .. .. .. .. ... ........ 1965-70 -25.9 -18.0 -21.8 
SouRcE.-UN, Demographic Yearbook 1976 (New York: UN Department of Eco-
nomic and Social Affairs, 1977). The 1973, 1974, and 1975 yearbooks were also used . 
. " This comparatively larger natural increase follows from an urban crude birthrate 
wtich is twice as high as its rural counterpart owing to the young population structure 
0 urban areas, possibly brought about by a large influx of young immigrants . 
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increase differentials concerning the rest of the period 1950-2000, we 
simply assume, for illustrative purposes, that the average values de-
rived above for the early 1970s for each country prevail throughout the 
whole period. Table 6 shows the ensuing unconditional estimates of the 
rural net out-migration rate as well as the discrepancies between cor-
responding conditional and unconditional estimates. 
For various reasons, the simple derivation of average values of the 
conditional and unconditional rural net out-migration rates just de-
scribed may, in some circumstances, be insufficient, and one may wish 
instead to determine estimates for any point in time during a given 
period. Let us note that, for this purpose, it is sufficient to know the 
function a(t) describing the evolution of the degree ofurbanization with 
time. From such a knowledge, equation (8) allows the derivation of an 
expression of the conditional net out-migration rate m(t), and, if the 
evolution of the rural-urban natural increase differential is known, 
equation (7) yields an ex.pression of the unconditional rate m(t). 
In general, no such expression of a(t) is known at the outset; 
therefore, one must either (a) use an adequate function interpolating 
between the observed values of the degree of urbanization or (b) fit a 
reasonable function to those observed values. In practice, these two 
alternatives are not really interchangeable. The first method is espe-
cially relevant when the period of reference is the observation period; 
the second method is more effective if the focus is on the likely evo-
lution occurring past the observation period. 
Both these alternatives are illustrated below. The interpolating 
method is examined in the remainder of this section, whereas the fitting 
technique is considered in Section VI. 
TABLE 6 
CONDITIONAL AND UNCONDITIONAL ESTIMATES OF THE RURAL NET OUT-
MIGRATION RATE (%0) IN SELECTED COUNTRIES , 1950-2000 
PERIOD 
COUNTRY 1950-60 1960-70 1970-75 1975-80 1980-90 1990-2000 
Unconditional-Conditional Differentials 
India ..... ... . .03 .04 .04 .04 .09 .06 
Egypt . . . .. . . .. 1.25 1.44 1.55 1.60 1.73 2.02 
Mexico . . .... . .14 .16 .18 .19 .21 .23 
Honduras - 4.40 -5.60 -6.62 -7.36 -8.58 - 10.27 
Unconditional Estimates 
India .... .. . . . 1.38 2.26 2.65 3.90 6.24 10.32 
Egypt . . . . ..... 10.38 8.75 6.08 8.18 I 1.68 17.42 
Mexico ....... 15 .37 18.59 20.68 21.03 20.57 18.44 
Honduras .. .. . J.84 2.44 2.74 3.44 4. 17 4.17 
--
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Two of the most effective interpolating techniques rely on poly-
nomial functions (whose degree is one less than the number of obser-
vations) and cubic spline functions, respectively. Although the latter 
technique is becoming increasingly popular in the field of demography, 15 
the former is chosen here because of its simpler computing require-
ments. 
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the conditional rural net out-mi-
gration rate m(t) in the developing countries previously studied, based 
on the application of the polynomial technique to the UN data of table 
3. The observation of this figure, indeed, confirms the general evolution 
observed earlier when estimating the average values of such a rate over 
the UN decennial (or quinquennial) intervals; but, in addition, it allows 
for a finer assessment of the evolution of such a rate if it is nonmono-
tonic (Egyptian case especially). 
Note that, in virtually all cases, the average values of the rural net 
out-migration rates derived earlier are, if plotted at mid-period, located 
near the curve representing the evolution of m(t), an observation that 
indeed points to the soundness of our interpolation procedure. How-
ever, the average values are generally located farther away from the 
curve in the case of the last decennial period (1990-2000). This is in 
agreement with the well-known result that polynomial interpolations 
tend to perform poorly at each extreme of the interpolation period. 16 
Finally, in the case of Honduras, the evolution of the conditional 
and unconditional rural net out-migration rates are contrasted in figure 
3. The unconditional rates are based on a rural-urban natural increase 
differential a(t) equal to its observed value in the late 1960s. Aside 
from the two thick lines stressing the evolution of these two rates, this 
figure displays thinner lines indicating the evolution of the uncondi-
tional rates for alternative constant values of ~(t). In principle, figure 
3 could be used as a figure of reference to directly determine the evo-
lution of m(t) from the knowledge of the actual evolution of ~(t). 
15 D.R. McNeil, T. J. Trussell, and J.C. Turner, "Spline Interpolation of Demo-
graphic Data ," Demography 14 (May 1977): 245-52 . 
16 To avoid such a poor interpolation for the first decennial period 1950-60, the 
observation period has been enlarged to include two pre-1950 observations. The values 
of the degree of urbanization thus required for India, Egypt, and Mexico, respectively, 
have been obtained from A. Bose, "Urbanization in India : A Demographic Perspective," 
m Patterns of Urbanization: Comparative Country Studies, vol. I, ed. S. Goldstein and 
D. Sly (Liege: International Union for Scientific Study of Population, 1974); A. Khalifa, 
The Population of Egypt, CICRED Series (Cairo: Institute of Statistical Studies and 
Research, 1973); and L. Unikel , "Urbanization in Mexico: Process , Implications, Pol-
icies and Prospects," in Patterns of Urbanization : Comparative Country Studies, vol. 
2, ed. S. Goldstein and D. Sly (Liege: International Union for Scientific Study of Pop-
ulat10n, 1975) . In the absence of any reliable source, the necessary values for Honduras 
were simply obtained from a backward extrapolation of the logistic curve estimated later 
on m Sec. VI. 
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FIG. 3.-Evolution of the rural net out-migration rate under various con-
stant natural increase differentials: Honduras, 1950-2000. 
V. The Evolution of Rural-Urban Migration Compatible with a Logistic 
Evolution of the Degree of Urbanization 
As mentioned above, another possible use of equations (7) or (8) follows 
from the availability of an expression for the degree of urbanization 
a(t). Is there any obvious functional form for such an expression? The 
literature does suggest that the past evolution of the degree of urban-
ization in the currently developed countries can be depicted by atten-
uated S-shaped curves (see fig. 4 for an illustration of the curves for 
selected countries). Furthermore, from a modeling viewpoint, these 
curves can be adequately represented by a logistic function. 17 
Thus, our focus naturally shifts to the functional form of the con-
ditional rural net out-migration rate that is consistent with a logistic 
evolution of the degree of urbanization. Let 
b 
a(t) = a + h , 
1 + ce- ' 
(11) 
where b, c, and hare positive constants and a is bounded from below 
and above by - (b/1 + c) and 1 - b, respectively. The variations of 
a(t) over time are illustrated in figure 5A, which shows the existence 
of a point of inflection occurring for t equal to 
17 IBRD, Urbanization (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1972); B. Berry, The Human 
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FIG. 4.-Historical evolution of population classed as urban in selected 
currently developed countries (Kingsley Davis, "The Urbanization of the Hu-
man Population," Scientific American 213 [1965]: 47). 
I 
la = h In C. (12) 
In such circumstances, the part of the population that is rural is 
equal to 
[3(!) = I - (a + b) + c(l 
I + ce - h' 
a)e - h' (13) 
It is then readily established from equation (9) that the conditional rural 
out-migration rate can be expressed as 
bche-h' ~(n = (I~ [I - (a + b) + c(l - a)e - h1](1 + ce-h1) • 
The first derivative of this function has the sign of 
x(t) = c2(1 -a)he - 2h1 - h[l - (a +b)] , (15) 
an expression which is positive for all t less than 
I c2(1 - a) 
t =-In . 
m 2h I - (a + b) (16) 
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Consequently, in case of a logistic evolution of the urbanization index, 
the conditional rural net out-migration rate first increases, passes 
through a maximum fort = tm, and then decreases toward zero: see 
figure 5B. 
In brief, if the rural-urban natural increase differential remains 
negligible over time, a logistic evolution of the urbanization index a(t) 
leads to a rural net out-migration rate function whose evolution through 
time is consistent with Zelinsky' s mobility revolution hypothesis. 
What if the rural-urban natural increase differential is not negli-
gible? Then, the (unconditional) rural net out-migration is clearly ob-
tained from 
m(t) = m(t) + a(t).:i(t) , (17) 
where m(t) and a(t) are given by equations (14) and (l l), respectively. 
The evolution of the rural net out-migration rate, which now de-
pends on the evolution of .:i(t), is likely to be similar to the one suggested 
by the evolution of m(t) in most circumstances .18 But, as implied by 
equation (17), this evolution is such that, with respect to the case of 
a zero natural increase differential, the maximum is reached less (more) 
rapidly and takes on a larger (smaller) value if .:i(t) is a positive (neg-
ative) function. 
VI. Long-Term Evolution of Rural-Urban Migration in Selected De· 
veloping Countries 
An immediate application that the mathematical developments of the 
preceding section suggests is the determination of the time at which 
the rural net out-migration will start to level off in the four developing 
countries already considered. 
As a first step toward such a determination, we now fit a logistic 
curve to the UN's 1950-2000 urbanization data (see table 3 above) to 
obtain the values of the parameters a, b, c, and h necessary to project 
the future evolution of m(t). Such an estimation is performed with the 
help of a nonlinear least-squares method-the so-called Levenberg-
Marquardt method-modified by Brown and Dennis. 19 
As suggested by the results shown in table 7, the estimation pro-
cedure yields reasonable results only in the case of Mexico and Hon-
18 It is simple to analytically establish this result for well-behaved evolutions of A(t). 
such as a constant 6(1) or one that is a linear function of the degree of urbanization. 
19 K . Levenberg, "A Method for the Solution of Certain Nonlinear Problems in 
Least Squares ," Quarterly Applied Mathematics 2 (1944) : 164-68: D. W. Marquard!. 
"An Algorithm for Least-Squares Estimation of Nonlinear Parameters," SIAM Joumal 
of Numerical Analysis 11 (1963): 341-441; K. M. Brown and J. E . Dennis, "Derivative 
Free Analogues of the Levenberg-Marquardt and Gauss Algorithms for Nonlinear Lea 1 










(Al Degree of urbanization 
IB) Conditional rural net outmigration rate 
525 
FIG. 5.-Evolution of the conditional rural net out-migration rate com-
Pllible with a logistic evolution of the degree of urbanization. A, Degree of 
ization. B, Conditional rural net out-migration rate. 
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duras: the limiting values of the degree of urbanization are 85.7% and 
91.5% and the dates at which the point of inflection occurs are 1963 
and 1995, respectively. 
The failure of the estimation procedure in the cases of India and 
Egypt is hardly a surprise and can be easily explained. On the one 
hand, the Indian degree of urbanization, as predicted by the UN, will 
still be, in the year 2000, in the swift-rise period preceding the reaching 
of the point of inflection, and therefore the estimation procedure is 
unsuccessful in determining a reasonable upper asymptote. On the 
other hand, urbanization in Egypt, which has evolved erratically be-
tween 1950 and 1975 because of the aforementioned wars, has not 
followed the smooth evolution characterizing a logistic curve. 
However, in the Egyptian case, since the evolution predicted by 
the UN for the period 1975-2000 is well behaved, we could simply fit 
a logistic curve in relation to the narrower period 1975-2000. But this 
would leave us with only four observations, that is, as many obser-
vations as there are parameters! 
Thus, in view of the impossibility of deriving a credible estimate 
of the ultimate degree of urbanization for India and Egypt, we adopt 
here the alternate methodology consisting of fitting a logistic curve with 
an exogenously determined ultimate degree of urbanization aoo; differ-
ent values of aoo are successively assumed in order to assess the sen-
sitivity of the estimates of m(t) to the choice of aoo. 
Part of table 7 displays the values of the coefficients a, b, c, and 
h obtained for five predetermined values of aoo ranging from 75% to 
TABLE 7 
CALIBRATION OF THE LOGISTIC CURVES DESCRIBING THE EVOLUTION OF THE 
DEGREE OF URBANIZATION IN SELECTED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:* PARAMETER 
VALUES, INDEX OF FIT, AND YEAR IN WHICH THE POINT OF INFLECTION OCCURS 
Country ax a b c h ssqt r. 
{" .1590 .5910 55.91 .06410 .1004 2012 .80 .1584 .6416 57.95 .06260 .0862 2015 India ........ .85 .1579 .6921 60.16 .06135 .0758 2017 .90 .1574 .7426 62.50 .06030 .0681 2019 
.95 .1570 .7930 64.91 .05940 .0622 2020 {" .3944 .3556 60.55 .08291 .0026 1999 .80 .3875 .4125 48.62 .07422 .0003 2002 Egypt ....... .85 .3820 .4680 42.76 .06820 .0002 2005 .90 .3775 .5225 39.57 .06377 .0004 2008 
.95 .3737 .5263 37.81 .06037 .0009 2010 
Mexico ...... (.8574) .2015 .6560 1.914 .05138 .0514 1%3 
Honduras . ... (.9150) .0306 .8845 5.003 .03563 .0356 1995 
• All curves were fitted to the UN's 1950-2000 data of table 3 except in the case 
of Egypt (1975-2000 data only). 
t The index of fit ssq is the sum of squares of the residuals. 
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95%.20 Note the regular variations of these coefficients with a~ and 
observe the small sensitivity of the parameter a and the high sensitivity 
of the parameter b to changes in the value of a~ . 
Table 8 displays the evolution, over the period 2000-2050, of the 
degree of urbanization resulting from the logistic trends just estimated. 
Considering first the two countries for which "full" logistic equations 
could be estimated, we observe a further 7. 2% rise-in absolute value-
of the degree of urbanization in Mexico, thus bringing this index to 
84.5% in 2050, a close value to the estimated ultimate figure of 85.7%. 
As for the degree of urbanization in Honduras, it is expected to rise 
from 51.1% in 2000 to 80.5% in 2050. 
Turning now to the other two nations and assuming an ultimate 
degree of urbanization of 85%, we also observe a sharp rise in the 
degree of urbanization, from 34.05% in 2000 to 77 .02% in 2050 in the 
case of India and from 57.36% in 2000 to 82.91% in 2050 in that of 
Egypt. In fact, depending on its ultimate value, the degree of urban-
ization reached in 2050 could range between 70.0% and 83.4% in India 
and 74.5% and 90.2% in Egypt. 
The evolution of the conditional rural net out-migration rates over 
the period 1950-2050 (1975-2050 in the case of Egypt), which follow 
from the logistic curves estimated above, are shown in figure 6. 21 In 
TABLE 8-PROJECTED PERCENTAGES OF POPULATION IN URBAN AREAS 
IN SELECTED DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 2000-50 
2000 YEAR 
COUNTRY O.x (UN) 2000 2010 2020 2030 2040 2050 
r 34.05 33.99 42.38 52.17 60.29 66.21 70.02 India ...... .. .80 34.05 34.00 43.09 53.05 62.09 68 .99 73.60 .85 34.05 34.00 43.30 53.80 63.71 71.58 77.02 .90 34.05 34.01 43.48 54.46 65.18 73.99 80.29 .95 34.05 34.01 43.63 55.05 66.52 76.26 83.43 
r 57.36 57.59 64.51 69.51 72.37 73.80 74.47 .80 57 .36 57.60 65.09 71.24 75.31 77.63 78.83 Egypt ... . .. . .85 57.36 57.60 65.50 72.58 77.77 81.04 82.91 .90 57.36 57.60 65.81 73.64 79.86 83 .10 86.71 .95 57 .36 57 .61 66.04 74.49 81.63 86.83 90.23 
Mexico ...... (.8574) 77.35 77.35 80.45 82.47 83.75 84.53 85.02 
Honduras .... (.9150) 51.04 51.06 58.69 65 .65 71.66 76.61 80.52 
20 The relatively better fit prevailing in the Egyptian case as suggested by the small 
values of the index of fit (sum of the squares of the residuals) simply reflects the limitation 
of the estimation procedure to the period 1975-2000 as against 1950--2000 in the case of 
India. 
21 Interestingly enough, the migration rate curves thus derived appear, over the 
observation period, to smooth the corresponding curves obtained earlier by use of the 
polynomial interpolation (see Sec . IV) and shown in each country diagram of fig. 6 by 
a dashed line. The comparison of the solid and dashed lines over the period 1990--2000 
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FIG. 6.-Evolution of the conditional rural net out-migration rate: selected 
developing countries, 1950-2000. Solid lines, 1950-2000 evolution based on a 
logistic evolution of the degree of urbanization. Dashed lines, 1950-2000 evo· 
lution based on polynomial interpolation of the degree of urbanization (from 
Sec. IV). In the case of Honduras, the evolution of unconditional rate is also 
shown for alternative values of the rural-urban natural increase differential. 
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the case of Honduras, alternative evolutions of the unconditional mi-
gration rate are also shown for various constant values of d(t), including 
the value observed in the late 1960s. 
In accordance with the result mathematically derived in Section 
V, each migration rate curve presents an upward evolution that, after 
some time, gives way to a downward evolution. A closer look at the 
dates at which the reversal is predicted to occur in each country allows 
one to conclude, with reference to Zelinsky's mobility revolution hy-
pothesis examined in Section II, that: Mexico is in phase III approach-
ing phase IV; Honduras and Egypt are in the transitional stage leading 
from phase II to phase III; and India has just arrived at phase II at the 
present time. Therefore, while the Mexican conditional migration rate, 
currently at its peak (21.1 %0 in 1979) is likely to decrease rapidly to 
less than 3%o in 2050, the conditional migration rate in the case of the 
other countries is expected to continue increasing well into the next 
century, until 2029 in Honduras, 2031 in India, and 2016 in Egypt (on 
the basis of an 85% ultimate value for the degree of urbanization). As 
indicated in table 9, these dates appear to be barely affected by the 
consideration of a rural-urban natural increase differential equal to the 
observed values set out in table 5, except for Honduras, where the 
maximal value of the unconditional migration rate is reached as soon 
as 2008 versus 2029 in the conditional case. 
The figures set out in table 9-if we disregard the cases corre-
sponding to highly improbable ultimate values of the degree of urban-
ization in India and Egypt (e.g., aoo = .90 and .95)-also suggest a 
maximal value of the rural net out-migration rate in the order of 
20%o-25%o, except in the case of Honduras. 
TABLE 9 
CONDITIONAL AND UNCONDITIONAL RURAL NET OUT-MIGRATION RATES: MAXIMAL 
VALVES (%0) AND CORRESPONDING YEARS IN WHICH THEY OCCUR 
CONDITIONAL UNCONDITIONAL 
COUNTRY Value Year Value Year 
r 18.86 2022 18.97 2022 .80 21.57 2026 21.68 2026 India ......... .85 24.93 2031 25.06 203 1 .90 29.40 2036 29.54 2036 .95 36. 13 2044 36.29 2044 
r 18.05 2005 20.25 2005 .80 20.24 2010 22.58 2010 Egypt .... .. ... .85 23.17 2016 25.69 2016 .90 27.28 2022 29.98 2022 .95 33.77 2031 36.74 2032 
Mexico (.8574) 20.86 1979 21.05 1980 
Honduras ..... (.9150) 19.35 2029 5.01 2008 
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Finally, let us stress here the remarkable evolution of the Indian 
conditional migration rate that rises from less than 2%o in 1950 to 3.6%o 
in 1975 before increasing dramatically to 12.3%0 in 2000 and up to the 
maximal value of 24.9%0 in 2036 (on the basis of an 85% value for a~) . 
VII. Evolution of Rural-Urban Migration with per Capita GNP: The 
Case of the "Representative" Country 
This paper has focused on the temporal evolution of the rural net out-
migration rate for a given country. Because intercountry comparisons 
play an essential part in understanding the processes of economic de-
velopment, we now adopt a larger perspective that attempts to quantify 
broadly the relationship between rural-urban migration and the degree 
of economic development, as measured by per capita GNP. 
For this purpose, let us assume that per capita GNP is a simple 
function y(t) of time. Then, recalling equations (7) and (8), we have 
m(y) = m(y) + a(y)Li(y) , (18) 
where 
dy da(y) 
m(y) = dt · [1 -a(y)]dy · (19) 
In addition, let us assume, on the basis of the scatter diagram of 
figure 7, that the degree of urbanization a(y) is a logistic function of 
the level y of per capita GNP, measured in logarithmic terms: 
b' () - '+----a y - a 1 + c' e-h' In Y , (20) 
where a', b', c', and h' are appropriate coefficients. 
Then, substituting equation (20) into equation (19) leads to 
-() dy b'c'h'e-h' lny 
m Y = - --------------------
ydt [1 (a' + b') + c' (1 - a')e-h' In Y](l + c'e - 1i· In Y). 
(21) 
This formula suggests that, if the rural-urban differential remains neg-
ligible, the rural net out-migration rate is proportional to the growth 
rate of per capita GNP as well as to a term whose evolution is similar 
to that of m(t) as defined by equation (14). Moreover, if the growth rate 
Of per capita GNP is constant, the evolution of the rural net out-mi-
&ration rate with the level of per capita GNP necessarily follows the 
532 Economic Development and Cultural Change 
pattern previously indicated: it first increases, reaches a maximum, 
and then decreases toward a value of zero. 
The logistic equation (20) was fitted to the 88 observations in the 
scatter diagram of figure 7, again using the modified version of the 
Levenberg-Marquardt procedure. The ensuing logistic curve, whose 
coefficients have the following values: a' = 0.0061, b' = 0. 7332, 
c' = 1615.75, and h' = 1.3519 is shown in figure 7, 22 whereas table 10 
sets out the values of the degree of urbanization for selected values of 
y. Observe that the degree of urbanization of the "representative" 
country equal to 8.6% for y = $50 increases to 50% for y slightly higher 
than $500, reaches 70% for y = $2,000, and then asymptotically tends 
toward the ultimate value of 73.9%. 
Also shown in table 10 are the conditional and unconditional rural 
net out-migration rates calculated on the basis of a constant growth 
rate of per capita GNP equal to 3% (the unconditional migration rates 
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Fm. 7.-The association of the degree of urbanization with per capita 
GNP: scatter for 88 noncentrally planned countries (1965) and logistic evolution 
pertaining to the representative country. Source for scatter of points: H. Che· 
nery and M. Syrquin, Patterns of Development 1950-1970 (London: Oxford 
University Press , 1975) . 
22 Note that this curve admits a point of inflection for y ' = [c']Wh'l = $236. 
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TABLE IO 
EVOLUTION OF THE DEGREE OF URBANIZATION (%) AND THE CONDITIONAL AND 
UNCONDITIONAL VALUES OF THE RURAL NET OUT-MIGRATION RATE (%0): 
THE CASE OF THE REPRESENTATIVE COUNTRY 
RURAL NET OUT-MIGRATION RATE 
PER CAPITA DEGREE OF Conditional Unconditional 
GNP URBANIZA-
(1964 US$) TION k=.03 k Observed k= .03 k Observed 
50 ... . ........ 8.62 3.17 0.50 3.56 0.90 
70 .... . ..... .. 12.49 4.61 1.97 5.18 2.55 
100 ........... 18.09 6.59 4.47 7.42 5.30 
150 . .. ........ 26.36 9.20 8.45 10.41 9.66 
200 ... .. ... . . . 33 .17 10.98 11.64 12 .51 13. 16 
300 ..... . ..... 43.15 12.74 15.51 14.72 17.50 
400 ........ .. . 49.80 13.08 17.01 15.37 19.30 
500 ...... . . ... 54.41 12.74 17.19 15.24 19.69 
750 . . . .. . .. .. . 61.22 10.99 15 .37 13 .80 18.19 
1,000 ...... ... 64.81 9 .21 12.94 12.19 15 .92 
J,500 ......... 68.37 6.59 9.07 9.74 12.21 
2,000 . . . . . . . . . 70.06 4.96 6.57 8.19 9.79 
3,000 ....... .. 71.65 3.17 3.84 6.46 7.13 
4,000 ... .. . . . . 72.37 2.25 2.48 5.58 5.81 
equal to 4.6%0, a value estimated by the UN23 as being the relevant 
figure for the world total in 1960). In addition, figure 8 illustrates the 
evolution of the conditional rural net out-migration rate consistent with 
alternative constant growth rates of per capita GNP (k = 1 %, 2%, 3%, 
6%, and 9%). 
In accordance with the observation made immediately after deriv-
ing formula (21), all of the alternative curves designated by a thin line 
in figure 8 display the same evolutionary pattern: the rural net out-
migration rate increases, passes through a maximum for a value of y 
equal to 
l _ a' ]1th' 
(a' + b') ' (22) 
that is, $387, and then decreases toward zero. 
Actually, as a country develops, its growth rate of per capita GNP 
varies. Observe the scatter diagram of figure 9 which plots the average 
annual growth rate of per capita GNP (actually per capita GDP) reg-
istered over the period 1960-70 against the 1965 per capita GNP for 
100 noncentrally planned countries. Quite clearly, it suggests that the 
growth rate of per capita GNP is likely to follow an evolution repre-
~nted by a bell-shaped curve oriented downward. This speculation is 
ID fact confirmed by a simple regression analysis of the per capita GNP 
"4u n United Nations , Global Review of Human Settlements-a Support Paper for Hab-
' vol. 2 , Statistical Annex (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1976) . 
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against a polynomial of the second degree in the logarithm of per capita 
GNP. The following regression equation was obtained: 
dy 
-d = -16.18 + 5.960 In y - 0.4353 (In y)2 , 24 (23) 
y t 
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F1a. 8.-Evolution of the conditional rural net out-migration rate under 
alternative evolutions of the annual growth rate of per capita GNP: the rep-
resentative country. 
24 The t-statistics relating to the coefficients of the logarithm terms are equal to 3;! 
and - 2.88, respectively, and the coefficient of determination R2 is equal to .53. (I 
that the use of a polynomial of higher degree does not substantially increase the 
provided by the polynomial of degree 2. 
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FtG. 9.-The association between average annual growth rate of GDP per 
Clpita (period 1960--70) and per capita GNP (1965): scatter for 100 noncentrally 
flanned countries and evolution pertaining to the representative country. 
ce of per capita GNP: Chenery and Syrquin, Patterns of Development 
1970 (London: Oxford University Press, 1975); source of annual average 
o~ growth of GDP per capita: IBRD, World Tables 1976 (Baltimore : Johns 
ns University Press, 1976). 
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The corresponding evolution of the conditional rural net out-mi-
gration rate in the representative country is shown in table I 0 as well 
as in figure 8 (thick line). It still takes the form of a downward U-shaped 
curve, but, in the present case, both the ascent and descent appear to 
be steeper than in the case of a constant rate of growth of the per capita 
GNP. Observe that the maximal value of the conditional rural net out-
migration rate that is reached for a per capita GNP just under $500 is 
slightly higher than 17%0. 
Finally, abandoning the assumption of a zero rural-urban natural 
increase differential, we now display in figure 10 the evolution of the 
unconditional rural net out-migration rate-assuming that the annual 
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FIG. 10.-Evolution of the unconditional rural net out-migration rate under 
alternative values of the rural-urban natural increase differential. 
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(23)-for various assumptions regarding the rural-urban natural in-
crease differential. The two curves designated by a thick line corre-
spond to the case of a constant natural increase differential equal to 
zero (i.e., the conditional case) and to 0.046 (i.e., as already mentioned, 
the observed value for the world total in 1960).25 The other curves 
designated by a thinner line also relate to the assumption of constant 
values of the natural increase differential , the two extreme curves cor-
responding to values of plus and minus 15%0. 
In fact, the rural-urban natural increase differential is not likely 
to remain constant over the development process of the representative 
country. Because of the nonavailability of the necessary data, however, 
its evolution remains unknown to us. But should this evolution be 
known, then figure IO could be used as a figure ofreference to directly 
determine the evolution of m(y). It is easy to see, from that figure, that 
the most likely evolution of m(y) characterized by negligible values at 
both ends of the range of variation for y would lead to an evolution of 
the rural net out-migration rate necessarily following the general down-
ward U-shaped scheme depicted earlier in this paper. 
VIII. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have attempted to clarify our understanding of ur-
banization dynamics by analyzing in broad quantitative terms its key 
element, that is, the net transfer of population from rural to urban areas 
that occurs as a response to the spatial imbalances between labor supply 
and demand during the course of modernization (industrialization). 
In brief, the quantitative analysis carried out in this paper has 
sought to characterize the evolution of the rural net out-migration rate 
consistent with the course of the urbanization process commonly ob-
served. The functional form of the rural net out-migration rate that we 
obtained was shown to be compatible with Zelinsky's mobility revo-
lution hypothesis . A rather straightforward application of this quanti-
tative analysis was the prediction of the evolution of the rural net out-
migration rate implied by the most recent UN projections of urban and 
rural populations for selected developing countries. 26 
However, the sole consideration of the temporal evolution of the 
rural net out-migration rate, even for a wide range of countries, is 
insufficient to provide us with a meaningful understanding of urbani-
zation dynamics. What is called for is a quantitative analysis of the 
relationship between rural-urban migration and the degree of devel-
opment. A first step in that direction was made in Section VII of this 
2i In the latter case , the actual values of the unconditional migration rate for selected 
values of the per capita GNP are also shown in table 10. 
26 UN Population Division . 
................... --------------
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paper by building upon the methodology developed in the earlier sec-
tions. A rough quantification of the relationship between the rural net 
out-migration rate, on the one hand, and the level and annual growth 
rate of per capita GNP, on the other, was proposed. The main drawback 
offered by this relationship appears to lie in a too rigid dependence of 
the rural net out-migration rate on the growth rate of per capita GNP. 
More work in the direction of a more realistic association between 
these two factors appears to be necessary. 
The Limits to Urban Growth: Suggestions for 
Macromodeling Third World Economies* 
Allen C. Kelley 
Duke University 
Jeffrey G. Williamson 
University of Wisconsin-Madison 
I. City Growth and "Overurbanization" 
While there are some signs that population growth rates may have 
peaked in many developing countries, there is yet another demographic 
event of major proportions currently besetting the Third World-city 
growth rates of spectacular magnitude. Projections to the end of this 
century yield urban agglomerations of unprecedented sizes: Mexico 
City at 31 million, Sao Paulo at 26 million, and Cairo , Jakarta, Seoul , 
and Karachi each exceeding 15 million. 
While some observers have viewed these city growth projections 
with alarm, analysts are sharply divided regarding their validity and 
relevance. Pessimists stress the Third World ' s inability to cope with 
the resource and social systems requirements of rapid urban growth 
and high urban densities, thus prompting the term "overurbanization." 
The key notion here is that the social costs of continued in-migration 
to the cities exceed private costs, thus tending to create cities which 
are "too large" as well as "too many." Optimists view urban growth 
as the natural outcome of economic development and as the central 
mechanism by which average living standards and labor productivity 
are raised. 
These city growth projections are based on models which fail to 
allow for the potential feedback of various city costs on the rural-urban 
migration decision. In addition, detailed analyses of Third World cities 
by urban economists and planners conventionally take in-migration as 
* This research has been supported by the Ford Foundation, the International In-
stitute for Applied Systems Analysis , and the National Science Foundation . 
• 
© 1982 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 
0013-0079/82/3003-0008$01.00 
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exogenously given. It is our view that the debate can be better informed 
by the application of general equilibrium models of Third World de-
velopment which include some of the potential costs of urbanization-
models which at least make an effort to internalize the most important 
of various alleged costs so that potential "natural limits" to urban 
growth can be evaluated and the relevance of UN forecasts assessed . 
Section II illustrates how existing macro models of the Third World are 
"pro-urban" biased: typically they minimize the potential limits to 
urban growth and are silent on the issue of overurbanization. Section 
III lists some key forces which might serve to retard the rate of ur-
banization. Section IV develops this theme at length by offering some 
explicit suggestions on how these forces might be introduced into a 
general equilibrium model of Third World development. Central to this 
discussion will be potential cost-of-living differentials between urban 
and rural areas, urban housing availability, the quality of urban public 
goods, urban land scarcity, modern sector factor requirements and 
resource "bottlenecks," and the competing demands of "unproduc-
tive" urban capital accumulation. While no conclusive results are of-
fered in the present paper, it seems to us timely nevertheless to open 
the debate on strategies for macromodeling the "limits to urban 
growth" in Third World economies. 
II. What's Wrong with Our Macro Models of Development? 
Based on the firmly held belief that the current structure of an economy 
can influence its subsequent growth performance, macro models of 
Third World societies have stressed sectorial detail from the start. The 
classic examples are offered by the dual economy models pioneered 
by Lewis, Fei and Ranis, and Jorgenson, the latter extended by Kelley, 
Williamson, and Cheetham. 1 Central to these models and their more 
elaborate extensions are the output gains associated with resource 
transfers from "traditional" low-productivity sectors to "modern" 
high-productivity sectors. Such resource transfers-and labor migra-
tion in particular-have spatial implications, urbanization being the 
most notable example. In the classic labor surplus version, modern-
ization (or urbanization) augments aggregate output both through short-
run efficiency gains and long-run growth effects . In the short run, labor 
resources with low marginal productivity are shifted to high marginal 
productivity employment. In the long run, accumulation rates are raised 
1 W. A. Lewis, "Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labour," Manchester 
School of Economics and Social Studies 20 (May 1954): 139-92 ; J . C. H . Fei and G. 
Ranis, Development of the Labor Surplus Economy: Theory and Policy (Homewood , 
Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, 1964); D. W. Jorgenson, "The Development of a Dual Economy," 
Economic Journal 71 (June 1961): 309-34; A. C. Kelley, J . G. Williamson, and R. J. 
Cheetham, Dualistic Economic Development: Theory and History (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 1972). 
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since saving rates are higher in the modern sectors-indeed, in the 
extreme version only capitalists save, and capital is an argument in the 
modern production functions only. Rising (urban) accumulation rates 
imply increased rates of modern sector job vacancies, a rural-urban 
migration response, and further urbanization. Thus, output growth, 
trend acceleration, and increasing urbanization are the likely outcomes 
of the labor surplus model. The neoclassical dual economy model 
makes the same prediction, 2 although in this case only the long-run 
accumulation effects are operative since with marginal factor produc-
tivities equated in the conventional neoclassical version, comparative 
static efficiency gains are not associated with the urban-accumulation-
induced labor transfer. 
What forces tend to inhibit the rate of urbanization in these dual 
economy models? In the medium term, the rise in the real wage is 
typically the only source of retardation in the rate of modernization. 
The rise in the real wage serves to choke off the rise in the saving rate, 
to reduce the rate of urban capital accumulation, and to retard the rate 
of increase in new urban job vacancies, thus to limit urban growth. The 
ultimate source of the limits to urban growth in the dual economy model 
is therefore agriculture, through the disappearance oflabor surplus and/ 
or through the rise in the relative price of agricultural products-the 
key wage good in such models. Nowhere in this account are competing, 
and potentially voracious, urban "unproductive" investment demands 
on the national saving pool considered. In addition, while inelastic 
agricultural land supply insures an eventual constraint on urbanization 
through rising food costs and real wage increases, nowhere is the impact 
of inelastic urban land supply on city rents-another key wage good-
and urban cost of living considered. It seems to us that such models 
are poorly equipped to confront urbanization problems in the Third 
World. They say nothing about the costs of urbanization and are equally 
silent on the possible limits to urban growth generated within the grow-
ing urban sector itself. If our understanding of Third World urbanization 
is to be enriched by macro modeling, existing multisectoral models 
must be revised to capture the potential impact of city costs on urban 
population growth through migration. 
III. How Can We Model the Limits to Urban Growth? 
How might our models of development be revised to better capture the 
costs of urbanization? If there are endogenous forces which tend to 
inhibit the rate of urbanization independent of overt anti-urban policy, 
what are they? How potent might these forces be? Could they impose 
2 A. K. Dixit, "Models of Dual Economies ," in Models of Economic Growth, ed. 
J. Mirrlees and N. Stern (London: Macmillan Co., 1973); Kelley, Williamson, and Chee-
tham. 
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important limits to urbanization, offering potential departures from the 
gloomy predictions produced by UN projections? 
No doubt rapid rates of population growth explain much of the 
spectacular growth of cities in the Third World. Furthermore, one could 
appeal to the mechanics of the demographic transition as a potential 
limit to urban growth. It is well known that fertility rates are lower in 
the cities than in the countryside thus implying an eventual retardation 
in population growth rates as urbanization proceeds. City growth would 
retard on that score alone. Yet these long-run demographic transition 
forces are of doubtful magnitude to offer likely limits to urban growth 
in the next quarter century. 
It seems likely that far more insight might be gained by examining 
various urban costs which influence the migration decision, on the one 
hand, and rising urban investment requirements which compete with 
"productive" capital accumulation, on the other. First among these 
influences are inelastic urban land supplies. Urban land constraints 
serve to raise (market or shadow price) rents, augment urban relative 
to rural living costs, and inhibit in-migration to the city. The importance 
of these urban land constraints on city rents can only be evaluated in 
a general equilibrium model which admits housing service activities 
and confronts issues of equilibrium land use. Furthermore, any urban 
land use characterization must allow for a variety of urban land re-
quirements-residential squatter settlements, factory sites, land use 
for public social overhead, and luxury housing sites. Second, the hous-
ing-cum-social overhead investment requirements of city growth must 
be confronted. "Unproductive" urban investments of this type may 
well take priority over those forms· of accumulation which create ca-
pacity for future urban employment. 3 In any case, unproductive urban 
investment requirements compete directly with productive capital ac-
cumulation. Any model of urban growth must deal with these competing 
requirements since new urban housing-cum-social overhead require-
ments may very well serve to check urban growth. Of course, if the 
housing-cum-social overhead investment is forgone, then housing costs 
will rise and the quality of urban services fall, further discouraging in-
migration to the city. In short, the rise in the relative cost of living in 
the city may impose a limit to urban growth and/or the rise of urban 
unproductive investment requirements will diminish the rate of pro-
ductive urban capital accumulation, new urban job vacancies, and thus 
limit urban growth. 
3 An early analysis of this framework is the study by A. J . Coale and E. M. Hoover, 
Population Growth and Economic Development in Low Income Countries: A Case Study 
of India's Prospects (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1958). 
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There are other possible constraints on urbanization worth con-
sidering. "Modern'' sectors tend to be relatively intensive in both skills 
as well as intermediate inputs, and imported inputs in particular. The 
most visible manifestation of the latter influence is the cost of energy. 
As far as skill bottlenecks go, there is considerable debate. If capital 
and skills are complements and labor of different skills poor substitutes 
for each other, then rapid rates of urban capital accumulation imply 
increasing demands for skilled labor. Any model of the limits of urban 
growth must take these potential skill bottlenecks into account for they 
may place important constraints on capacity expansion in the modern 
urban sectors, retard the rate of growth in urban employment demand 
in general, and thus place further limits on urban growth. Any effort 
to relax this constraint by skill accumulation is likely to compete with 
productive urban capital accumulation and thus offer an alternative 
limit to urban growth. 
We have no way of appreciating how important these and other 
limits to urban growth may be without their explicit evaluation in a 
general equilibrium model of Third World development. What follows 
is an attempt to move in that direction. 
IV. A Menu of Possible Modeling Directions 
A. Technology, Sectors, and Potential Resource Bottlenecks 
It seems to us that the limits to urban growth cannot be adequately 
confronted unless at least eight sectors are specified . The distinguishing 
characteristic of our proposed approach is not the number of sectors, 
however, but rather the characteristics of the sectors. Our key emphasis 
is that five of these sectors produce outputs which are nontradeable 
interregionally, making rural-urban cost of living differentials possible, 
perhaps therefore influencing the rural out-migration decision. Our ap-
proach distinguishes between manufacturing (M), agriculture (A), mod-
ern services (KS), urban "traditional" services (US), rural "tradi-
tional" services (RS), urban high-cost housing (H,KS), urban low-cost 
housing (H, US), and rural low-cost housing (H,RS). While the first two 
of these are traded internationally and interregionally, the third is traded 
only interregionally, and the remaining five are consumed only at the 
site of production. 
Like many multisectorial development models, ours stresses pro-
duction dualism. Thus, the eight sectors exhibit quite different rates 
of technical progress, factor intensity, and substitution elasticities. 
Conventional physical capital, K;, is used in agriculture, manufacturing, 
and the modern service sector, although it is specific to a given sector 
once in place. Unskilled labor, L;, is used in all sectors except housing. 
Skilled labor, S;, is utilized in the manufacturing and the modern service 
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sectors only while land, R, is used as an input in both agriculture and 
urban housing. In what follows, we shall focus on the two modern 
sectors-manufacturing and the modern service sector-and reserve 
discussion of the remaining sectors for sections to follow. 
The production process in the two modern urban sectors is viewed 
to be more capital-cum-skill-intensive than both agriculture and the 
remaining service sectors. In addition, we shall impose restrictions on 
elasticities of substitution consistent at least in spirit with the "struc-
turalist" school,4 namely, that the elasticity of substitution in urban 
modern sectors is less than one. Yet, the presence of three factors of 
production in the modern urban sectors makes the conventional con-
stant elasticity of substitution (CES) production function inappropriate. 
Since it is not possible to confront the issue of earnings distribution or 
skilled labor bottlenecks without paying explicit attention to labor het-
erogeneity, we insist that the working population be distinguished at 
the very minimum by skilled and unskilled labor. Furthermore, we are 
convinced by several empirical studies that the elasticity of substitution 
between each of the three pairs of inputs in these modern sectors is 
not the same. Rather, we are persuaded that conventional capital and 
skills are relative complements5 and that this fact goes a long way in 
accounting for the phenomena of rising urban skilled wages, "wage 
stretching,"6 and increased earnings inequality in much of the Third 
World where capital accumulation and urbanization is so rapid. 
Most important, this specification introduces the possibility of skill 
bottlenecks accompanying rapid modern sector accumulation. Given 
complementarity between skills and capital in the modern sectors, rapid 
accumulation breeds sharply rising derived demands for skills. To the 
extent that skill accumulation is slow in matching that demand , modern 
sector output growth will be inhibited, new job vacancies for unskilled 
in the modern sectors suppressed, and rural-urban migration fore-
stalled. Capital-skill complementarity in the modern sectors, therefore, 
suggests one possible limit to urban growth. Any effort to relax that 
4 H.B. Chenery and W. J. Raduchel, "Substitution in Planning Models," in Studies 
in Development Planning, ed . H. B. Chenery (Cambridge , Mass .: Harvard University 
Press, 1971). 
5 Z. Griliches, "Capital-Skill Complementarity," Review of Economics and Statistics 
51, no. 4 (November 1969): 465-68; P. R. Fallon and P.R. G. Layard, "Capital-Skill 
Complementarity, Income Distribution and Output According," Journal of Political 
Economy 83, no . 2 (April 1975): 279-301; J. R. Kesselman , S. H. Williamson, and E. R. 
Berndt, "Tax Credits for Employment Rather than Investment," American Economic 
Review 67 , no. 3 (June 1977): 330-49. 
6 S. Morley and J. G. Williamson, "Class Pay Differentials , Wage Stretching, and 
Early Capitalist Development ," in Essays on Economic Development and Cultural 
Change in Honor of Bert F. Hoselitz, ed . M. Nash (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1977). 
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limit by accelerated skill accumulation implies forgone physical capital 
accumulation and thus an alternative limit to growth in those sectors 
which use capital most intensively, namely, the urban modern sectors 
themselves. 
Given the need to specify modern sector production functions that 
allow for relative complementarity between skilled labor and capital, 
the most useful specification is the "nested" CES first proposed by 
Sato7 and since applied to developing economies in a number of case 
studies. 8 The two modern sector production functions therefore take 
the following form: 
Q. = A·Q·Fa;,Fz.a;,z n Q· .au i = M,KS *1· I I I, I I ,) ' 
j ~ A,M,KS 
Qi.F = {~;<l>/a;-/J/a; + (1 _ ~;)[zL;]fa;-l)la;}a;l(a;-1), i = M,KS 
<I>;= {f ;[xK;]fa';-1)/a'; + (1 - f ;)[yS;)fa';-l)la';)}a';/(a';-1)' i = M,KS 
Ia;,j = 1, i = M,KS 4' j = F,Z,A,M,KS, 
(1) 
where Q; is gross output in sector i, Z; is imported raw materials, Q;,j 
are intersectoral inputs (excluding intrasectoral inputs), a;,j are the cost 
shares of each factor in gross sales, <I>; is a composite input index of 
conventional and human capital (skills), ~;and f; are distribution pa-
rameters, and a; and er'; are substitution elasticities. Factor-augmenting 
technical progress determines the level of x(t), y(t), and z(t). 
The reader will also note the presence of both imported raw mate-
rials, Z;, and domestic intersectoral inputs in these modern sector pro-
duction functions. The distinction is likely to be of substantial impor-
tance since without it we could hardly investigate the impact of, say, 
future increases in the price of energy-another resource bottleneck 
which may serve to limit urban growth since Z; is used most intensively 
in these modern sectors. 
B. Labor Migration, "Wage Gaps," and Cost-of-Living Differentials 
The most popular model of migration appears to be that first offered 
by Todaro. 9 Todaro's model was motivated by issues similar to those 
central to this paper, namely, how to account for apparent overurban-
7 K. Sato, "A Two Level Constant Elasticity of Substitution Production Function," 
Review of Economic Studies 34, no. 2 (April 1967): 201-18. 
s For example, see I. Adelman and S. Robinson, Income Distribution Policy in 
Developing Countries: A Case Study of Korea (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University 
Press, 1978). 
9 M. Todaro, "A Model of Labor, Migration and Urban Unemployment in Less 
Developed Countries," American Economic Review 59 (March 1969): 138-48. 
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ization in Third World economies in the sense that urban underem-
ployment in "traditional" urban service sectors was expanding rapidly 
in spite of impressive rates of accumulation and modern sector expan-
sion. 
The Todaro hypothesis is simple and elegant. While similar state-
ments can be found elsewhere, the most effective illustration can be 
found in Corden and Findlay 10 (reproduced in fig. 1) assuming perfect 
capital mobility. There are only two sectors analyzed, but they are 
sufficient to illustrate the point. Under the extreme assumption of wage 
equalization through migration, and in the absence of wage rigidities, 
equilibrium is achieved at E (the point of intersection of the two labor 
demand curves, AA' and MM'). Here w* A = w* Mand the urbanization 
rate is OML *MIL, where M denotes the manufacturing sector and A 
denotes agriculture. In addition, the Corden-Findlay model incorpo-
rates the widely held belief that the wage rate in Third World manu-
facturing sectors is "pegged" at artificially high levels, say at wM. If 
overt unemployment is assumed away, then all who fail to secure the 
favored jobs in the M sector would accept lower-paying jobs in the A 
sector at w** A· Clearly, the level of employment in the urban sector 
has been choked off by the high wage in manufacturing and both mi-
gration and urbanization have been forestalled. As Todaro initially 
pointed out, however, urbanization rates have been dramatic in the 
Third World and furthermore there has been an expansion in traditional 
urban service underemployment. Todaro explains this apparent conflict 
M 
FIG. 1.-The Harris-Todaro-Findlay model 
10 W. Corden and R. Findlay, "Urban Employment, Intersectoral Capital Mobility 
and Development Policy," Economica 42 (February 1975): 59-78. 
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(e.g., migration in the face of urban underemployment) by developing 
an expectations hypothesis which in its simplest form states that the 
favored jobs are allocated by "lottery," that the potential migrant cal-
culates the expected value of that lottery ticket, and compares it with 
the certain employment in the rural sector. Migration then takes place 
until the urban expected wage is equated to the rural wage. Given the 
pegged wM, at what rural wage would the migrant be indifferent between 
underemployment in the traditional urban service sector and employ-
ment in the agricultural sector? If his probability of getting the favored 
job is simply the ratio of LM to the total urban labor pool, Lu, then the 
qq' curve in figure 1 indicates the agricultural wage at which he is 
indifferent between employment locations. The equilibrium agricultural 
wage, wA, and urban underemployment (e.g., the size of the traditional, 
unorganized sector) is thus given at Z. 
This conventional wisdom is elegant, and we adopt it here with 
qualifications. These qualifications are motivated by the following ob-
servations . First, we are not convinced that wM can be viewed as pegged 
in the Third World and independent of market forces. 11 Put differently, 
the apparent wage rigidity attributed to institutional factors (unions, 
government regulations) may in fact be explained by market forces, 
with institutions merely responding to those forces. 12 Second, we agree 
with Willis that the lottery view of who gets favored jobs is naive and 
ignores property rights. 13 It seems to us that the allocation of new job 
vacancies in the favored sectors is hardly random, but rather very 
much a function of bribes, nepotism, employment search costs, union 
dues, and the like. That is, these favored jobs have property rights 
earning rents that command an implicit or explicit price. Third, the 
Todaro formulation ignores the obvious fact that the majority of the 
favored jobs are more skill-intensive than either farm labor or tradi-
tional urban service activity. Finally, and we think most important, the 
formulation ignores cost-of-living differentials between regions. 
Our approach is a hybrid which attempts to meet at least some of 
these criticisms. On the one hand, we assume perfect mobility of un-
skilled labor within the rural sector since everyone seems to agree that 
free entry and costless mobility are reasonable approximations there. 
We make the same assumption for both skilled and unskilled labor 
between the two modern urban sectors, certainly an acceptable premise 
11 See D. Mazumdar, "The Urban Informal Sector," Staff Working Paper no. 211 
(Washington , D.C.: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1975) . 
12 See L. Taylor, Macro Models for Developing Countries (New York: McGraw-Hill 
Book Co., 1979), chap. 5. 
ll R. Willis, "Comment on International Migration in Developing Countries: A Sur-
vey," in Population and Economic Change in Less Developed Countries, ed. R. Easterlin 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979) . 
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to the Todaro adherents given their willingness to aggregate all modern 
sector activities. On the other hand, we model the unskilled wage gap 
between traditional urban services and the modern sectors by inserting 
an exogenous differential, K, that reflects the costs of the property right 
as discussed above. Thus, 
(2) 
Finally, and most important, the rural-urban migration process must 
be specified. Here we adopt a position which is closer in spirit to the 
Todaro hypothesis. The potential rural-urban migrant is assumed to 
behave as if he calculates expected urban nominal earnings, wu. These 
earnings are simply the weighted average of potential urban unskilled 
earnings and skilled earnings (net of taxes), where the weights are 
marginal probabilities rather than average probabilities as in the simple 
Corden-Findlay version. Thus, 
[ S( - 1) J [ S( - 1) J Wu = [(1 - Tr)wM,s] Lu( -1) + 1 - Lu( -1) 
(3) 
[ 
LM( - 1) LKs( -1) Lus( - 1)] 
X wM,L Lu( -1) + WKs ,L Lu(_ l) + Wus.L Lu( - l) ' 
where Ty is the income tax rate on high-wage skilled labor. The migrant 
has accessible current information on city wages, but not on his em-
ployment probabilities . Thus employment weights are lagged t year in 
the migrant's calculation of expected urban income. In summary, the 
migrant is induced into the cities with the anticipation of having the 
chance to gain one of two favored modern sector jobs: either unskilled 
employment at a higher wage rate, or training and thus (perhaps sub-
sequently) skilled employment at an even higher wage. Training and 
skills creation will be discussed below (see subsection D, "Education, 
Training, and Skills Accumulation"). 
Finally, we assume that the migrant is not motivated solely by 
nominal (expected) earnings gaps, but rather by real income differ-
entials. Thus, 
WA,L Wu 
COLR(- 1) COLus(-1)' (4) 
where the location-specific cost-of-living indices, COL;, are influenced 
by price differentials for nontradeables. 
In summary, such a model is capable of generating an endogenous 
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earnings structure in four dimensions: rural unskilled earnings, urban 
traditional sector unskilled earnings, modern sector unskilled earnings, 
and skilled earnings. The wage spread over these employment cate-
gories will be determined by the endogenous forces of market demand, 
supply, and the migration process itself. The speed of urbanization will 
be determined by the same set of forces. While expectations of favored 
sector employment may well generate the Todaro result of overurban-
ization, it is also possible that cost-of-living influences may choke off 
that tendency without the overt introduction of government policy. One 
such cost-of-living influence is the relative scarcity of urban housing. 
C. Housing, Land Markets , and Equilibrium Land Use 
At the very minimum, there are at least two competing uses to which 
land stocks can be put in any model of urbanization-farming and urban 
residential land sites. We shall assume that urban residential sites im-
plicitly include in fixed proportion factory-site requirements as well as 
public land (parks, roads, schools). The fixed proportion assumption 
will simplify the analysis considerably, since we can focus exclusively 
on the residential site demand component of urban land use. Further-
more, we shall assume that "wasteland" exists in the rural area. This 
wasteland has no inherent site value, but it can be used for rural housing 
construction. Thus, the stock of productive land is defined as 
R =Ru.us +Ru.Ks +RA, (5) 
were urban land sites are utilized for two types of housing-low-cost 
"squatter settlements" (Ru.us) and high-cost "luxury housing" 
(Ru.Ks). 
It seems to us that the urban housing market must be central to 
migration behavior and thus to any analysis of the urbanization process. 
One of the limits on urban growth rates in the Third World is the 
availability (and cost) of urban housing facing new urban households, 
whether the housing is of the informal, labor-intensive, owner-occupier 
type in squatter settlements, or more substantial dwelling units con-
structed by capital-intensive techniques and rented in a formal housing 
market. Any serious model of urbanization must admit this possible 
source of limits to urban growth. The limits may take various forms, 
but we shall focus on two constraints in particular. First, urban rents 
may rise in the long run due to the inflation of urban site rents as in 
classical urban location theory.14 In addition, urban rents may also rise 
in the short run if investment in new structures lags behind demands 
14 E. Mills and B. N. Song, " Korea's Urbanization and Urban Problems, 1945-1975," 
Working Paper no. 7701 (Seoul: Korea Development Institute, 1977); J . V. Henderson, 
Economic Theory and the Cities (New York: Academic Press, 1977). 
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generated by rapid urban population growth. Second, to the extent that 
investment in housing responds to those demands generated by the 
immigration, aggregate saving available for productive accumulation 
or training will contract and thus the rate of output expansion will 
suffer economy-wide. 15 Since physical capital and skills are used most 
intensively in the modern sectors, the rate of urban labor absorption 
is diminished. As a result, in-migration to the cities and urbanization 
rates may slack off. 
As we pointed out above, there are two housing types in our model. 
In this we follow the United Nations' Habitat where they state: "In 
many less developed countries building is characterized by the exis-
tence of two sectors: (a) a multiple of very small enterprises ... which 
operate in the rural and peri-urban areas, belonging almost entirely to 
the informal sector of the economy; (b) a small number of large firms 
using modern techniques and organization,'' 16 and where "squatter 
settlements" "generally refer to areas where groups of housing units 
have been constructed on land to which the occupations have no legal 
claim. In many instances housing units located in squatter settlements 
are shelters or structures built of waste materials without a predeter-
mined plan. Squatter settlements are usually found ... at the periph-
eries of the principal cities ." 17 According to the same source , these 
squatter settlements account for the bulk of the growth in urban dwell-
ings throughout the Third World. It seems to us important to distinguish 
these two types of urban dwellings, the different sectors that produce 
them as well as the different socioeconomic classes that consume the 
rental services that flow from these residential structures . 
Suppose urban housing services are produced under constant re-
turns to scale with housing structures , ~. and land Ru,j• as inputs. 
While estimates of the elasticity of substitution between land and struc-
tures in residential housing production functions vary considerably, 18 
the estimates are almost always quite high. We shall, therefore, adopt 
a Cobb-Douglas specification for urban housing in what follows: 
(6) 
where o.H,j + o.R,j = 1, QH,J is the service flow from housing of type 
j, US denotes squatter settlements , and KS is luxury housing. In con-
15 Coale and Hoover. 
16 United Nations, Global Review of Human Settlements: A Support Paper for Hab-
itat, 2 vols. (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1976), 1:70. 
17 Ibid., 2: 11. 
18 For example, see R. Muth, Cities and Housing (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1969), and "The Derived Demand for Urban Land," Urban Studies 8, no. 2 (June 
1971): 243-54; G. D. Ingram, Residential Location and Urban Housing Markets (Cam-
bridge, Mass .: Ballinger Publishing Co., 1977): Henderson. 
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trast, rural housing services are not likely to require the input of land 
of significant site value, so that a fixed coefficient production function 
QH.Rs = aH.Rs - 1HRs is assumed to apply. 
This rural-urban asymmetric treatment of housing insures that rising 
land prices and increased site rents will have a disproportionate effect 
on cost of living in urban areas as urbanization proceeds. Perhaps this 
can be seen more clearly when the total rental price for urban housing 
is written explicitly as 
(7) 
where du is the site rent and rH.j is the structure rent. In our model all 
of these are shadow prices since all dwellings are owner-occupied. (In 
Korea, for example, 94% of rural and 83% of urban households were 
owner-occupiers in 1975.)19 Nevertheless, it will still prove analytically 
useful to decompose total rental (shadow) prices in this fashion. In 
percentage rates of change (denoted by an "*"),these rental prices are 
related by 
(8) 
Land' s share, cx.R ,j• has been estimated to be about 0.10 .20 It follows 
that modest increases in urban rental prices may be consistent with 
dramatic increases in urban site rents (called the "magnification effect" 
in the urban literature). Dramatic increases in urban site rents imply 
equally dramatic increases in urban land prices and the latter have 
become a notable feature of twentieth-century development even in 
the Third World. For example, Korean urban land prices have been 
rising in real terms at 16% per annum since the early 1960s.21 
What, then, determines land rents and land use in our model? 
If the agricultural production function is Cobb-Douglas, land rents 
per hectare can be written as 
(9) 
where QA is agricultural output, RA is farmland, PA are farm product 
prices, and cx.A .R is the output elasticity of land in agriculture. Alter-
19 S. M. Suh, "The Patterns of Poverty in Korea," Working Paper no. 7903 (Seoul: 
Korea Development Institute, 1979), table II, p. 47. 
20 Muth, The Derived Demand for Urban Land. 
21 Mills and Song. 
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natively, expression (9) can be written as a derived demand function 
for farmland: 
(10) 
Similarly, the urban housing Cobb-Douglas production functions imply 
derived urban land demands for residential purposes (recalling that 
"residential" requirements embody commercial, factory, and public 
site needs). Thus, 
(11) 
where PH./ is the net rent received by the owner (imputed, not cash) 
after paying an urban property tax. Since it is not our purpose here to 
determine the distribution of urban populations across urban space-
as in classic urban location theory-nor to confront the Third World 
reality that squatter settlements tend to locate at the fringe of the city 
while luxury housing tends to locate nearer the central business dis-
trict, 22 we shall assume that urban site rents are the same for all urban 
households . Thus, 
(12) 
The aggregate derived demand function for urban land is simply 
Our model is in no way a true spatial framework since distance 
plays no role in either of the two sectors. Thus , farm gate prices do 
not rise with greater proximity to urban markets and therefore farmland 
does not exhibit a "rental gradient" reflecting such heterogeneity. Sim-
ilarly, proximity to the central business district does not offer any of 
the advantages typically postulated in conventional urban location the-
ory. There is therefore no urban rental gradient implied. Since urban 
land is homogenous in this sense , only the "extramarginal" rent at the 
fringe of the city matters in determining land use. 
Figure 2 supplies the optimal land-use solution under such con-
ditions. The equilibrium rent is denoted by d*(O) , and the optimal land-
22 This process is discussed in R. Mohan , Urban Economic and Planning Models 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press , 1979); G. K. Ingram and A. Carroll , "The 
Spatial Structure of Latin American Cities" (paper read at the American Economic 
Association Meetings, Chicago, 1978); Mills and Song. 
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use mix is derived accordingly. What seems interesting to us is how 
many central land-use issues are captured by this simple framework. 
Three such issues are confronted in what follows: Does the model 
predict rising urban densities over time? Can it account for the dramatic 
rise in urban land values? Will it produce an encroachment on farmland 
over time? 
It is common theorem of growth theory that factors in relative 
inelastic supply will increase in relative rent (and thus price or value) 
unless technology tends to be very factor-saving of the inelastically 
supplied input. 23 In our model, capital accumulates, skills are aug-
mented through training, population growth swells the labor force (and 
thus residential housing stocks), but the stock of land grows exoge-
nously, and presumably at relatively low rates. The presumption is that 
relative rents will rise over time unless technological change serves to 
save on land. If one focuses only on land for agricultural uses, "tech-
nological change'' surely does tend to save on land since the agricultural 
sector declines in relative size with successful economic growth. On 
the other hand, our model explicitly introduces an additional land use-
urban residential site needs-and since successful economic growth 
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FIG. 2.-The determinants of land rents and optimal land use 
23 See, e.g., D. Nichols, "Land and Economic Growth," American Economic Re-
view 60 (June 1970): 332-41. 
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growth model are no longer so relevant. Indeed, while our urban hous-
ing production function specifications include the possibility of exten-
sive substitution of structures for land (guaranteeing that urban den-
sities will increase in the face of rising land rents), rapid urbanization 
implies a relatively voracious demand for land and the encroachment 
of farmland at the cities' margin. Additionally, there are forces at work 
in agriculture which will shift outward the derived demand for farmland: 
the rising price of foodstuffs and the accumulation of agricultural cap-
ital. In short, we would expect such a model to produce an outward 
shift in the derived demand for land in both uses over time, but we 
would also expect that the derived demand for urban land would shift 
outward at a more rapid rate. 
The long-run implications of such derived demand growth can be 
seen in figure 2, where the following trends should be observed: rents 
rise at a rapid rate, urban and rural; land use shifts in favor of urban 
residential use, but the rate of shift is choked off by two forces-the 
downward-sloping character of the derived demand for farmland and 
the tendency for urban housing to consume less space as land gets 
scarcer; urban land densities rise. All of these aitributes are "stylized 
facts" ofurbanization in the Third World. In addition, urban land values 
can be calculated assuming naive expectations regarding the behavior 
offuture rents (i.e., du is expected to prevail at the current rate forever) 
and assuming infinite life . Thus, 
Vu = duli, (14) 
where i is the economy-wide "discount rate ." In the absence of any 
upward drift in i over time, increases in the relative price of urban land 
should be a characteristic of our model of urban growth as well. 
In short, we have uncovered another natural limit to urban growth. 
Rising urban land scarcity is assured in our model and the resulting 
increased urban site rents will tend to widen urban-rural cost-of-living 
differentials as urbanization proceeds. Whether the relative rise in the 
urban cost of living will seriously inhibit urban in-migration is an em-
pirical issue, but it is a limit to urban growth worth considering in 
greater detail. 
D. Education, Training, and Skills Accumulation 
The availability of skilled labor may have a potent impact on growth 
and urbanization. Slow rates of growth in the stock of skills can con-
strain expansion in the modern urban sectors where skilled labor is 
utilized intensively. Demand shifts favoring these skill-intensive sectors 
serve to raise skilled labor' s wage, to produce wage stretching and 
earnings inequality, as well as to generate skill bottlenecks. The po-
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tential importance of these bottlenecks depends critically on the degree 
to which unskilled labor and capital can be used as substitutes for skills . 
Debate on this issue has been extensive and until recently divided into 
two camps: the manpower "structuralists" who see little opportunity 
for substitution between labor of different skills, and their opponents 
who argue on the contrary that substitution elasticities are very high 
between labor of different skills. We have been persuaded by the struc-
turalist position so that relatively low substitution elasticities should 
be incorporated in the production function presented in equation (1). 
The importance of a skilled labor bottleneck also depends on the 
response of skill accumulation to demand. Skill formation rates are a 
function of three forces in the specification which follows: the stock 
of "trainable" urban labor, the relative scarcity of skills, and the level 
of government expenditures on formal education which influences the 
ease with which "trainables" can in fact be converted to skilled labor. 
We are aware that many Third World economies appear to exhibit a 
glut of formal school graduates. The specification which follows is 
designed to account for a variety of Third World experience, since the 
model may generate abundance or scarcity of those formally schooled. 
In any case, the stock of trainables is limited to urban workers only: 
rural workers, regardless of educational training, must first migrate to 
urban areas before being considered for training. 
How, then, might the skills acquisition process be modeled in a 
general equilibrium model of urban growth? We shall assume the train-
ing to be financed by the industries which utilize skilled labor, and that 
individuals cannot gain access to training unless selected by firms who 
find it profitable to make such investments. The full cost of the training 
is therefore borne by the industries rather than the individual. (Trainees 
do bear the time cost of training, but only in forgone leisure.) Fur-
thermore, we shall treat our urban modern sectors as if in collusion on 
their training investments, and no industry tries to obtain a "free ride" 
by simply hiring newly skilled workers after another industry has made 
the necessary investments. 
The procedure involves first determining the returns to investment 
in training (and thus the demand function for skills), second determining 
the costs of training (and thus the supply function for skills), and third 
determining the supply of workers actually trained. Given the latter, 
the training activity can be priced and thus the total investment re-
quirements computed. These investment requirements become another 
claim on the current saving pool. The economy therefore accumulates 
three types of long-lived assets-physical capital , housing, and skills. 
We are conscious of the fact that the KS sector relies more heavily 
on skilled workers drawn directly from the formal education sector 
(clerks, bureaucrats , teachers , and doctors), while the M sector nor-
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mally relies more heavily on blue-collar workers who acquire skill by 
on-the-job training. Yet, our simplification does not appear to be totally 
inappropriate. Public education is determined in part by government 
investment decisions, and thus the formal-education-using KS sector 
can also be viewed in the same light as the M sector. Moreover, con-
siderable training may even be required in government activity to con-
vert the formally educated student into a worker of more immediate 
use. 
After taxes, total profits are simply r1{1 - Tn)Kj, where rj is a pre-
trade rate of return in the jth sector (j = M,KS) and Tn,j is the profit 
tax rate . With physical capital stocks fixed in the short run, total profits 
are augmented by the marginal addition of one more trained skilled 
worker as follows: 
a[ril - Tn)KJ = K{l - ~ -) ar; I = <P . MKS (15) 
j 'fl J SJ ' }. = ' ' as. · as. - · 
J J S1+S1 
where <Ps.j is the marginal after-tax revenue from the addition of one 
skilled worker. 
For purposes of simplification, assume for the moment that the per 
unit costs of training a worker are constant at c. These are marginal 
(and average) costs common to both industries. While these training 
costs are all incurred in the current time period , the revenue stream 
will continue throughout the working life of the skilled worker. We 
shall assume that firms find it profitable to train only young workers 
with a long working life. For computational simplicity, we shall also 
assume that firms compute the present value of these anticipated re-
turns assuming naive expectations that <Ps.j shall prevail indefinitely 
and that the young skilled laborer can be viewed (at least approxi-
mately) as an asset with infinite life. The resulting present value of the 
benefit stream generated by current investment in training is simply 
f S.j 
<Ps . 
_.J j = M,KS, (16) 
where i is an economy-wide discount rate, the latter taken as the 
weighted average of returns to physical capital in the various sectors. 
Thus, we have explicitly introduced the notion that training must com-
pete with alternative investments in economy-wide physical accumu-
lation. Presumably, the firm is indifferent between investment in train-
ing and alternative modes of accumulation such that current costs and 
capitalized benefits are equated: 
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fs .J = c , j = M ,KS . (17) 
What determines the stock of potential trainables? Generally, this 
includes all of last year's unskilled workers (excluding deaths and re-
tirements) plus all new entrants who are children of urban households , 
but excludes any of this year' s rural in-migrants . The exclusion of 
recent in-migrants is based on a two-staged view of in-migration: only 
those unskilled who have already had some exposure to urban work 
are considered trainable by modern sector firms . The urban unskilled 
are also distinguished by level of formal education, the latter dictated 
by previous government educational policy and the demographic struc-
ture of the urban population. Thus, the current stock of urban trainables 
by formal educational achievement is determined exogenously. Fur-
thermore, it seems reasonable to assume that those with high formal 
educational attainment tend to be relatively cheap to train . A "step" 
cost function of the following kind might be postulated: 
Co , 0 ~ S ~ Lu.o, k = 0 ' Ed> n years 
C1 ' Lu.o < S ~ Lu.1 ' k = I 
' 
n - I< Ed~ n 
c = (18) 
en ' L u.n- 1 < S ~ L u.n ' k = n, Ed= 0 
where K represents the formal education class (k = 0 denoting highest 
attainment), and the total trainables constraint is 
S = !.J SJ ~ Lu , j = M,KS , (19) 
where L is the optimal class trained satisfying (17) and S are total 
workers trained. 
Figure 3 portrays the training market. Anticipated returns and the 
discount rate dictate the aggregate demand function for training. High 
anticipated returns generate buoyant demands in the two industries 
combined; such high anticipated returns may manifest themselves in 
skill bottlenecks with sizable skill premia. Figure 3 illustrates two pos-
sibilities. At point X, demand (f;) is slack and a substantial share of 
those in the k = I educational class would find themselves glutting the 
market and thus employed at unskilled tasks. (In the k = I class AB 
workers will be trained and BC workers will remain untrained .) In 
contrast, at point Y, a much larger share of those with formal education 
are trained as skilled workers, leaving perhaps only elementary school 
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FIG. 3.-The skills investment market 
Note too that an expansion in demand for skilled workers may in some 
circumstances be met with a rise in skilled wages and no additional 
training (from Y to Z), while in other circumstances the training rate 
may rise (from X to Y). The stock of trainables by k class as well as 
the height of the step in the cost function both matter to this result. 
Total training costs, or total investment in training, can be written 
in either of two ways: 
Training costs = 2.kciJ,u.k + ci[S - 2.iJ,u.k], k = 0, ... , I - 1 (20) 
and 
Training costs = PKs ·ls.Ks (21) 
These trammg costs must lay claim on some real resources in the 
economy, that is, some "capital goods" sector must allocate resources 
to that investment activity and the investing firm's training cost ("tu-
ition") must accrue as income to some sector. As is apparent in equa-
tion (21) , it seems sensible to us to assign this capital goods activity 
to the KS sector since, after all, KS includes formal education. We are 
aware that this specification may have important implications for wage 
structure dynamics: high skill premia and earnings inequality imply 
profitability of investment in skills acquisition. The training investment 
response places demands on the KS sector. These added demands for 
KS output imply the augmentation of demand of skills (since they are 
Allen C. Kelley and Jeffrey G. Williamson 615 
used especially intensively there) , and thus the wage premium may 
remain high in spite of rapid skills accumulation. 
E. Housing Investment, "Productive" Accumulation, and Aggregate 
Saving 
Aggregate saving determines accumulation possibilities, and this sav-
ings pool is generated from three sources: retained after-tax corporate 
and enterprise profits, government saving, and household saving. (For-
eign saving serves to augment government resources and thus indirectly 
appears as a component of government saving; see subsection F, 
"Demand, Urban Bias, and the Role of the State".) These three sources 
can be written as 
Savings = (1 - l\IM)[(l - Tn,M)(rM - oMPM)KM] 
+ OMf'MKM + (1 - l\!Ks)[(l - T1J.Ks)(rKs (22) 
where the 1\11 are after-tax firm pay-out rates, '61 are depreciation rates, 
s1 are class-specific per capita savings , G, is government savings, and 
Care the number of property income recipients. There are three com-
peting demands on this savings pool: investment in physical ("pro-
ductive") capital, investment in human capital (training), and invest-
ment in ("unproductive") housing. Following the conventional emphasis 
in the development literature, the value of physical capital accumula-
tion (investment goods produced by the M sector or imported) is written 
as a residual in equation (23): 
PMIM = Savings - Housing - Training costs , (23) 
but it should be emphasized that these three modes of accumulation 
are determined simultaneously and in competition. The determinants 
of training investment were described above . This section will focus 
on housing investment demand under imperfect capital markets. It will 
then conclude with a summary of the mechanism which dictates overall 
investment allocation. 
Following Coale and Hoover, we distinguish between ''produc-
tive" and "unproductive" investment. Unproductive investment is 
captured by housing requirements , a component which is sensitive to 
demographic and urbanization forces. Furthermore, housing invest-
ment might be viewed in much the same way that subsistence con-
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sumption requirements are treated in most consumer demand systems. 
That is, private households might be assumed to behave in a fashion 
such that housing needs receive first priority in their investment port-
folios. Only after these investment needs are satisfied might households 
release their residual savings for productive accumulation purposes, 
through banks, nonbank financial institutions, and informal "curb" 
markets. This characterization is motivated by McKinnon's emphasis 
on "financial market fragmentation." 24 Since the formal mortgage mar-
ket is poorly developed or nonexistent in much of the Third World, we 
might for simplicity assume that none of the three private housing 
sectors (rural, urban squatter settlements, and urban luxury housing) 
are able to secure external finance to satisfy investment requirements. 
Housing investment would therefore be self-financed by each house-
hold sector independent of other surplus-generating sectors. While this 
specification eliminates the possibility of intersectoral housing financial 
flows, it does not exclude the possibility of intrasectoral housing fi-
nancial flows. For example, fathers may loan to sons, but middle-class 
skilled households cannot loan to poor unskilled households. Certain 
sectors may therefore be starved for housing finance while others have 
a surplus which they allocate to the national saving pool for productive 
accumulation or training investment. 
Under conditions of rapid population growth, it is quite possible 
that household savings will be fully exhausted by housing investment 
requirements. This potential demographic burden would be reinforced 
in our model by rapid rates of urbanization since migration of even a 
stable aggregate population requires new housing construction in the 
receiving regions, and net investment economy-wide. Yet, future in-
migration and urbanization may well be curtailed given the urban hous-
ing requirements that current population movements imply. After all, 
increased urban housing investment serves to inhibit the accumulation 
of productive capital, and we know that the rate of productive capital 
accumulation is a central determinant of the relative expansion of em-
ployment in the modern sectors and thus migration and urban growth. 
On the other hand, urban housing investment shortfall will result in a 
rise in urban rents thereby attenuating in-migration through cost-of-
living effects. 
What remains is to convert these qualitative descriptions of in-
vestment demand in housing under capital market fragmentation into 
explicit quantifiable equations. At given prices and incomes, suppose 
we were to specify the following type of investment demand equation: 
24 R. McKinnon, Money and Capital in Economic Development (Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution, 1973). 
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IHJ = min {sjLJ'j_,, !Hf + &H,jH) , 
IH,j = max {O, IH.J , 
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(24) 
where sjL.f'j _, is the saving generated by households consuming the jth 
type of housing (deflated by Pj and thus converted into housing in-
vestment quantities), !Hf is net investment in housing, IH,j is gross 
investment in housing, and Hj is the housing stock of typej (j = US, 
RS, KS). The first expression simply states that household saving in 
sector j may be binding on housing investment in that sector. If not, 
dwelling investment will not exhaust the sector's household saving and 
a surplus will be available for accumulation in other forms. The second 
expression above simply states that gross investment cannot be neg-
ative. This expression is unlikely to be binding under conditions of 
rapid population growth, even with substantial rural out-migration 
rates . 
In discussing the determinants of net investment, it will be helpful 
to define the following terms, some of which are new while others are 
added to refresh the reader's memory: 
fH,j = an index of profitability of housing investment in thejth housing 
stock, a "benefit-cost" ratio computed as the ratio of the dis-
counted stream of net rents to current construction costs; 
Pj = per unit construction costs of Hj; 
rHJ = per unit "structure rent" on Hj (a shadow price since owner-
occupied status is assumed, and thus rents are fully flexible 
with no market stickiness); 
the discount rate, or average rate of return on physical capital 
economy-wide; 
PH,j total rental price, including both the site and structure rental 
components. 
Using these definitions, net investment in housing in the jth sector is 
written as 
(25) 
where fH.j is the index of investment profitability: 
High values of fHJ indicate high profitability with positive gaps between 
capitalized anticipated net rents and current construction costs. This 
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expression also states that net investment in housing should be zero 
when the benefit-cost ratio is unity, that is, where the economy-wide 
percentage rate of return equals the rate of return on sector j's new 
housing investment. Higher values of fH,J imply more housing invest-
ment at the expense of alternative investment elsewhere in the econ-
omy. 
As equation (26) reveals, structure rents are central to the deter-
mination of fH.J· Given Cobb-Douglas urban housing service production 
functions (see subsection C), urban structure rents are 
j =US, KS. (27) 
Recall that rH.J is a shadow price since we have assumed for conve-
nience that all housing is owner-occupied. Note, too, the presence of 
PH./ in the expression for rH.J· It is the total rental price after urban 
residential property taxes have been assessed and paid. 
There are three sectors involved in housing construction in our 
simplification. IH.Rs represents rural dwellings produced by the informal 
RS sector, perhaps even constructed by the occupying household itself 
and with waste materials. IH.us represents similar low-cost urban dwell-
ings (shanty housing or squatter settlements) produced by the informal 
labor-intensive US sector, also perhaps even constructed by the oc-
cupying household itself. IH,Ks denotes high-cost housing, produced by 
the formal construction sector, which, as part of KS activities, is rel-
atively capital- and skill-intensive, and generates intermediate input 
demands in the primary product and manufacturing sectors. When 
these housing investment requirements are valued by current construc-
tion costs, P1, total investment demand for housing is obtained in value 
terms: 
It might be helpful to summarize saving, accumulation, and capital 
goods sector activity at this point. In terms of the majority of com-
putable general equilibrium models, we are suggesting an unusual treat-
ment of accumulation. There is not just one capital goods sector, but 
rather four (KS producing skills; RS, US, and KS constructing dwell-
ings; and M producing physical capital goods). There is not just one 
mode of accumulation, but rather there are three (skills, physical cap-
ital, and housing). Note, too, that the three modes of accumulation are 
explicitly competitive. Skills accumulation takes place up to the point 
where rates ofreturn are equated to the economy-wide rate on physical 
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capital accumulation. Physical capital goods are allocated across the 
three capital-using sectors so as to minimize rate of return differentials. 
Dwelling investment will utilize household saving only up to the point 
where rates of return are equated to the economy-wide rate on physical 
capital accumulation. Of course, there are important institutional and 
technological features which seriously restrict the economy's ability 
to equate rates of return at the margin. Any of the three dwelling 
markets may be starved for funds since the absence of an intersectoral 
mortgage market may leave housing investment requirements in excess 
demand . The immobility of physical capital stocks between sectors 
makes it possible that current physical investment allocations are in-
sufficient to equalize rates of return to capital. Indeed, the larger hous-
ing investment requirements are, the smaller is the residual pool avail-
able for "productive" capital accumulation and the more likely it is 
that current investment allocations are insufficient to equalize sectoral 
rates of return between A, M, and KS. Furthermore, firms' demands 
for skills may be unsatisfied if the stock of "potential trainables" is 
insufficient to meet the training investment levels which would equalize 
rates of return economy-wide. In short, capital market disequilibrium 
may well be a permanent attribute of our urbanizing economy. 
F. Demand, "Urban Bias," and the Role of the State 
Thus far we have made no mention of demand, either public or private, 
and this is an obvious pro-urban force. Private sector demand can be 
dispatched quickly. Whichever formal demand system one favors (and 
we favor the extended linear expenditure system), it will clearly exhibit 
a pro-urban bias since implied income elasticity of demands will surely 
favor urban goods following Engel's law. Given high income elasticities 
attached to saving, we have an additional pro-urban demand bias since 
the majority of the capital goods producing sectors are urban located. 
The same is likely to be true of the government sector, although here 
the pro-urban bias is almost certainly larger. While we have focused 
on supply-side limits to urban growth up to this point, this section 
therefore dwells on some especially strong urban growth stimuli coming 
in particular from government demand . 
It seems apparent that government demands are far more urban 
biased than are private demands, and we capture this characteristic by 
assuming that all government final demands are satisfied by the capital-
cum-skill-intensive (KS) modern service sector. Thus, a shift in current 
income from the private to the public sector imparts an inevitable pro-
urban bias from the demand side. The key to this urban bias is therefore 
the endogenous determinants of the tax revenue share in GNP. 
Total tax revenues, T, come from a wide range of sources. For 
brevity, it will suffice to simply list these sources: taxes on households' 
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consumption of M sector goods; taxes (or subsidies) on agricultural 
intermediate inputs purchased from manufacturing (e.g., fertilizer); 
taxes on urban property (uncommon in Third World economies at pres-
ent, but a potential future revenue source); taxes on net enterprise 
income in the Mand KS sectors; taxes on high-income households-
that is, taxes on distributed profits, rental income in agriculture, skilled 
labor's income; and foreign trade duties. Any total tax revenue function 
with these component sources is certain to exhibit a high elasticity with 
respect to GNP and its correlates-especially urbanization itself-an 
increase in the share of manufactured goods in total household expen-
ditures, a rising share of modern sector output, a shift of the labor 
force into higher-skilled occupations, and an increasing inequality in 
the distribution of income in the early to intermediate stages of eco-
nomic development. A rising share of taxes and government spending 
in GNP is a likely outcome from our model, and such patterns would 
conform with several empirical studies. 
Unlike most general equilibrium models, government spending is 
not exogenously given in our model. 25 The present model attempts, 
albeit in a highly simplified fashion, to capture aspects of government 
spending over time by appealing to much the same forces that determine 
private consumption and saving behavior. The government is assumed 
to allocate its budget to saving, G5 , in response to increments in the 
resources available to it from taxes and foreign sources, and in response 
to demographic and urban pressures-by assumption the main source 
of public investment demands. Thus, 
(29) 
where Nu( - I) is the Jagged increase in the urban population and P 
denotes external aid and net private foreign capital, both assumed to 
flow through government channels. We anticipate that government's 
marginal propensity to save, 13G, exceeds that of the private sector, 
based on the literature accumulated to date on this issue. 26 We also 
expect, contrary to the Coale and Hoover hypothesis , that public saving 
is positively related to increasing urban populations, 'Ye > 0. 27 Some 
analysts, like Michael Lipton , would view this prediction as an accurate 
25 For an exception, see P. S. Heller, "A Model of Public Fiscal Behavior in De-
veloping Economies," American Economic Review 65 , no. 3 (June 1975): 429-45. 
26 R. F. Mikesell and J . E. Zinser, "The Nature of the Savings Function in Developing 
Countries: A Survey of the Theoretical and Empirical Literature,'' Journal of Economic 
Literature II, no. I (March 1973): 1-26; P. Yotopoulos and J. Nugent , Economics of 
Development : Empirical Investigations (New York: Harper & Row, 1976); J . G. Wil-
liamson, "Why do Koreans Save 'So Little'?" Journal of Development Economics 6, 
no. 3 (September 1979): 343-{;2. 
27 Coale and Hoover. 
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reflection of the realities of the "urban bias in world development."28 
A pooled sample of representative Third World economies covering 
the 1960s and early 1970s confirms both expectations. Indeed , ~c and 
~c are estimated as 0.334 (9.19) and 0.484 (4.06), respectively (t-sta-
tistics in parentheses). This result is not conditional on our definition 
of saving since similar results are forthcoming when expenditures on 
education are excluded from government saving. 
Finally, note that since ~c < 1, changes in levels (lf foreign aid do 
not augment the domestic saving pool by an equal amount, but rather 
by only ~c · dF. This places us squarely in the "revisionist" foreign 
aid camp. 29 That literature has pointed out that domestic saving appears 
to bear a negative correlation with foreign aid levels , implying that the 
domestic savings effort is relaxed with the addition of foreign aid . 
Presumably, the "relaxation" of the domestic saving effort lies pri-
marily with the government sector where, it is thought, the tax effort 
is diminished and current expenditures are expanded at the expense 
of government saving. While our model has little to say about a di-
minished tax effort, it is apparent from the expression f3c · dF, where 
~c = 0.334, that foreign aid does not augment the domestic saving 
pool dollar for dollar. 
V. Research Agenda 
The popular and scientific literature has raised cries of alarm over the 
exceptionally rapid urban growth in the Third World. This alarmist 
reaction to an important historic event makes all the more imperative 
research on demoeconomic models capable of revealing the causes and 
consequences of urban growth. Descriptive accounts of poverty in 
sprawling squatter settlements, of urban congestion and pollution, and 
of rising social and political unrest provide insufficient evidence for 
passing final judgment on the merits of urban growth. Nor does such 
evidence necessarily imply overurbanization. 
Those who view urban growth as unequivocally bad have failed 
to consider the far worse counterfactual alternative of no growth at all. 
They certainly fail to take seriously the thousands of migrants voting 
28 M. Lipton, Why Poor People Stay Poor: Urban Bias in World Development (Cam-
bridge , Mass .: Harvard University Press, 1977). 
29 K. B. Griffin and J. L. Enos, "Foreign Assistance: Objectives and Consequences," 
Economic Development and Cultural Change 18, no. 3 (April 1970): 313-37; T. Weisskopf, 
"The Impact of Foreign Capital Inflow on Domestic Savings in Under-developed Coun-
tries," Journal of International Economics (February 1972), pp. 25-38; G. F. Papanek, 
"Foreign Aid, Private Investment, Savings , and Growth in LDC's," Journal of Political 
Economy 81 (January/February 1973): 120--30; J. Bhagwati and P. Grinols, "Foreign 
Capital, Dependence, Destabilization and Feasibility of Transition to Socialism," Journal 
of Development Economics 2 (June 1975): 85-98; E. Grinols and J . Bhagwati, "Foreign 
Capital, Savings and Dependence," Review of Economics and Statistics 58, no. 4 (No-
vember 1976): 416--24. 
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with their feet. Migrants leave the farm in favor of the city because 
they project improvements in their living standards. Equally important, 
recent arrivals, on net, stay in cities even after personally experiencing 
the alleged disamenities and high pecuniary costs of urban life. This 
evidence offers an overwhelming rejection of the view that migrants 
are irrational, that they fail to take into account the nonpecuniary costs 
of urbanization, and that they are misinformed regarding the true costs 
and benefits of urban life. 
Analysis of urbanization must, it seems to us, be shifted from the 
normative perspective which the word "overurbanization" implies. It 
should shift its focus back to the underlying causes of growth, accu-
mulation, and spatial distributions of population. 
The present study has suggested some components which might 
be incorporated into a general equilibrium model of Third World ur-
banization. While the complete model is developed more fully else-
where,30 here we have focused our discussion on the limits to urban 
growth in an effort to redress the imbalance in the literature which 
stresses overurbanization. Having said as much, we must emphasize 
that our model is neutral on the overurbanization issue. It is a general 
equilibrium model, after all, but we feel that it is a relevant perspective 
for any realistic assessment of the sources of third World urbanization. 
One way to characterize our somewhat complex model is to divide 
it into two parts; the first part offers a detailed specification of migrant 
behavior; and the second part embeds that specification in an elaborate 
economic superstructure which influences and is influenced by this 
behavior. The migrant responds positively to prospects for improving 
his living standards. Factors in this decision include his known rural 
and his anticipated urban rates of pay, his prospects for obtaining fa-
vored urban employment, the relative regional costs of housing and 
other services, and the opportunities he and his children have to con-
sume various urban amenities and public goods (e.g., formal education 
and on-the-job training). While no single model can specify every aspect 
of migrant behavior, we feel our characterization is quite rich. 
The remainder of the model-the economic superstructure-
makes endogenous many features of a potential migrant's decision. 
This includes relative wage rates, housing and service prices, training 
opportunities, job creation in various industries, and the like. Central 
to this modeling effort is the general equilibrium notion of feedback: 
migrants respond to economic change, and economic change is influ-
enced by migration. Adjustment occurs in markets where prices (e.g., 
output prices, interest rates, rents, wages) play a signaling and rationing 
30 A. C. Kelley and J . G. Williamson, Modeling Urbanization and Economic Growth 
(Laxenburg, Austria: International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis , 1980). 
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function, and where factors (e.g., capital , land, labor, commodities) 
move in response to the signals. While our model does not assume 
perfect and instantaneous market adjustment-indeed, capital market 
fragmentation, imperfect labor markets, and nonmarket activities are 
prominent features of our Third World paradigm-a tendency toward 
long-run equilibrium is a key attribute of the system. It is this attribute 
which gives analytic content to the primary prediction of our study-
even in a dynamic and growing economy, forces are set in motion which 
generate endogenous limits to urban growth . The paper has spelled out 
in considerable detail some of these forces. 
When will city growth slow down and then cease? At what level 
will urbanization ultimately settle? These are empirical questions of 
more than just academic interest. They can be answered by parame-
terizing demoeconomic models like the one outlined in this paper, by 
simulating these economies over time, and by analyzing in detail-
possibly through the use of the historical counterfactual-many of the 
forces which are alleged to explain urban growth. It should be apparent 
that this represents a very ambitious research agenda. We would argue, 
however, that it also represents the minimum necessary effort for pro-
viding even a preliminary assessment of the sources and consequences 
of Third World urbanization. While serving as a catalyst for such re-
search, alarmist prophecies of doom are poor substitutes for comput-
able general equilibrium models in providing useful answers to ques-
tions of overurbanization in the Third World. 

Development and the Elimination of Poverty* 
Nathan Keyfitz 
Harvard University and Ohio State University 
Why does inequality in poor countries still persist after at least 30 
years, during which the need for leveling as well as raising incomes has 
been in the consciousness of all concerned? Why the great expansion 
of government, with policies that inhibit growth of a native bour-
geoisie, so that the classic nineteenth-century interplay between 
bourgeoisie and proletariat cannot be acted out on the national stage? 
Why the neglect, indeed the handicapping, of agriculture through con-
trived price and other policies in countries where many people are 
hungry, and agriculture, the main industry, is the prime basis of a 
higher standard of living? Agriculture is the industry of two-thirds of 
the population; why does the educational system almost wholly dis-
regard it, and why is research to improve it infinitesimal? 
These are questions that puzzled me when I worked in Burma and 
Indonesia around 1950. I hope to show that there is at least one com-
mon component in the answers to each of these apparently very differ-
ent questions--concerning inequality, government expansion, neglect 
of agriculture, the urban bias of education and research. That compo-
nent is the drive toward a certain way of living, one which readers 
of this article so take for granted they tend not to notice it-the style of 
life that we may call middle class or consumerist, with all the good and 
bad connotations of those terms. 
Groups and Classes in Development 
Development occurs in a context of older institutions , and change in 
those institutions is a central part of the development process. New 
leading groups have been gaining ascendancy over preexisting land-
lords. For the new group, development is the means by which it can 
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writing was mostly done at the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis in 
Laxenburg, Austria. 
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assert itself; it can overcome settled landlords by identifying itself with 
development and gain popular support as it shows signs of being able to 
achieve it. The traditional culture that gave ideological underpinning to 
the previous leadership ceases to satisfy , and the new group promises 
change to something different. In the place of religion appear goods of 
hitherto unknown variety and attractiveness that make possible a fully 
legitimized new way of living, a vision to be made real by the mastery 
of modem technique. 
Most writers take the new class for granted; some few give it 
explicit mention as an actor in development. Thus Paul Streeten asks, 
What are the forces that support the multinational corporation in the 
developing country? He replies that they include ''. . . the small em-
ployed aristocracy of workers who enjoy high wages and security, the 
satellite bourgeoisie to whom world-wide mobility and prospects are 
opened." He goes on to say, "On the other side of the fence are the 
masses of unemployed ... and underemployed.'' 1 I shall argue that the 
kind of employment offered to senior local employees by the multina-
tional is much more attractive than the work life of the innovator and 
entrepreneur of indigenous capitalism. 
The opposition that these pages will take up is that between the 
elite, usually urban, of the Third World, and their masses, mostly rural. 
Like other conflicts, this one is sometimes strident, sometimes muted. 
For a generation there have been parts of rural Burma where city 
people cannot go without the protection of an army detachment; in 
most of Indonesia the well-off stranger is welcomed. Yet observation 
of any one of the 100 or so developing countries shows some difference 
of interest, expressed or latent, between the middle class on the one 
side and the poor on the other. 
The influence of the middle class in determining the course and 
type of development is strong even in those countries in which there is 
full democracy and in which the peasants are by far the largest part of 
the electorate. In Ceylon during the late 1950s and 1960s the middle 
class was defeated at the polls. The rural-based Bandaranaikes initiated 
equalitarian policies whose effects linger, but Sri Lanka seemed unable 
to persist in the course that they set. 
The middle class has access to education and can understand the 
issues, is aware of its interests and able to act politically to further 
them. Schooling and influence enable it to pass its status to its young, 
and so it tends to be hereditary. (Nee shows this even for the 
equalitarian society of China.)2 It recruits from the peasantry through 
the process of urbanization, in highly selective fashion. Its initial task is 
1 Paul Streeten, The Frontiers of Development Studies (London: Macmillan Co., 
1972). 
2 Victor Nee , "Post Maoist Changes in a South China Production Brigade" (un-
published manuscript, Center for International Studies, Cornell University). 
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to break the rural landholding class; once that is accomplished its in-
fluence is decisive, for the dispersed, uneducated peasantry are no 
match for it. The peasant in an economy exporting rice cannot judge 
the effect on himself of a tariff on flashlight batteries; once it is ex-
plained to him that this is a way of getting cheaper batteries in the long 
run, if only he will be patient, he may well cease to argue. Yet even 
when he understands well enough to be in chronic rebellion, the gov-
ernment somehow carries on without him, determining national 
policies in the light of its own (urban) interests, and identifying itself 
with progress and development. 
Diffusion of the Modern Culture 
Development is not simple but multiple, and each of its distinct attri-
butes can provide a definition of it. It may be seen as the investments in 
people that make them more valuable items of human capital; it may be 
seen as the accumulation of physical capital and the resultant rise of 
income, or as the creation of a certain state apparatus, usually with 
social welfare coloring. Without dropping the other definitions, this 
article regards it as the diffusion of a certain culture and the dominance 
of a new class that carries that culture. Like any culture, this one exists 
in people's heads, but its expression depends on material artifacts. The 
point of view of this article is complimentary to, rather than in-
consistent with, the view of development as rising average income per 
head; it attempts to place the economics of development in a social and 
cultural framework. 
The Modern Way of Life 
The middle-class style has been taught to the Third World by the 
United States and to some extent by Europe. It consists of centrally 
heated and cooled homes equipped with television sets and re-
frigerators, transport by automobile, and procurement of foodstuffs 
and other supplies in self-service supermarkets. It is found most typi-
cally in cities with paved streets, the countryside between those cities 
being laced with a network of paved roads and another network of air 
transport. Literacy is essential to it, and the daily press and monthly 
magazines are conspicuous, along with television. The content of its 
press and other media has remarkable similarity worldwide: local, na-
tional, and world politics; urban crime; and other prob°lems like the 
cost of living that arouse its mass public. Whether there is a worldwide 
culture of poverty one can doubt-poor people seem to retain their 
indigenous and differentiated ways rather well-but there is a 
worldwide middle-class culture-right down to such matters as when 
to eat one's three meals, the way to set a table for dinner, what to do on 
workdays, and how to spend one's weekends. 
Of course, national and regional variants exist. Most obvious is 
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language; the new life goes on not only in its language of origin, En-
glish, but in Indonesian or Thai or Brazilian. The supermarket in Paris 
carries better wines, cuts its meat differently, has different bread from 
the supermarket in Chicago. Automobiles in the United States are 
heavier than those in Japan. Americans use twice as much energy on 
the average as Europeans. But these differences are smaller than the 
differences between the middle-class person of any of those countries 
and his national predecessor, say, the minor nobility of eighteenth-
century Europe or the samurai of Japan. 
The unimaginative see our way of life as unique-as the only form 
that our wealth can assume. Yet plainly we could, like the wealthy 
Buddhist, take our productivity out in leisure for contemplation. Like 
our ancient Greek opposite numbers we could live simply and spend 
our time in gymnastics and in amateur science and philosophy. Like an 
eighteenth-century baroque prince, we could indulge in making and 
listening to chamber music. We could support clubs more luxurious 
than those around St. James's Park and gardens that would outdo 
Versailles. These are not the mainstream of the consumer or middle-
class culture. 
The medieval community was not rich, and neither was the Puritan 
community of New England, but it was productive enough to have 
Sundays free of labor and devoted to piety. We are rich enough to have 
similar luxury 5 days per week and do all our work in 2 days, and we 
could take out our productivity in piety. Yet far from spending 5 days a 
week communing with one another and with transmundane beings, we 
mostly do not even spend I day, or even 2 hours, per week at a church 
service. The bourgeois Victorian family could have half a dozen chil-
dren, and find much of its pleasure in watching them at home well into 
mature life. We are down to fewer than two children per family , and by 
common consent these leave home as soon as can be managed. 
The point of such comparisons is that the modem middle-class 
way of life is, like all culture everywhere, in considerable part an 
arbitrary choice out of a wide range of possibilities. The participants in 
a culture do not perceive how wide the range is, but the observer can 
have an idea of it in the degree that he is acquainted with a variety of 
cultures. The elements of modem living that are dictated by man's 
physical and psychological nature are few. Up to 3,000 calories of food, 
heating in winter, air conditioning in a warm climate, clothing, some 
means of transport, and some entertainment are in various degrees 
essential; people will seek them as soon as their income permits. On 
the other hand, the food need not include most of a pound of meat per 
day; wealthy Indians from time immemorial have eaten no meat at all 
and lived long lives with vegetable sources of protein. 
The only aspect of living in past ages that cannot be reproduced in 
Nathan Keyfitz 653 
our age of mass consumption is their retainers. If the middle-class style 
of life is to be universal in a community , then by definition it cannot 
depend on human domestic help. Once the wages of those who might 
be servants approach I 0% of the incomes of those who might be mas-
ters, servants can no longer be afforded. But this one constraint by no 
means prescribes the modern way of life, which must be regarded as an 
arbitrary cultural form, selected from the many that our high produc-
tivity could provide. 
The American Contribution 
Americans have pioneered in the organization of the workplace, both 
office and factory. The design of the home, with its kitchen including 
refrigerator, has many American touches. The 3-day weekend spent on 
the highway and at the beach is a product of the automobile, whose 
mass use came first in the United States. We have put together ele-
ments borrowed from here and there, with some created by ourselves, 
into a way of life that is wholly different from the way of life of those 
who are our peers as far as relative income is concerned-the ruler of a 
minor German principality, the Indian landlord , or the Chinese manda-
rin scholar. 
Free land made American society unprecedentedly equalitarian 
from the beginning. Under the constraint that individual wealth for 
most of us can no longer be taken out in domestic service , we have 
broken through to new forms of consumption. Deodorants, motor 
boats, bathing suits, cigarettes, and daily newspapers, which we may 
or may not have invented but did much to spread, take their place in a 
culture that we designate "middle class ." That way of life is not static. 
The innovation ofrefrigerators in the 1920s, television in the 1950s, and 
new clothing styles in the 1960s has kept our culture moving; airlines 
and the interstate highway network destroyed our passenger railways a 
decade or two back; computers are changing our lives today. 
It is this culture that is now becoming worldwide, and the devel-
opment process is the means by which it is spreading. Economists have 
written on one aspect of this modern conception of how to live and how 
to work, calling it the demonstration effect. People learn from films and 
other media to want a level of consumption that is for the moment 
beyond the capacity of their national productive apparatus to support . 
Their having such wishes causes premature spending and impedes the 
saving and investment that would bring such benefits within the scope 
of national production and trade. But in fact the demonstration effect 
has not had a large impact on economics. It forms a very small part of 
the models of development, mathematical or other, that are used to 
guide policy. It should be taken seriously , both in its negative aspects , 
and positively as the motor of development. 
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Measuring the Poor and the Middle Class 
The usefulness of the concept of middle class does not entirely depend 
on our being able to measure it. We talk about the hungry, the rich, the 
managerial class, and many others, and there is no way of drawing a 
boundary around such categories or of accurately counting their mem-
bers. 
The work of Mollie Orshansky and the Social Security Adminis-
tration has been the major serious effort to count the poor. Choosing a 
point on the overall income distribution for individuals or families will 
not do; one must make specific assumptions about requirements, which 
will differ according to the ages of a couple and the number of their 
children. In the United States it is easier to measure poverty and take 
the middle class as a residual; when we extend the measure to other 
countries it is on the whole easier to measure the middle class, who are 
the minority, and take the poor as the residual. 
The U.S. Department of Agriculture designed a 1961 Economy 
Food Plan that forms the basis for the calculation of the poverty in-
come thresholds, recognizing family size, sex, and age of the family 
head; number of children under 18; and farm-nonfarm residence. Farm 
levels are set at 85% of the corresponding nonfarm level. Annual ad-
justments are made on the basis of the Consumer Price Index, but the 
consumption levels continue to be those established for the base year 
1963. 3 The number of families that fall below the poverty line in the 
United States was just under 40 million in the late 1950s, and had 
dropped to 25 million by 1977. 4 Particularly useful are the breakdowns 
showing, for instance, that of white families 8.9% were below the pov-
erty line in 1977; of black, 29.0%; of families with male head, 6.9%; 
with female head, 32.8%. Among Puerto Rican families with female 
head, 70.4% were below. In New Hampshire, 7.9% of the population 
were below the poverty line in 1975; in Mississippi, 26.1% were below. 
Among those 65 and over, 14.1% were poor in 1977. 
We note that the percentage of families that owned automobiles in 
the United States in 1974 was 83.8, at a time when the percentage 
above the poverty line was 88.8. Apparently owning a car is a some-
what more stringent criterion than being above the poverty line. Differ-
ent individuals are involved; 37% of households with incomes under 
$3,000 have cars, and 3% of those above $25,000 do not have cars. 5 
Thus the Social Security Administration figures, extrapolated to 
1980, show 24 million poor, 196 million middle class, for a total popula-
tion of 220 million. Our task is to find how this can be extended to the 
world. 
3 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1978), p. 438. 
4 Ibid., p. 465 . 
5 Ibid., p. 474. 
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A sharp dividing line between poor and middle class is hardly to be 
expected. Marx recognized gradations and intermediate types between 
capitalist and proletariat. Alfred Marshall's entrepreneurs shaded off 
into capitalists and into workers. Similarly with our middle class; it is 
easy enough to see the difference between the resident of a suburb of 
Detroit who has a job as office manager with General Motors and the 
Javanese peasant with a holding of half an acre on which he is trying to 
grow enough to feed his five children, but it is not easy to draw a sharp 
boundary through the intermediate conditions. 
Yet the concept is sharper than many that are used, for it meets all 
three of the criteria of class. The middle class has a superior position in 
the market, that is, its income is high-above the U.S. poverty line of 
$7 ,000 for a family of four. It has a style of life and a status in the world 
characterized by its enviable pattern of consumption. It has power, 
being the major component of the ruling group in countries as far apart 
as India and Brazil. Aside from these three characteristics mentioned 
by Max Weber, it has a common way of thinking on many subjects, and 
even some capacity to coordinate itself in the defense and enlargement 
of its interests. 
The middle class can be traced at least broadly through statistics of 
ownership of certain artifacts. An automobile is one indicator, and we 
have statistics of automobile ownership for 75 countries. Of course, we 
know that an automobile is seen as more essential in America than it is 
in Europe, though there are well-off New Yorkers who own no car. 
One poor country-India-discourages the use of automobiles, while 
another-Thailand-imports them freely. Counting two persons per 
automobile, the American standard, is a first approximation on which 
we can improve slightly. 
The United Nations Statistical Yearbook gives 271,620,000 pas-
senger vehicles in the world in 1976, of which 109,003,000 were in the 
United States. Using this ratio to bring the U.S. middle class of 196 
million to a world total gives us 196 x 271,620/109,003 = 488, or just 
short of 500 million. But because automobiles are less used in Europe 
and elsewhere by people who could afford them than they are in the 
United States, this is a low figure. It is also low insofar as families 
elsewhere are larger than in the United States. A figure of 2.5 or 3 
middle-class persons per vehicle would bring us closer, but we tum to 
other artifacts. 
Energy consumed is one indicator. The total in million tons of coal 
equivalent for the world in 1976 was 8,318, and for the United States it 
was 2,485. 6 This ratio would bring us to 656 million middle-class people 
• United Nations, Uni1ed Na1ions Swtistical Handbook (New York: United Nations 
Department of International Economic and Social Affairs, 1978), p. 389. 
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in the world. Better than automobiles , but still probably too low ; the 
American burns more energy than middle-class people elsewhere. 
Income partly allows for this , and the problem with it is that dis-
tribution is not the same in all countries and is very difficult to measure. 
We note the total for the market economies of the world in 1976 at 
5,426 billion, and the United States in that year at 1,695 billion .7 The 
ratio used crudely gives us 627 million people above the poverty line. 
To it would have to be added the number of middle class in nonmarket 
economies for which we lack data-on the order of 150 million . (The 
United Nations calculates for the centrally planned a weight of 0.196 in 
the world economy .)8 
On the basis of such evidence , the number of middle class in the 
world in 1980 might be 700-800 million. Their distribution by country , 
as obtained using the national income figure and continuing to accept 
the figure for the United States of 196 million, is shown in table l. 
This calculation is essentially the same as made above for the 
world total. One crude way of saying it is that if in the United States 
TABLE 1 
ESTIMATED DIVISION OF POPULATION BETWEEN PooR AND MIDDLE CLASS FOR 14 
COUNTRIES, USING GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT AS INDICATOR (in Millions) 
GDP No. of No. of 
(Billions Middle Class Poor as Total 
Country of$) Based on GDP Residual Population 
Canada ... ....... . . .. .. 196 22 2 24 
United States . ... . .. . .. 1,695 196 24 220 
Brazil . .. . ..... .. ...... 124 14 108 122 
Mexico .. . . ... . .. . . ... . 80 9 63 72 
India .. . .. ... .. . . . . . ... 86 10 657 667 
Indonesi a ..... . . . .... . . 37 4 151 155 
Japan .. . .. ..... .. . .. . . 564 65 53 118 
France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 349 40 14 54 
Federal Republic 
of Germany ... . . .. .. . 447 52 10 62 
Italy .... ... . ... . . . .... 171 20 38 58 
United Kingdom . . . ... . . 221 26 30 56 
Sweden* . .. .... . ..... .. 74 8 0 8 
Switzerland* . . . .... ... . 57 6 0 6 
Australia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 12 3 15 
Total ... . . .. .. . ... . .. 484 1, 153 1,637 
NoTE.-Numbers intended to apply to 1980. The extrapolation of the total population 
was made from the 1970 and 1977 figures of the United Nations , and the national income 
(strictly GDP) figure s used a s indicators are for 1976. 
* We assume no poor in Sweden or Switzerland . 
7 Ibid., p . 748. 
8 Ibid ., p . 10. 
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1,695 billions of income can produce 196 million middle class , then I 
billion of income produces 196/1,695 , and the Federal Republic of 
Germany with 447 billions of income must have 447 x 196/1,695 = 52 
million middle class. 
The defect of this way of doing the calculation is apparent. The 
right way is to duplicate country by country and over time the proce-
dures used by Mollie Orshansky for the United States. Some variation 
in the minimum standard of living according to the requirements and 
prices of the country would be accepted . Fortunately, the conclusions 
that are to be drawn are robust in relation to the method of measure-
ment. 
Over time we might identify the increase of the middle class with 
that of the GDP for the world as a whole, supposing that no great 
change in distribution has taken place. The U.N. index is 48 for 1960 
and 110 for 1977, an average annual increase of GDP of 5%. 9 Passenger 
motor vehicles in use were increasing at 5. 7% during the years 1968-77, 
but this seems too high for net additions to the middle class. Averaging 
with other material suggests somewhat under 5% as the annual rate of 
increase of the middle class over the past 30 years. 
The important matter is that a similar calculation gives 200 million 
for the middle class of 1950. The entry of Europe and Japan, plus some 
progress in the Third World , was what brought the total to 800 million 
by 1980. Progress can be indicated by the 20 million per year of average 
addition to the middle class. If the same amount of progress is occur-
ring now as in the years 1950-80, then each year 20 million new en-
trants have been joining the middle class. The world population in-
creases at about 75 million per year, so if 20 million of the increment 
are comfortable, then 55 million are poor (table 2). 
The figures are to be taken as illustrative or hypothetical only; 
among other gaps, we do not have any record of births and deaths 
TABLE 2 
WORLD POPULATION AND ITS DIVISION INTO PooR AND MIDDLE CLASS (in Millions) ; 
ILLUSTRATIVE NUMBERS 
Middle 
Poor Class Total 
1950.. . ..... . .. . ... .. . . . ..... . . . 2,300 200 2,500 
1980 ..... . ... . . .... . . . . . . .. .. .. . 3,600 800 4,400 
Increase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,300 600 1,900 
Increase in the year 1980 . . . . . . . . . 55 20 75 
In middle-class families . . . . . .. .. . 6 
New middle class . .. . . . . . .. . .... . 14 
9 Ibid. 
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according to whether the person is poor or middle class. The 6 million 
children (strictly the net addition, i.e., children born less deaths) born 
per year into middle-class families have in practice the best chance to 
be middle class, and the remainder of the 20 million are somehow 
chosen around the world from among both the rich and the poor coun-
tries. 
This accounting is optimistic in various ways. It assumes that the 
economic advance of 1950--80 is continuing and will apply to 1980--81. 
The pace of absolute real income gain in the early 1980s is probably less 
than the average of 1950--80, and (omitting oil) the part of the increase 
obtained by the poor countries in the present time of disarray could 
well be less than it was in a time of more widespread prosperity. 
Hollis Chenery has published calculations of the poor population 
of the world, using a more austere definition than mine. to Thus he finds 
only 59% of the population in poverty in Indonesia, 55% in Uganda, 
43% in Pakistan, and 46% in India. His basis is the 2,150 calories per 
person, emergence from sheer hunger, in India; other countries are 
taken at the point in their income distribution corresponding approxi-
mately to the forty-sixth percentile of the Indian population. t 1 My 
purpose is different; it is to see how large a fraction enjoys something 
like middle-class high-energy consumption-typically that drives an 
automobile, has a refrigerator, watches television. My basis being the 
U.S. standard of Jiving, it of course gives larger proportions in poverty 
in less-developed countries. 
Production 
Being middle class is not a matter of consumption alone; certain kinds 
of work are middle class and other kinds (like being a peasant, even a 
rich one) are not. Office work at a salary that permits owning a car and 
an adequately equipped house is the ideal; if the salary does not permit 
buying a car, then obtaining one as a perquisite of office will do. The 
boundary of the middle class does not coincide with that of nonmanual 
workers. With contemporary wage scales in advanced countries and in 
some less developed ones, manual and nonmanual wages converge so 
that all can aspire to middle-class style. 
Middle-class workers seek to avoid the hazards of entrepre-
neurship. The hurly-burly of the early Ford or Carnegie epoch is no 
longer the ideal either in its native America or abroad. Much better is 
the job of senior administrator, working according to fixed rules and 
understandings within a framework of law, with no personal capital at 
stake. Next in desirability to a job in government, and paying better, is 
10 Hollis B. Chenery et al., Redistribution with Growth (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1974), p. 460. 
11 Ibid., p. 459. 
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being hired by a multinational corporation. Once again there is nothing 
in common between the work life of the Thai or Nigerian local execu-
tive of Exxon and the life of its founder, Rockefeller. 
If the multinationals have access nearly everywhere, despite so 
many words said so loudly against them, it is partly because their kind 
of steady operation, with administratively determined salary scales and 
relatively fixed hours of work, is understandable and gratifying. They 
are seen as offering the right kind of jobs to the right kind of people. 
The entry of such cultural preferences into the work world creates 
a difficulty. The kind of work people like to do, and which they some-
how manage to get jobs doing, diverges from the kind of work that 
produces the goods on which collectively they want to spend their 
salaries. In a competitive economy this is no problem: the total pro-
duction of all concerns is bought by the total of their employees, or by 
outsiders; any concern that produces things no one wants goes out of 
business and its employees look for other jobs. But the government 
employee may be engaged in administering the collection of taxes, or 
the organization of cooperatives, or the country's foreign policy. These 
activities make little contribution to producing the groceries he seeks to 
buy at the supermarket or the plumbing fixtures for his new house. This 
lack of congruence between what the person wants to spend his work-
time doing, and the sorts of goods he wants to spend his salary on, 
could well be the subject of economic study. Elaborate 5-year plans 
involving heavy government expenditure provide little protection 
against the lack of congruence to which noncompetitive elements in 
every economy are subject, and that seems to be a special hazard of the 
LDCs. 
Relief of Poverty versus a New Culture 
Those sponsoring development, whether in the poor countries as ac-
tors, or in rich countries as observers, do not describe the process as 
the preceding paragraphs have done. They see its objective as the relief 
of poverty, the lessening of hunger and sickness, the spread of educa-
tion. It is of course all of these things, as well as the creation and spread 
of a social group that we call middle class, and this last aspect is 
stressed here only because it has elsewhere received so little attention. 
For Robert McNamara, development is a twofold task: "to accelerate 
economic growth and to eradicate absolute poverty." 12 The two are 
not the same. Growth in the form of an expanding middle class is 
consistent with an increasing number of poor. 
Of course the middle-class way by itself is relief of poverty for 
12 Robert S. McNamara, Address to the Board of Governors (Washington, D.C.: 
World Bank, September 30, 1980), p. 44. 
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some. Those who have gained entry into it do have enough to eat, are 
well clothed, have adequate medical services, can read and write. Yet 
this relief of poverty seems to be incidental. For if adequate food and 
clothing, basic medical services, and literacy were the main objectives 
of development it would go on in a very different way from that now 
pursued. Brazil's national income per capita of $1,400 could provide 
these amenities for every one of its 120 million inhabitants. Yet in fact 
the majority of its inhabitants, and conspicuously those in the north-
east, lack these altogether, while others in the south have them and 
much more-television sets, automobiles, air conditioning. After 30 
years of formal development effort in 75 countries we can infer the 
objective of the process from actual observation. As much as anything 
it is the diffusion of the artifacts that support a certain way of life, and 
in a poor country only a minority can benefit. 
While the particular culture of the middle class belongs to the 
second half of the twentieth century, the idea of an urban industrial 
group with incomes far higher than their rural contemporaries goes 
back much farther. Adam Smith saw development as taking place in 
the measure in which material capital accumulated in cities. With each 
increment of city capital some jobs would be created. A new textile 
factory, or pin-making concern, or steel mill could offer wages high 
enough to attract people from the countryside. Until the call to city 
employment came from a productive enterprise, the peasant would 
remain in his ancestral village, doing what he and his forebears had 
been doing since time immemorial, in a static society that was no 
burden to urban industry. 
But Adam Smith's path of development is out of ideological favor 
now, replaced by an alternative offered in its clearest form by Mao Ze-
dong. On this equalitarian pattern, which is indeed the relief of pov-
erty, everyone would go up at the same time. It would not be a matter 
of a few joining the middle class each year, but rather of everyone in 
the country having a small increase of income each year. 
The difference in the distribution of the increment of income be-
tween the two ways of doing development appears conspicuously in 
the physical accoutrements. On the equalitarian path, instead of a few 
having automobiles in the early stages, everyone would have a bicycle. 
Instead of college for a few, everyone would learn to read and write. 
Instead of rags for most and Arrow shirts for a few, all would wear neat 
and sturdy, if not very elegant, clothing. Corresponding differences 
would appear in medical services, in diets, in housing, in entertain-
ment. China offers the best example on the one side, Brazil on the 
other. 
Of course, the two routes of development can end up at the same 
place. If 2% of the original population enter the middle class each year 
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and have five times their original income, then at the end of 50 years all 
would have been relieved of poverty. If the income of everyone goes 
up by I 0% of its original value each year, then at the end of 50 years all 
have fivefold their predevelopment incomes. But though the end point 
may be the same, the trajectory is different, and on any criterion more 
humane in the Mao Ze-dong model. It is praised even by those whose 
policies lead in a different direction. 
Middle-class living is a rounded entity, a lump that seems unstable 
piecemeal. Those who obtain some part of it want the rest quickly; they 
are not willing to be held back by the slow pace that making all of their 
fellow citizens middle class at the same time would require. Each ele-
ment brings a demand for the next. One who obtains a transistor radio 
wants to move up to a television set. A kind of standard package is in 
everyone's mind-including a home, automobile, and the means to do 
some traveling; within the house must be electric lighting, a re-
frigerator, and a television set. One can imagine people being satisfied 
to slow down their progress once they have these facilities and allow 
the rest of the country to catch up, but not before. Lower-level sub-
stitutes are unsatisfactory; for those who are well started on this path a 
bicycle or even a motor scooter will not do for transport, nor will the 
services of a barefoot doctor be acceptable. 
The consolidation of the less equitable form of development is 
furthered by the institution of the family; the man who has made it to 
the good life will do everything possible to ensure that his sons have 
access to the same. The means to do so vary from regime to regime; in 
the Soviet Union one cannot pass on stocks and bonds or a house in the 
suburbs to his sons, but one can exercise influence over his education 
and subsequent employment. 
Temporary Inequality May Be the Only Way 
Does the phenomenon of unequal development occur in a free market, 
or is it the result of governments determining the kinds of goods that 
are produced and the kinds of jobs provided? That Adam Smith first 
described this route of development may suggest that it mainly takes 
place in the free market he recommended, but we cannot be sure. 
Comparisons of income distribution between places like Hong Kong, 
where market freedom prevails, with directed economies like the 
Soviet Union or Cambodia, show inequality produced by government 
no less than by the market. 
That the tendency to inequality is strong was noted in China, 
where Mao warned of the danger, giving the Soviet Union as an exam-
ple to be avoided. The Cultural Revolution was the crowning expres-
sion of the view that the masses can do everything. Statistics are 
needed, but not specialized statisticians-everyone can get into the 
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counting. Forecasting of earthquakes can be provided by the masses, 
each making observations near his own house with rudimentary in-
struments, or watching the behavior of animals. City youth must live at 
least a year or two with the rural masses. 
Yet even China during the last few years has relaxed its insistence 
that city youth must spend time in the countryside, or that higher 
education and research wait until poverty has been relieved. However, 
the reversal did not take place until arrangements had been made for 
the equitable distribution of food, for adequate clothing allowances, 
and for some kind of minimal medical service for all. 
This paper cannot describe the deep social forces that everywhere 
support the unequal pattern of development. It is not enough to say 
that the mass media, including films, have taught that there is a certain 
way to live, and everyone wants it. That they want it would not suffice 
to explain why the Indian factory manager can get it, while more 
numerous peasants go to bed hungry, when the latter can outvote the 
former by 50 to one. It can only be that even in democracies the levers 
of power are in the hands of the middle class, which determines the 
policies that make the cities grow and the countryside wilt. Thus sub-
ways often come ahead of irrigation schemes, new housing in prefer-
ence to grading up squatters' colonies. Insofar as the subways will 
make life easier for city people, they increase the city populations. 
Incentives to Rural-Urban Migration 
This tendency of the middle class perpetually to enlarge itself acts in 
various ways to increase the city populations. Harris and Todaro, 
Henry Rempel, and others regard the city poor as queued up to enter 
the protected labor market, which would make them middle class or 
close to it. I would add that the city attracts people because it is so 
visibly the place where important things are going on. Its boulevards 
and great buildings symbolize the nation, the major social organization 
of our age. If people have a chance of becoming middle class any-
where, it is here. 
Whatever expands city facilities, or lowers the price of foodstuffs, 
increases the size of the city . Numerous economic measures provide 
material support to life in the city. We can even suggest a positive 
feedback that results from legislation and administrative action. The 
price of rice is, in many countries, fixed well below the world market 
(translated at a true foreign exchange rate) , and a law requires peasants 
to deliver some part of their crop at this price. Officials go into the 
countryside to execute the procurement. The unpleasantness and ac-
tual loss contribute to causing some of the peasants to leave and go to 
the city. That increases the need for foodstuffs, including rice, in the 
city , so that the procurement activity is intensified; the result is to 
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discourage more peasants, and so on. Where the countryside is over-
populated such feedback can build up city populations rapidly. 
One might think that rather than positive feedback there would be 
an equilibrium point in migration. In a crowded countryside, when 
some people have left, the remainder should be able to make a better 
living. When enough have left, the living should be equal to what 
migrants could get by going to the city, and at that equilibrium point 
migration should stop. One reason it does not, as Alfred Marshall 
pointed out a long time ago (quoted by Lipton), is that there is selection 
on who comes to the city; while empirical studies show mixed results, 
on the whole those who come are better educated, and have more 
initiative .13 Thus their departure does not make things better but 
worse; this I call positive feedback, and Myrdal and Lipton, cumula-
tive causation. From Szentes we have the "pulling-out of manpower 
from the 'traditional' economies which deprives the latter of the most 
able-bodied young male labour, needed for the physically hard work in 
agriculture." 14 
Notwithstanding overpopulation, we can imagine policies that 
would discourage internal migration. For one measure, taxes to pro-
vide urban services could be levied on urban real estate rather than 
coming out of the national budget. Inputs to agriculture could be sub-
sidized. Some effort is made in this direction, but it is not enough. The 
right way to consider the cost of fertilizer is not in terms of nominal 
subsidies, but the amount of rice or wheat required to buy a pound of 
typical fertilizer mix. Lipton reports that in developed Japan farmers 
received 1.43 times as much for a kilo of paddy as they paid for a kilo of 
fertilizer, while in nine poor countries of Southeast Asia the ratios 
ranged from 0.96 (South Korea) to 0.12 (Burma), averaging around 
0.4 . 15 
An effect similar to subsidies would be obtained by better prices 
for farm outputs. Aside from the compulsory procurement at 
government-established low prices in Burma and many other coun-
tries, governments often make market purchases at harvest time in 
what amounts to a forced sale, as the farmer is pressed by debtors and 
unable to hold his crop for more favorable markets. On the other side, 
the inputs to industry bought abroad tend to be artificially cheapened, 
most commonly by overvaluation of the local currency. Even if capital 
13 Michael Lipton, Why Poor People Stay Poor: Urban Bias in World Dei·elopment 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977), p. 376. 
14 Tamas Szentes, "Unemployment, Miseducation , Wasteful Utilization of Human 
Resources, Widening Income Gap and Rural Marginalization-as the Inherent Structural 
Defects of Periphery Economies Dominated by International Capitalism" (paper deliv-
ered at the Sixth World Congress of the International Economic Association, Mexico 
City , 1980). 
15 Lipton, p. 292. 
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goods are cheapened equally to the farmer and the urban industrialist, 
there is a bias, for capital is a more important part of the productive 
process in the city. Credit in the city is more available and cheaper than 
in the countryside. And the output of industry is made more expensive 
by tariffs, as well as by trade unionization of employees (practically 
impossible for peasants) and by monopoly practices permitted by the 
limited number of establishments. 
Such are the policies that improve the lot of city people and so 
incidentally increase city sizes. They help explain the perversity of 
urbanization, in which a Mexico City of 12 million or Cairo of9 million 
are likely to double by the end of the century. Most of the newcomers 
to the city are queuing in the hope of ultimately landing in middle-class 
jobs. Those who have already attained such jobs and are in power may 
not be directly trying to expand their numbers, but it is hard for them to 
avoid doing so. For one thing, the urban amenities that they 
introduce-roads, local transport, and schools-are available in some 
degree to the poor. The elite cannot make the city better for themselves 
without in some degree making it better for the newcomers, and so 
encouraging further newcomers. They could of course forcibly prevent 
migration, or expel existing migrants, and this has been tried in Mos-
cow, Jakarta, and elsewhere, but by and large has not been successful. 
An exception is Pnom Penh of the late 1970s, where extreme violence 
deurbanized rapidly. 
The masses in the capital city are physically close enough to the 
government to communicate their wishes, as those of Cairo did 2 years 
ago when they forced the government to cancel its increase of food 
prices. Such an increase would have helped the peasant and dis-
couraged migration, but the political forces in place did not permit it. In 
the same way the housing problem is constituted by the pressure of 
those within the city for middle-class accommodation at something 
below the equilibrium price. Governments cannot always resist the 
very reasonable demands of their employees and other members of the 
protected segment of the labor force for decent places to live. And with 
wages insufficient to buy premises, with no private mortgage market at 
affordable rates of interest, the government often intervenes and builds 
houses with funds that could equally have gone to rural roads, schools, 
irrigation works, latrines, or other rural investment. As a seeming 
irony, poor villagers are asked to build these things voluntarily, under 
community development schemes. Yet the argument for community 
development is strong: it makes use of otherwise unemployed people. 
Local transport within the city is often government run. The costs 
of the buses it imports, and the fares it charges, are public matters, and 
very much the business of administrators and legislators. They tend to 
set the custom duties on imported vehicles and the fares charged, so as 
to hold down the cost of transport to users. They do not always set the 
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fares high enough for even their low-cost imported buses , and when the 
bus operations make a loss it is covered from general revenues, which 
means in some part from the rural sector. The middle class may not 
partake directly of this benefit , since it uses its own cars. But the 
middle class benefits indirectly from reducing transport within the city 
for subordinate office and factory workers on whom the middle class 
depends. 
Other public utilities run by government at a loss even more 
clearly favor the middle class. Electricity is largely used by them, in 
their homes, offices, or factories; even less of it is available to the 
peasant than of the subsidized bus transport. The view has been that 
industry needs protection more than agriculture, that manufactured 
exports are better than farm exports, that agriculture's decreasing re-
turns justify removing resources to help industries giving increasing 
returns. That city-oriented capitalist farming is better than village-
oriented peasant farming was said in early nineteenth-century Brit-
ain.16 Szentes speaks of " the heavy bias of the whole pattern of trans-
port facilities, market institutions, banking and credit system, etc . and 
of the consumers ' demand, too, against the ' traditional ' sector and its 
products.' ' 1 7 
The need for food supplies to permit the town people to engage in 
manufacturing was accepted by all the classics: thus Smith says , " ... 
it is the surplus produce of the country only, or what is over and above 
the maintenance of the cultivators, that constitutes the subsistence of 
the town , which can therefore increase only with the increase of the 
surplus produce." 18 For Cantillon, " ... towns are limited by the 
product of the lands owned by the landowners who live there , net of 
transport costs ." 19 
Holding the price of grain down is not the way to increase the 
supply. Investment in agriculture is called for. Szcaepanik shows that 
the gross marginal capital/output ratios for 1960-65 are very much 
higher for nonagricultural than for agricultural investment. Thus the 
capital required per unit of income for countryside and city, re-
spectively , in three typical countries is: 20 
16 Ibid., p. 93. 
17 Szentes. 
Philippines ..... . .. . 
Sudan .. . ...... ... . 
Tanzania ....... .. . . 
18 Lipton , p. 94. 









20 United Nations, FAO Monthly Bulletin (Rome : Food and Agricultural Organiza-
tion of the United Nations, 1969), p. 2. 
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There are a few observations in the F AO table in which the opposite 
appears, but on the whole the capital required to produce a given 
amount of income is more than double in industry what it is in agricul-
ture. For all countries with data the average is 1.7 for rural and 3.9 for 
urban. 
Some of these points are now being recognized, and efforts are 
being made on behalf of agricultural output. The efforts tend to be 
guided by city people; the passive elements of the peasantry are not 
expected to take the initiative. The Mexican government is investing a 
good deal in modernization, and it is stressing the use of machinery. "If 
W5! do not mechanize our countryside we run grave risks . . . to 
mechanize the farm is an urgent task," runs the official message, re-
iterated on television and in the press. The man with the bullock is no 
longer portrayed as a romantic figure, but one to be replaced by a 
tractor operator, with backing by soil chemists, agronomists, irrigation 
specialists, and bankers ready to advance rural credit. All this will 
indeed provide employment, but for specialists and not for the masses 
in the countryside. It will produce a surplus available for sale abroad 
and to the cities of Mexico, but will in no way inhibit movement to the 
city-indeed, in the degree to which it is successful in converting to 
large-scale agriculture it could accelerate the move to the city. 
Here much depends on the patterns of consumption and residence 
of the new classes in the rural areas. If the tractor operator and the soil 
chemist live in the city and commute to the rural area, or if they live in 
the village but use their new incomes on city goods, following the 
middle-class pattern of life described in preceding pages, then un-
employment in the countryside will be greater than ever, and cityward 
migration will continue and even accelerate. If they use their incomes 
on domestic retainers and live like the caciques of tradition, or if they 
adopt the style of the traditional English squire so that each of the new 
farmers has 10 or 20 servants, then the countryside will be able to hold 
its people. But in fact no one expects this. The new agricultural pro-
ducers want automobiles, refrigerators, and television sets. One fears 
that the present policy, sound as it is from the balance-of-payments 
viewpoint, will do little to check urbanization. The one measure that 
will help in this regard is Mexico's recent removal of the 5% export tax 
on certain agricultural products. 
T. W. Schultz has more than once criticized the patronizing view 
that peasants are not very capable or adaptable, so that they need 
regulating, and even then not too much is to be expected of them. He 
demonstrates that they are in fact very quick to respond to price in-
centives, and the trouble with agriculture in most LDCs is that the 
price incentives are not set in such a way as to elicit more output. 
In few fields does the middle-class urban bias reveal itself as 
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clearly as in education. In the first place, most schools above the pri-
mary level are in cities, and the ordinary peasant's children stand little 
chance of attending. The disparity in numbers of secondary schools 
between rural and urban areas is matched by some disparity in the 
quality of instruction. Moreover, the primary schools that are now to 
be found everywhere in the developing world, and which are attended 
at least long enough for most peasant children to learn to read and 
write, have little to do with peasant life. Rather than being planned to 
make better farmers, they serve as a selection device, by which ability 
is discovered and sent to secondary school, usually in the city; it is not 
wholly wrong to think of rural elementary schools as a vast selective 
mechanism that combs the countryside for ability that will be of use to 
the city. 
Arguments for Inequality 
Is it possible that creating a middle-class enclave, and allowing that to 
expand until it covers the country, and then the world, is still the 
efficient way to eliminate poverty? There are many ways of arguing 
that it is. One of these is the demographic argument: to raise the poor a 
little bit at a time, which is all that one could do with the resources 
available, would only encourage childbearing, at the same time as it 
increases the survivors among children born. Only when people make a 
quantum leap into the middle class do they control their childbearing. 
This crude argument does not take into account the spectacular fall in 
the birthrate in equalitarian China and Ceylon, but it is not without 
proponents. 
An analogous argument applies to saving and the accumulation of 
physical capital. If increases in production go to the poor majority of 
the population, necessarily in small amounts, they will only add to 
consumption. The family that is on the edge of starvation does not save 
any appreciable part of its marginal increase of income. Hence confin-
ing the initial benefits of the development process to a minority, each of 
whom obtains substantial increase of income, will enable a larger part 
of the increment of income to be saved. Again a crude argument, but 
one that has appeared in print before this. 
It may also be said that if full development is the ultimate objec-
tive, then it is physically more economical to provide it for a small part 
of the population and then spread out, rather than provide a little bit at 
a time for all. For different artifacts and methods of production are 
involved. If automobiles are the ultimately satisfactory means of trans-
port, then why start by making millions of bicycles? Better to make a 
few automobiles, and build up the organization and skills; it will be 
easier to expand later than to convert from bicycles. To carry the 
argument further, to produce more food along present lines is to ex-
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pand the peasant sector, which cannot be development, since it has 
been going on for centuries. Better start up new lines of activity in 
manufacturing, which will then later tum out tractors and other ag-
ricultural implements, and transform agriculture to the way it must 
ultimately be. 
Another reason for depriving the peasant and arranging tariffs, 
exchange rates, utility prices, and taxes so as to favor city industry is 
that extreme encouragement is necessary if the new enterprises are to 
start at all . Imperial Germany's tariffs protected her infant industry 
against that of England. Japan has used even more drastic kinds of 
protection and continued them long after she had attained preeminent 
manufacturing efficiency. In the early days of development import 
permits in many countries were allocated to members of the govern-
ment and businessmen, with the aim of stimulating them to secondary 
processing. They often merely sold the import permits and used the 
proceeds for consumption. Even while this was occurring the govern-
ment thought that the process was worthwhile, in that it provided the 
funds for the formation of an indigenous bourgeoisie. It failed to note 
that someone who gets rich by trading import permits is not likely to 
put his gains into a difficult and risky productive enterprise; as he 
earned his fortune-by his influence on government-so he will try to 
add to it. 
Explanation Rather Than Policy Guidance 
The number of middle-class people in the world was about 200 million 
in 1950; it has grown to about 800 million by 1980. The growth was so 
rapid that it has pressed on oil and other resources. It was too rapid, in 
that it has not given time for the technological progress that will sub-
stitute for the materials that are running short, as Britain was able to 
substitute coal for firewood at the slower pace of the eighteenth cen-
tury. 
Yet from the viewpoint of those waiting to join the middle class, 
growth was much too slow. The world population went from 2.5 billion 
to 4.4 billion during 30 years. It is true that the increase of the middle 
class was nearly 5% per annum, which seems very rapid indeed com-
pared with the population's 1.8%. But percentages are not what count, 
and it looks as though each year something like 20 million people are 
added to the middle class, and two or three times that number to the 
poor. To recognize only one category-the whole population-and 
measure progress by per capita figures of GNP gives a picture that by 
itself is less satisfactory than the two-class model, even when the num-
bers are as crude as these are. 
The present paper stands back from development and refrains 
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from offering policy advice, at the same time that it tries to look at it 
from a point of view closer to the experience of the citizen undergoing 
the process than to that of the expert. The citizen of poor countries 
under any political regime sees development as the advent of goods 
that make possible a modem style of life. For the typical urban dweller 
development is what will enable him to have a pukka house with elec-
tric appliances, including a refrigerator and television set; above all an 
automobile; and that will enable him to send his children to college so 
that the social ascent will not have been for himself alone but for his 
whole line of children and grandchildren. The goods are , of course, 
useful for themselves, but they are above all symbols that one has 
attained a certain status. Middle-class status may be something that the 
vanguard of Americans are increasingly indifferent to, but it retains 
novelty and glamor in the poor countries of the world. 
This wish of people for middle-class status is an engine of 
development-it can induce acceptance of the hard work and absti-
nence that development requires. Yet it is not a readily manipulated 
policy variable, like a tariff or the rate of interest or some other lever in 
the hands of a government. The object of this paper is not to reveal 
some easy way by which development can be brought about but to 
make it look as difficult on paper as it apparently is in reality. Rather 
than add further policy advice, I have tried to build a framework that 
will show why excellent policy advice is disregarded. Thus, reaching 
for middle-class status is an explanatory rather than a policy variable. 
It tells us why government has grown, why cities have expanded, why 
poor countries aim to produce automobiles rather than bicycles, why 
the import of consumption goods is everywhere so large an element in 
the balance of payments. 
Other articles in this issue discuss questions of aid and trade, 
provide models for the analysis of tax policies, take up questions of 
capital and labor, examine the several levels of technology, and make 
statements about the path of development in economic and technologi-
cal terms. They are oriented to policy, to finding the variables and the 
relations among the variables that will give the policymaker a handle on 
the things he wants to influence, and principally speeding up the rise of 
the Gross National Product. 
The Empirical Study of Development 
When development as a conscious and controllable process came on 
the scene in the 1950s one was free to hold to any ideal one wished 
about its course. Much of the early writing on the subject was 
normative-how development ought to take place. But a quarter cen-
tury of experience has placed some constraints on our thinking, in the 
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form of facts on how the process has gone .. Sometimes these facts are 
summarized by saying that development has been disappointingly 
slow: poverty still persists, and because of the rate of population in-
crease, is numerically greater than it was at mid~century. Yet from 
another point of view the process has been a great success. Within each 
of the poor countries there is an expanding middle-class enclave. We 
need to observe more closely the social mechanisms that cause the 
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